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Vesely, Laurent W. Doctorate of Philosophy, Purdue University. August 2016. After the 
Honeymoon: the Obama Effect on Political Attitudes and Participation. Major Professor: 
James McCann.  
 
My dissertation takes a mixed-methods approach to investigating the possibility of a 
lasting Obama Effect on the political attitudes and behaviors of 2008 Obama supporters. 
Defining the Obama Effect as the extraordinary enthusiasm surrounding the 2008 Obama 
campaign, I argue that a short term Obama Effect was clearly present in 2008 based on 
  	
 		   and ability to inspire volunteerism, as 
well as on the historic nature of his candidacy. However, my quantitative analysesbuilt 
upon panel survey data from the American National Election Studiessuggest little 
evidence of lasting campaign effects that were positive and/or unique to Obama 
supporters. With regard to attitudes and behaviors such as political interest, political 
efficacy, or attendance of political events, Obama supporters often showed relative 
declines or stagnation over time when compared to nonsupporters or supporters of 
previous presidents. Conversely, my qualitative analysisbased upon interviews with 30 
former campaign volunteersrevealed many different manifestations of a lasting Obama 
Effect on campaign volunteers. Many former Obama volunteers remained highly 
xii 
 
interested, civically engaged, and continually inspired as a result of their involvement in 
the 2008 Obama campaign. In sum, I find little evidence of the transformational Obama 
Effect on the broader electorate, but strong evidence of a lasting and positive Obama 
Effect on many of his most enthusiastic supporters. 
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campaign. Obama had become well-known within political circles after his keynote 
address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, but, prior to that speech, had been 
an obscure Illinois state senator with negligible name recognition nationally. Having been 
in Washington only 2 years, he ranked among the least-powerful senators and had 
garnered few legislative accomplishments. As late as October 22, 2006, he was still 
making Shermanesque statements to Tim Russert on Meet the Press, clearly stating his 













any executive experience. Are you ready to be president? 
 
Obama: 2  3 + fl &ffi (flff( "& ff( fl  fi&"ff fl (+
president. You know, ultimately, I trust the judgment of the American people that, 
in any election, they sort it through. And we have a long and rigorous process, 
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Will you serve your full six-















Obama: I will serve out my full six-year term. You know, Tim, if you get asked 
enough, sooner or later you get weary and you start looking for new ways of 
saying things, but my thinking has not changed.
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Russert: So you will not run for president or vice president in 2008? 
 
Obama: I will not. 
 
As it so happened, by February 2007, tremendous encouragement from his 
supporters had persuaded Senator Obama to throw his hat into the ring. Yet nobody 
believed his nomination to be a foregone conclusion. From the beginning, Senator Hillary 
Clinton was widely considered by pollsters and by the national press to be the prohibitive 
frontrunner. She would, in fact, maintain a dominant lead in national polls over the rest of 
the Democratic primary field all throughout 2007. As   	
   
October:  
Clinton has led the Democratic pack in every Gallup Poll conducted between 
November 2006 and October 2007. For most of this time, Clinton has led Obama 
by a double-		 	
 	






     ff
ff ff fifl-14. Gallup polling on Democratic 
nominations going back to the 1972 election shows that, by historical standards, a 
lead of even 20 points is large for Democratic candidates. (Newport et al. 2007) 
 
ffi
	   






 his budding 
support base was undeniable. In 2012, a year after I had decided to write my dissertation 
on the Obama Effect, an eponymous film was released by Charles Dutton. In The Obama 





























Obama campaign placards, and embarks on a nearly 2-year crusade in which every aspect 
of his life becomes devoted to the singular mission of converting new Obama supporters 












   	 	        ign outside 
his house, in hopes that he will be left alone at least until Election Day draws nearer.       
	    ff fi    fl  	ffi 	   
     fi    !fi  	       
 
candidacy. He was, after all, the first African-American candidate with a serious chance 
of winning a major party nomination, let alone the presidency. His future running mate, 
Joe Biden, was even criticized for his spontaneous remarks on Obama entering the race: 
 	 fl  ffi"     
 	 	 #
 #	  $    fi 
and clean and a nice-%  &  	 fl ffi   %fl 	& '   ! fi fl 
 
apologizing and clarifying that he meant no offense to his friend and competitor, Biden 
(then a 35-   "   
   (  )   fi    	 * +% 	 
probably the most exciting candidate that the Democratic or Republican Party has 





rett 2007, emphasis mine). 
The Obama campaign made every effort to capitalize on both the positive 
coverage and the bright spotlight. In his announcement speech, on February 10, 2007, 
Obama effectively cast himself as a transformative figure, needed at that exact moment in 










































































































American candidate presenting himself as someone who could once again bring together 
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a nation exhausted and seemingly divided by unending war, overridden with hyper-






	    
agency and mobilization: 
 
	       -Illinois 
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  
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   ff 
     fi  flflffi  
argued, as politicians often do, that this particular election was especially important and 
critical. But it would not be good enough, Obama claimed, for the thousands in the 
crowds to simply vote on Election Day and then again in four years. His campaign and 
presidency would be designed to serve as a grassroots vehicle that would allow the 
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 flfl
 "  	  fi    
  fl 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
	 ffi   gave people to understand that 
through his presidency, his supporters would be empowered,even more so than 
registered lobbyists and special interest groups, he was fond of promising,to create for 
fl+  	 fi  flfi 
ffi
 
Over the yearlong-plus campaign to follow, more than a few political observers 
would come to criticize the Obama Effect. National Review editor Rich Lowry (2008), 
for example, poked fun at Obama supporters for appearing to pre-anoint the relatively 
unaccomplished Illinois Senator as the reincarnation of John F. Kennedy. Arch-
conservative firebrand radio host Rush Limbaugh (2008) sneered aloud at the notion that 
several Obama supporters had actually fainted in his presence from too much excitement. 


























the supporter enthusiasm 
   
   
 
 was both asinine and 
undeserved.  
However, for the Obama campaign, this agency-based approach proved to be a 
remarkable success in terms of supporter recruitment and mobilization. By many 
measures, such as primary election turnout, general election turnout, overall fundraising, 
small-donor fundraising, grassroots volunteerism, and the historic nature of the candidacy 
itself, the 2008 Obama candidacy inspired a level of enthusiasm unprecedented in 
modern presidential campaigns. And it proved to make all the difference, electorally 
speaking.  
The Obama Effect in the 2008 Primary 
 The 30.2% of eligible voters who participated in the 2008 presidential primaries 
represented the highest rate of turnout since the direct primary system was implemented 
by both major parties in 1972. Almost every state in the Union shattered its previous 














despite highly competitive races for both Party no 
   
  
votes#19.3%#were cast in the Democratic Primary. Only 10.8% chose to vote in the 
Republican Primary. For recent comparison: the previous two open Democratic races in 
2004 and 1992 had witnessed turnout rates of 9.7% and 12.6%, respectively. Similarly, 
the previous two open Republican races in 2000 and 1996 had produced turnout rates of 
10.1% and 9.8%, respectively. One must go back to 1980 to find a combined-party 
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primary turnout rate above 26% of eligible voters, and back to 1976 to find a single-party 
primary turnout rate higher than 16% (Gans 2008). 
  	
           
Democrats and Republicansone that would persist throughout the general election 
seasonto the Obama Effect. Other major factors that likely contributed to driving up 
 	    ff	   fi fl	  ffi
campaign as the first major female candidate for president, the determinedly low 
approval ratings of sitting Republican President George W. Bush, the weakening national 
economy, and the increasing unpopularity of the War in Iraq. (Only the Democratic 
candidates were calling for troop withdrawal.)  
Despite a possible convergence of several factors, once the Democratic primary 
voting began, the undeniably unique reality of the Obama Effect came into clear focus. 
On January 3, 2008, Obama received a stunning 38% support from caucus-goers in the 
first-in-the-nation Iowa caucus. John Edwards followed with 30%, with Hillary Clinton 
receiving 29%. Although Obama was favored to win, the wide margin was a major 
surprise to pollsters and the national press. The average of the six polls conducted the 
week prior placed him at 30.8%, less than 2 points ahead of his closest rival, and not a 
single poll had him above 34% (Real Clear Politics 2008). In fact, many prognosticators 
  
 
ffi  fi 	   fi
-time caucus-goers would 
underperform turnout expectations (due to the time-consuming nature of caucus-going 
      	
!" #

    fi
 
ffi
Iowa caucus victory was a widely-recognized affirmation of the extraordinary enthusiasm 
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surrounding his campaign, that is, the Obama Effect. Once the voting began, nobody 
could deny that it was a very unique and a very real phenomenon.  
 Clinton rebounded by defeating Obama 39-36 in the New Hampshire primary a 
week later; however, on January 26, Obama regained his momentum with a landslide 55-
27 victory over her in the South Carolina primary. He was widely regarded as the favorite 
   	
   
      		 	 	
newfound frontrunner status by dominating the Illinois, Georgia, and Alabama primaries 
and by winning with supermajorities in each of the caucus states that voted that day: 
Colorado, Minnesota, Kansas, Idaho, Alaska, and North Dakota. Over the next few 
weeks, his momentum continued with huge victories in Washington State, Nebraska, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Washington D.C., Virginia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin. By the 
time Clinton recovered to win the March and April primaries in Ohio, Texas, and 
Pennsylvania, Obama had already opened up a nearly insurmountable delegate lead, 
giving him a clear pat



















The Obama Effect in the 2008 General Election 
The November 4, 2008, election cycle produced a higher rate of voter turnout%
about 58% of the voting-age public%than in any United States election since 1968. For 
recent comparison, the 2012 presidential campaigns produced a voter turnout rate below 
55% of eligible voters. Despite a voting-age population increase of roughly 10 million 
between the 2008 and 2012 elections, more people overall voted in the 2008 presidential 



















considerable accomplishments in the Senate, the heightened electoral participation in 
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many commentators observed that the Republican Party tended to nominate the logical 
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  %& Bush), and John 
McCain was simply and clearly next in line, as the candidate who had lost to George W. 
Bush in the 2000 Republican Primary.  
Attributing the higher-than-usual turnout at least in part to the Obama Effect 
instead of a McCain effect also makes sense in light of the proportion of the vote received 
 '( ff 	
(  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of the national popular vote received by any candidate since George H.W. Bush in 1988. 
Obama received nearly 70 million votes, about 10% more than George W. Bush had 
received in the previous election cycle of 2004 (Peters and Woolley 2012).  
It was also noteworthy that Obama won every swing state in the 2008 general 
election besides Missouri. His 365 Electoral College votes represented the highest total 
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 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ditional blue states or even traditional 
swing states; he was able to expand the electoral playing field even into traditionally red 
states (Nagourney and Zeleny 2008). North Carolina wound up voting for the Democratic 
presidential candidate for the first time since choosing Jimmy Carter over Gerald Ford in 
1976. Similarly, Virginia and Indiana voted for the Democratic candidate for the first 
	
(
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Goldwater won only 6 states). Indeed, the enthusiasm driving the 2008 Obama campaign 
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proved to be more broad-based than even his most optimistic supporters could have 
imagined 2 years prior as they were encouraging him to enter the race.      
The Obama Effect on Fundraising  
In early 2007, while still trailing Senator Clinton in the Democratic primary polls, 
Obama promised that he would finance his general election campaign with public 
funding. However, by June of 2008, as the general election campaign season was 
beginning, it was clear that Obama could raise much more money privately than he 
would receive from the public funding system; thus, it made little practical sense to 
adhere to his commitment. The move was widely noted by the national press as the sort 
of blatant promise-breaking that is common among presidential primary candidates. They 
   	

	             
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without intending to adhere to those promises during the general election. In all 
likelihood, his campaign simply had not anticipated his remarkable capacity for 
fundraising. At any rate, Obama was largely able to avoid sharp or sustained criticisms. 
Kenneth Vogel of Politico reported the press reaction to the broken promise as follows:  
In a widely expected move that will give Democrat Barack Obama a huge cash 
advantage over Republican John McCain, Obama announced Thursday morning 








ts a break from the strong signals 
he sent last year about his commitment to the public financing program. It means 


































$84 million spending limit. (2008) 
 
In 2004, the George W. Bush and John Kerry campaigns had raised a combined 
$653 million between the primary and general election campaigns. This included the 
nearly $75 million that each candidate received in public funding for the general election. 
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That massive sum (which did not include substantial fundraising from Howard Dean and 
several other primary candidates) dwarfed the $528 million raised by all candidates 
combined in the 2000 primary and general election cycle. 
Surprisingly, the 2008 Obama campaign blew right past that 2004 fundraising 
record. The Associated Press (2008) observed that the Obama campaign outraised the 
Bush and Kerry campaigns combined, for a total of about $745 million between the 
primary and general elections. As Tahman Bradley reported in December of 2008, while 
most candidates opted out of public funding for their primary campaigns (on the 
calculation that they could raise more money independently), Obama was the first major 
presidential candidate to decline public funding in the general election. As noted above, 









public financing rules, the Obama campaign amassed nearly $300 million just in the two 
months following the Democratic National Convention. 
Shortly after the 2008 general election, NPR reporters Renee Montagne and Peter 











Montagne: Now, Peter, we've been hearing about record financing from the 
Obama campaign for a couple of years now. Is this more of the same? 
 
Overby: It isfiit's more of more of the same. This report runs from October 16th 
to 20 days after the election and over that time periodfiobviously, mostly before 
Election Dayfithe Obama campaign raised $104 million. Not so long ago, that 
was a good amount to run a whole presidential campaign on. I was at a conference 
yesterday with some political scientists, talking about all this. And Tony Corrado 
[of the Brookings Institute] made the point that the Obama campaign raised more 
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campaign in history had ever tapped into such a broad donor base. In May 2008, the 
Associated Press pointed to the unprecedented breadth and nature of the operation:  
Dozens of Associated Press interviews with donors and an AP financial analysis 
show how contributions that make only a   -
   ff 
ff

in increments of $10, $15 and $50, have collectively swelled into a financial roar 
that has helped propel Obama toward the Democratic presidential nomination. 
Altogether, Obama's campaign has taken in an unprecedented $226 million, most 
of it contributed online. His donor base is larger than the one the Democratic 
National Committee had for the 2000 election. (May 9, 2008, emphasis mine)  
 
 The Washington Post reported that by Election Day of 2008, more than 4 million 
individual donors had contributed to the Obama campaign. Over 40% of these donations 
were from donors who contributed $200 or less, representing a record percentage of 
fundraising from small donors for any campaign on record (MacGillis and Cohen 2008). 
A LexisNexis search revealed that in the last 3 months of 2008 alone, the Washington 








remarkable ability to raise funds from small donors.  
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had considerable experience running field operations for previous campaigns. (Field 





































Campaign Manager Steve Hillenbrand, who served as chief coordinator for early state 
  	
                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Director Paul Tewes had worked alongside Hillenbrand on the 2000 Gore field team and 
 	  fi    	     fl fi	 	 ffi	  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 !	ff
chief deputy in Iowa, had previously coordinated statewide field operations for both the 
Louisiana Democratic Party and the South Dakota Democratic Party, as well as for Jon 
"	ff # 	 ffi     ff	 $  %  
 & 
Carson, was highly-regarded for his previous successes in running statewide field 
operations for the Democratic Party in both South Carolina and New Jersey.  
The grand idea was for this experienced senior staff to channel the remarkable 
enthusiasm of early Obama supporters into a massive and sustainable grassroots 
volunteer operation. The national press began to take notice of this emphasis on 
ffi		  	  ffi'ffi 	 ( 	   ) *	 *''ff	 Washington Post article 
+ *ffi 	   !fi  ,-	     % . /)0
chronicled the earliest stages of the volunteer recruitment operation. He observed that 
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 	  	 fl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enthusiasm into actual support on the ground in the early voting states (i.e., Iowa and 
New Hampshire). And without success in the early states, it was virtually impossible for 
any campaign to gain momentum leading into the later voting states. Thus, the promise, 
energy, and momentum that had earned considerable media praise and attention for the 
Dean campaign throughout 2003 had been largely quelled even before the first caucus 
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from the beginning to translate their enthusiastic support base not just into voter turnout, 
but also into volunteerism. Anyone who attended an Obama campaign event was required 
to provide the campaign with their phone number and email address, so that they could 
late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On March 31, 2007, more than 9 months before the start of the primary voting, 
this loose grassroots infrastructure was put to the test for the first time. Supporters were 
encouraged to use a basic social media tool on the campaign website to self-organize a 
  fl ff' (
flflffi ) ' 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
event or find one nearby through a zip code search feature. The strategy proved an 
astounding success: over 6,000 meetings nationwide were set up at venues such as 
Obama supporter homes, local public libraries, and college student union buildings. In a 
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Throughout most of 2007, the Obama campaign provided few material resources 
to volunteers outside of the early states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South 
Carolina). Most states had few, if any, campaign offices or paid staffers, and volunteers 
on the ground received very little from campaign headquarters in terms of direct funding 
or other material resources. Through the website, volunteers were typically provided only 
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with printable lists of voters to contact in their areas and printable messaging scripts to 
    	
  	   	 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
the campaign. Volunteers were always asked to record information for the campaign 
database about every voter they contacted (in particular, whether the voter was a 
supporter, non-supporter, or undecided). By allowing their loosely-organized grassroots 
volunteer operation to channel its enthusiasm into direct voter contact, the Obama 
campaign was able to collect large amounts of data and thus continually improve the 
efficiency of its voter outreach efforts throughout the campaign.  
By June of 2007, the wide-ranging grassroots network had blossomed to include 
more than 10,000 volunteers nationwide. At this early stage in the primary campaign, 
they had already knocked on more than 350,000 doors during their door-to-door 
canvassing operations (Keating 2007). In December, Obama campaign volunteers were 
making over 10,000 calls per night to potential caucus-goers in advance of the January 3rd 
Iowa caucus (Zeleny 2007). By the time the general election got into full swing in the 
summer of 2008, already more than two million people had volunteered for the Obama 
campaign at least one time. The campaign estimated that about 70% of these volunteers 
had never previously volunteered for any political campaign, and that around six million 
people would volunteer at least once before Election Day (Mooney 2008).   
The aforementioned record-setting fundraising hauls were now being translated 
into more professionalized field operations in more than a dozen swing states that the 
Obama campaign considered winnable for the general election. Boston Globe reporter 
Brian Mooney (2008) observed that the ever-growing base of enthusiastic volunteers that 
had been called upon to self-organize during the primary season, were now being 
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organized by the largest army of paid field staff in the history of presidential campaigns. 
The Obama campaign reported deploying an astonishing 1.5 million volunteers for get-
out-the-vote operations on Election Day 2008 alone (Moore 2008).  
The Obama Effect and the Historic    	
  
 The uniqueness of  race and racial identity also contributed to the 
enthusiasm surrounding his 2008 campaign. Obama was not treated by the national press 
as just another candidate who happened to be black. Instead, journalists frequently 
fffiflffi  ! "!# $#fl% fi & $ff  flfiffi#ffifly and commented explicitly on his 
status as the first African American nominee of a major political party, or as the first 
African American with a serious chance of winning the presidency. A Lexis Nexis search 
from 2007-2008 revealed no less than 103 different New York Times or Washington Post 
articles containing both  !   "% fiffi "!# $#fl% $ "% fiffi "'ff#flfi
'#flfi(% A good deal of academic literature also appeared in the two years after his 
election to challenge those who attempted to cha
fl #
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wrote extensively about his racial identity in his 1995 memoir Dreams from My Father, 
he took great pains in his national political career to avoid being viewed simply as a black 
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motivation was to empower the black electorate and other marginalized groups. 
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Conversely, Obama took a universalistic approach: his campaign wanted to capitalize on 
his newness with the electorate and to focus less on issues specifically of race, and more 
on issues like health care and opposition to the Iraq War. Also, while Jackson sought to 
lead a social movement reminiscent of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 
1960s, Obama set out to run a more traditional campaign merely seeking to maximize 
votes. A third major distinction was   limited fundraising appeal	he raised less 
than $14 million between his two presidential campaigns	
   renowned 
fundraising prowess and reliance on a much broader donor base (as described above) to 




  desire to appeal to the broader electorate often did result in 
attempts to employ 
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 rhetoric. For example, in his 2004 convention speech 
Obama claimed  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ized terms. He insisted, 

It is 
way too simplistic just to say that 
 "
 "
t care about black people,

 
instead arguing that the administration had simply been ins
     


(p. 18). Even in his 2007 announcement speech he explicitly invoked President 
Lincoln, yet did not explicitly mention race at any point during the speech.  
Walters notes that when Obama did employ racialized rhetoric, it was again often 
as a tactic to reassure whites that he was not going to focus too much on black issues. For 
example, he would occasionally chastise blacks about not taking personal responsibility 
for community or family plights (e.g., gang violence or absentee parenting), but without 
mentioning any public policy issues at the root of those very plights. This reassurance 
17 
 
tactic was employed broadly, for example, in his March 18, 2008 speech entirely about 
race, delivered in Philadelphia in the wake of a firestorm of negative press over 
  	 
 
  	 Jeremiah Wright. In that speech Obama 
did attempt, at great length, to articulate reasons behind the anger felt by many black 
Americans such as Reverend Wright; yet he also spoke at length and in a legitimizing 
way about frustrations experienced by whites toward nonwhites. He placed much of his 
emphasis on themes such as optimism and the need for more cross-racial dialogue. The 
New York Times        	  		 

Chooses Reconciliation over Rancor (Scott 2008).  
 
 apparent cross-racial appeal during the 2008 election does not, of 
course, mean that Obama nonwhite racial identity was an asset to his electoral chances 
or that it made campaigning easier for him. In fact, in his analysis of survey data from 
1992-2008, Piston (2010) found considerable evidence to the contrary, arguing that 
Obama likely would have done much better if not for persistent white prejudice (as 
defined by whites characterizing blacks as lazier and/or less intelligent than whites). 
Piston noted that Obama won 95% of the vote among African Americans and 67% 
among Latinos, but only 43% among whites. He concluded that Obama was affected 
negatively by racial prejudice more than any other candidate in the previous two decades.  
 Notwithstanding the headwinds Obama likely faced as a result of race, I argue 
that his unique racial identity did serve as a genuine source of excitement for the national 
press and for many racial minorities as well. The national press was largely positive 
toward Obama regarding his handling of race-related issues, and more generally about his 
status as the first African American nominee of a major party. African Americans and 
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Latinos alike voted for Obama at a substantially higher rate than they had voted for John 
Kerry, the Democratic nominee, in 2004. I therefore I argue that the historic nature of the 
  	
 was a major contributing factor to the Obama Effect in 2008.     
Chapter Breakdown 
In these opening pages, I defined the Obama Effect as the extraordinarily high 
   	 	
    	 	
   
Effect was observable from early 2007 when he announced his candidacy and up until his 
election to the Presidency of the United States on November 4, 2008. I explained how the 
Obama Effect manifested itself in a dominant primary election win over the heavily-
favored Hillary Clinton, and then in a general election landslide victory over John 
McCain; in record fundraising totals from small donors in particular; in extraordinary 
levels of volunteerism from his tremendously enthusiastic support base; and even in part 
because of his historic status as the first African American nominee of a major political 
party.  
Chapter 2 contains my literature review and theory chapter. I begin by situating 
my research question within the pertinent literature on and candidate-centered campaigns. 
While most studies of campaign effects employ vote choice as the dependent variable 
(i.e., they investigate the factors that influence the vote choice), I explain my decision to 
use vote choice as an independent variable to investigate possible campaign effects. I 
employ it to compare attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of Obama supporters over time 
to outcomes of non-supporters over time. Through my theoretical framework, I juxtapose 
Obama with other outsider candidates in the post-reform era and posits the 2008 Obama 
campaign as the culmination of the candidate-centered campaigns (as opposed to party-
19 
 
centered campaigns) that have characterized these last 4 decades of American 
presidential elections. As such, the central research question guiding the study is: Did the 
2008 Obama campaign actually have, as I hypothesize, a positive, unique, and lasting 
Obama Effect on the political attitudes and political participation of his supporters? In 
other words, was the 2008 election truly a transformative election as the Obama 
campaign hoped that was able to keep supporters engaged even after the election? Or 
was the Obama Effect just a campaign phenomenon of extraordinary but short-lived 
enthusiasm, easily observable during the campaign season, but destined only to wither 
and die out after Election Day 2008? (This would represent the null hypothesis, i.e., that 
there was no lasting Obama Effect.) Or, to consider a third possibility, was there indeed a 
lasting effect to the campaign, but one that represented a larger presidential effect or 
candidate effect (as opposed to an Obama Effect), not at all unique to Obama supporters? 
A fourth and final possibility is that the lasting Obama Effect actually constituted a 
negative effect on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama supporters. 
(These last two outcomes would constitute rejections of my general hypothesis of a 
positive Obama Effect.) After explaining each possible outcome, I argue that a positive 
and durable Obama Effect on his supporters should be expected precisely because of the 
unique and extraordinary success enjoyed by his 2008 campaign. Lastly, I provide a 
theoretical basis for the inclusion of all other dependent and independent variables under 
investigation in my analytical chapters (Chapters 4-6).   
Chapter 3, my Data and Methods chapter, includes a discussion of my empirical 
mixed-methods approach to investigating the Obama Effect. It begins with an explanation 
of the rationale for employing panel survey data and American National Election Studies 
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(ANES) data, in particular, for my quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. Second, it 
explains how data is incorporated from earlier election cycles for comparative purposes, 
so that it is possible to differentiate between an actual Obama Effect, and an effect that is 
not unique among Obama supporters. Third, it discusses relevant information on 
interviewer methods, survey items, variable measurement, and validity and reliability 
concerns. Further, it explains the approach to hypothesis-testing and lays out all of my 
major hypotheses for Chapters 4 and 5. I then shift my attention to the discussion of the 
qualitative data and methods for Chapter 6, the interview-based analysis. This section 
begins with a discussion of interviewee sampling and recruitment techniques, including 
the Internal Review Board process required for working with human subjects. It explains 
how my sample of interviewees all volunteers from the 2008 Obama campaign differs 
from the samples of panel participants that constitute the ANES panel surveys. Next, it 
provides general data on my interview subjects, such as dates, lengths, questions, and 
formatting of interviews. Finally, it establishes the relationship between my chosen 
interview question wording and the ANES survey items used in my quantitative analyses. 
I explain how the in-depth interviews were designed to flesh out the major themes from 
my quantitative findings, in order to draw comparisons and contrasts between these 
campaign volunteers and the ANES panel participants (who are more reflective of the 
national electorate than a group of volunteers).   
Chapter 4 presents my empirical quantitative analysis of potential Obama Effects 
on political attitudes. I run regression models testing my hypotheses of a lasting and 
positive Obama Effect on the political interest, on the political efficacy, and on the 
	 
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2010 election cycle to corresponding results from the previous two presidencies (2000ff
2002 and 1992ff1994). While I identified certain instances of a clear and positive Obama 
Effectfion political efficacy in particularfiin the broader analysis, I find it quite difficult 
to draw neat conclusions about a positive and lasting Obama Effect on the political 
attitudes of his supporters. While some ambiguity in the data is to be expected, patterns 
that apply to all political attitudes in my analyses were far less clear than I had 
anticipated. In some cases, such as with political interest, I actually observe what appears 
to be a negative Obama Effect. In yet other cases, such as with partisanship, I observe 
remarkably similar outcomes across groups and across election cycles, prompting me to 
posit a broader candidate effect instead of the hypothesized Obama Effect. This result 
leads to a discussion of some broader candidate effects that were identifiable among 
Obama supporters, but not unique to that group. I interpret all of my statistical analysis 
for this chapter (and the next) in the comparative context of the three election cycles.   
Chapters 5 follows a layout similar to Chapter 4. In this second quantitative 
chapter, I present my empirical analysis of potential Obama Effects on political 
participation. Once again, I employ multiple regression models, as well as binary logit 
models, for hypothesis testing. I hypothesize a lasting and positive Obama Effect on the 
voting behavior, on attendance of political meetings, and on attendance of political 
protests among fl ffi  !   
" #  	 

 support for a 
candidate had no observable impact on voter turnout. In the case of attending political 
meetings, I find increased participation among supporters of both candidates; but the 
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level of increase if consistently higher among supporters of the losing candidates. 
Similarly and unsurprisingly, supporters of losing candidates tended to participate more 
in protests, marches, rallies, or demonstrations.     
Chapter 6 is my qualitative analytical chapter. My data package for this chapter is 
comprised of transcripts from 30 in-depth interviews I conducted with volunteers from 
the 2008 Obama campaign. All 30 volunteers were Purdue University students who 
volunteered for Obama on the Purdue campus at least twice in 2008. I asked these former 
volunteers wide-ranging questions about their political attitudes and participation since 
2008, with particular focus on how they came to feel about the candidate they helped 
elect after the initial excitement of his election   	
  	
had subsided. I also probed into their political and civic participation, or lack thereof, 
     

 	    	  
   the analysis in relation to 
my quantitative results from Chapters 4-5that is, I compare the political attitudes and 
political participation of these volunteers to the much larger and more representative 
samples of panel respondents analyzed in the previous two chapters

this chapter also 













enthusiastic group of supporters: those who were willing to go out and volunteer for his 
campaign on their free time.  
Chapter 7, my concluding chapter, contains a summary of my quantitative and 
qualitative analyses and situates my findings in the context of further discussion. I will be 
completing this dissertation in the spring of 2016; so the following question is raised in 
my closing pages: what might we expect in terms of the long-term attitudinal outcomes of 
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lack thereof, as was often the case) and that truly transformational effects may be the 
rarest of legacies for American presidential campaigns.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Central Research Question 
 Following the 2008 election, was there a positive, unique, and lasting Obama 
Effect on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama supporters? Based 
upon some of the more remarkable elements of the 2008 campaign which I discussed in 
Chapter 1 (i.e., turnout, fundraising, volunteerism), my general hypothesis at the outset of 
the study was that such an Obama Effect may have been not only positive, but possibly 
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the American electorate in these ways. My central task in this research is to investigate 
the extent to which he succeeded in that endeavor, in other words, the degree to which his 
campaign succeeded in producing a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect.    
Why Study Campaign Effects? 
 The study of political campaigns can potentially tell us a great deal about the 
quality of democratic representation in the United States. As a representative democracy, 
we expect our candidates to tell us what they plan to do if elected. We thus provide 
candidates who hope to be re-elected (i.e., the vast majority of candidates) with a clear 
incentive to govern in a fashion consistent with their campaign rhetoric. To disappoint 
public expectations would signal to voters that the campaign was little more than a 
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charade and that the candidate (and, by extension, his or her party) cannot be trusted in 
the future. To this point, political scientists have indeed found that contrary to 
conventional wisdom candidates for office are, in fact, inclined toward honoring or at 
least attempting to honor their campaign promises. The nature of democratic 
representation, that is, the re-election principle, gives them great reason to do so (Shaw 
1998; Mayhew 1977; Downs, 1957).    
 This incentive to campaign in good faith allows us to study political campaigns as 
the mechanism through which candidates for office seek to inform voters about their 
 	
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certain political attitudes and/or political behaviors within the electorate. We can 
distinguish between more immediate or short-term campaign effects, such as influencing 
the vote choice in that immediate election, and longer-lasting campaign effects, such as 
sustained changes in political attitudes and behaviors that can be observed over the 
course of multiple years or even multiple election cycles.    

























The Decline of Political Parties (1984) was published 
over 30 years ago, and his thesis has only gained traction in the years since. He has 
updated the volume several times to present new data and evidence regarding this decline 
in pure partisanship and in party power, especially since the 1970s era of Vietnam and 





























words, while the decline in pure partisanship over the last 4 decades looks quite stark on 
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a 3-point scale (Democrat, Independent, Republican), a 7-point scale reveals that the 
decline in pure partisanship has led to a rise in Independent-Democrat leaners and 
Independent-Republicans leaners. 
From Party-Centered to Candidate-Centered Campaigns  
I am particularly interested in the uniqueness, or lack thereof, of the 2008 Obama 
campaign and its effects. This potential uniqueness is best understood in the larger 
context of the modern presidential nomination process. Prior to the post-reform era (pre-
1972), presidential nominations were essentially the business of the national Democratic 
Party and the national Republican Party. Whether running for local, state, or national 
office, candidates typically could not be seen as viable without strong party backing 
(McCann 1996). Logistical support, including fundraising operations, get-out-the-vote 
drives, and campaign office staffing, was largely provided by the party infrastructure, 
which served as the centralized decision-making apparatus (including candidate 
selection) from the national all the way down to the local level.  
Following the 1968 Chicago protests and riots outside the Democratic National 
Convention, the Democratic Party changed its nomination process to allow primary 
voters to nominate candidates directly. The Republican Party followed suit shortly after. 
Any introductory American Government textbook will observe that these changes 
  	
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proverbial smoke filled back rooms, without any input whatsoever from rank and file 
voters. However Cohen et al. argue in The Party Decides (2008) that contrary to this 
conventional wisdom, not much has changed in the post-reform era. The nomination 
systems still allow for party insiders and activists to function as filters for presidential 
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nominees, thus limiting the choices available to primary voters. No candidate can win a 
major party nomination on the strength of primary voters, they argue, unless that 
candidate already has a strong base of support among state party officials, lobbyists, and 
leaders of special interest groups.  
We do have clear evidence, however, that in at least certain circumstances 
candidates can earn substantial popular support with primary and general election voters 
regardless of their standing or level of formal support within the party. Wattenberg 
(1991) contends, convincingly, that political campaigns in the United States have indeed 
become increasingly candidate-centric and decreasingly party-centric since the early 
1970s reforms. Most notably, despite having no institutional supporter whatsoever, in the 
1992 general election Ross Perot won 19% of the national popular vote as an Independent 
candidate running against the candidates nominated by the two major parties. Ralph 
Nader, a famously independent-minded candidate running on the Green Party ticket in 
2000, played a widely-documented outsized role in influencing that presidential election 
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Pat Robertson, Pat Buchanan, Steve Forbes, Alan Keyes, Mike Huckabee, Rick 
Santorum, and Ron Paul for the Republicans; and Jesse Jackson, Gary Hart, Bill Clinton, 
and, of course, Barack Obama for the Democrats. Except for Clinton and Obama, who of 
course ultimately did secure the nominations for their party, each of these candidates was 





 his lack of 
institutional support from the party itself.  
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One might argue that the Republican Party remains relatively strong compared to 
the Democratic Party, in the sense that Republican voters have repeatedly selected the 
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been loath to nominate an individual-centered candidate the way the Democratic Party 
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Republicans in the 1976 election. Reagan, having lost the last time around, was able to 




vice president, George H.W. Bush was tapped for the Republican nomination in 1988. 
Party elder Bob Dole was nominated to run in 1996; and then George W. Bush, son of the 
former Republican president, was chosen by Republican primary voters in 2000. 
Longtime Washington stalwart and party leader John McCain won the Republican 
nomination in 2008. His closest rival in that 2008 primary election, Mitt Romney, was 
the winner of the 2012 Republican primary. Therefore, we might draw this conclusion: 
although many candidates have attracted a substantial segment of enthusiastic Republican 
primary voters, the Republican primary electorate as a whole have typically selected the 
same candidate that would likely have been chosen by party elders in that proverbial 
smoke-filled back room. This conclusion suggests that although candidates are no longer 
beholden to merely carrying out the will of the party and its platform, the parties are not 
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party structure in the modern era. The Democratic Party has actually nominated several 
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candidates in recent decades whose nomination did not seem likely at the beginning of 
the primary. Jimmy Carter, for example, was nominated in 1976 despite being an obscure 
governor from Georgia with negligible national name recognition at the time of his 
announcement. Bill Clinton, similarly, was running outside the top five Democratic 
candidates in the early primary polls from 1992. And perhaps most obviously, Obama, 
having only served 2 years in an office higher than state senator when his candidacy 
began, was also relatively unknown among the national electorate at the time of his 
campaign announcement speech.      
  	
 The Rise of Candidate Centered Politics was published in 
1991 as a sequel to The Decline of American Political Parties. This modification in 
terminology indicates the dual nature of the phenomenon under observation: not only that 
parties have grown increasingly weak, but that the vacuum was being filled by individual 
candidates often with strong, dynamic, unique, and engaging personalities. Many of these 
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emphasize these contrasts as an effective mechanism for highlighting their independence 
from their party. After all, the thinking goes, voters respect qualities in a candidate such 
as independence, leadership, and willingness to do what they think is right even if 
unpopular within their own parties.  
The Popular Question in Campaign Effects Research 
Traditionally, political scientists have tended to treat vote choice as the dependent 
variable in research on campaign effects (Holbrook, 1996). They ask, what factors 
influence vote choice? This is often the case for both individual-level analyses, in which 
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the goal is to determine the potential factors that may influence the vote choice of 
individuals, and aggregate-level analysis, in which the goal is to determine the potential 
factors that may influence larger electoral outcomes at the local/state/national level. 
 In this project, however, I am investigating the possible existence of a very 
different type of campaign effect. Instead of treating vote choice as the dependent 
variable and then seeking to d         	

       
major impact on voting behavior, I treat vote choice as my key independent variable. In 
essence, my question deals with whether support for a particular campaign may condition 
certain types of changes in our political attitudes and political behaviors. Nonetheless it 
makes sense to briefly review the main studies looking at potential campaign effects on 
voting behavior, since this constitutes the general thrust of the literature on campaign 
effects.  
The Case for Limited or Minimal Campaign Effects 
As noted above, the over-arching theme in this body of research is to determine 
the degree to which political campaigns affect voting behavior. Some political observers 
assume campaigns to be the key independent variable, or at least one of the more 
important ones, that influences vote choice. After all, presidential campaigns are very 
expensive and time-consuming. For that reason, the lay reader may be surprised to learn 
that in the view of many political scientists, campaigns are essentially tales of sound and 
fury, but which signify very, very little in terms of actual campaign effects (i.e., 
influencing individual or aggregate vote choice). For example: 
 In their groundbreaking 1940s Columbia panel study on voting behavior, 
Lazarsfeld, Berleson, and Gaudet (1944) found that individuals rarely changed 
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their vote preference at the end of the campaign from the preference they had 
expressed at the beginning of the campaign. They argued that campaigns may 
strengthen or weaken previous political dispositions held by individuals, which 
are typically derived from family/group membership. But campaigns were 
unlikely to convert more than a very small percentage of voters to the other 
candidate, because most voters would be disinclined to break from the perceived 
group interests that led to their original candidate preference. This research is 
considered seminal seven decades after publication.   
  The authors of the seminal The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) argued that 
party identification was far more influential as a vote choice determinant than 
campaigns could ever be. One may assume that policy preferences tend to 
condition support for a party/candidate; however, they argued that the causal 
arrow typically points in the opposite direction: Americans actually talk 
themselves into agreeing with the positions and voting for the candidates because 
of their party affiliation. According to this argument, then, individual campaign 
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deterministic or set in stone for life, Campbell and colleagues characterized it as a 
relatively stable political attitude, typically adopted through the political 
socialization process involving institutions such as family, schools, and media. 
They argued that party affiliation was unlikely to be flipped by any single 
political campaign. They found that on average, a strong majority of 63% of 
voters had already made up their minds who they would vote for by the ends of 
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the respective Democratic and Republican nomination conventions, before the 
beginning of the general election campaign.  
  In The Responsible Electorate (1966), Key argued that neither predisposition 
based on group membership nor party identification was the most important factor 
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and that they were inclined toward rewarding the party of the previous 
administration if they did a good job while in office. Conversely, voters would 
punish that party by supporting their opponents if the previous administration had 
done a poor job. Vote choice in the future, in his view, would largely be a 
function of how voters evaluated the previous administration. His work is perhaps 
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victory no matter whom the Democrats had nominated and no matter what 
Mondale had done differently during his campaign.  
  A senior Dukakis strategist Susan Estrich argued after the 1988 campaign that 
while they could have run a much better campaign, they never really had much of 
a chance of winning. After all, she noted, the unemployment rate was at a 20+ 
year low, and the Reagan/Bush administration was able to point to a years-in-the-
making economic recovery to provide all the tailwind Bush needed for his 
campaign sails.      
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  Quirk and Dalager (1993) argued, similarly, that for structural reasons, any 
Democrat would have beaten George H. W. Bush in 1992 by emphasizing the 
theme of change (as Clinton did). After all, with the economy in such a deep 
slump and after 12 years of Bush being in the White House as vice president and 
then president, it was all but a given that Americans would elect a Democrat to 
replace him in 1992.  
  2008 may have been very similar to 1992, in that any Democrat running on the 
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or any other Republican would have been associated with the party that was in 
office when the housing market and stock market collapsed in 2007-2008. These 
collapses led to a national (and worldwide) recession, further suppressing the 
approval ratings of the already unpopular George W. Bush.  
The Case for Significant Campaign Effects 
While the more prominent line of research argues that campaign effects are 
relatively minimal, or at least relatively unimportant, certainly not all scholars have 
arrived at this conclusion that campaigns have little, if any, impact on vote decisions. 
Many observers of American campaigns have referred to powerful campaign occurrences 
that seemed to represent a major impact on the attitudes of the electorate, such as the 
following:  
  In the second debate of 1984 between Reagan and Mondale, the incumbent 





 fi  ffi  fl 
 
ffi	 !






   
		 	 
  -
election campaign because he effectively deflected criticisms that his age may 
render him unfit for office.  
 The Willie Horton adve	
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widely seen as successfully instilling fear in the public that Dukakis would be 
weak on crime. Later, when Dukakis was asked if he would support the death 
penalty if his own wife were raped and murdered, he answered in the negative, 
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 Early in the 1992 campaign, George H.W. Bush visited a grocery store and 
expressed wonder and amazement at the technology of the price scanner (which 
had been commonplace for many years). The New York Times described his 
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himself to the electorate as a man in touch with middle- 
% " 	  
his inability to run an effective campaign would prohibit him from winning re-
election in his campaign against Bill Clinton.  
 Following the 2000 election in Florida, Al Gore drew considerable criticism for 
looking dull and boring compared to George W. Bush. Gore was viewed 
throughout the campaign as an uninspiring policy wonk, while Bush became a 





  In 2008, John McCain was widely scrutinized for his selection of the relatively 
unknown Sarah Palin as his running mate. This initial decision seemed to provide 
a jolt of momentum to the McCain campaign, indicating a sort of campaign effect; 
indeed, McCain closed a significant polling gap with Obama in less than a week 
after the Palin announcement. However as the campaign wore on, the Palin 
detractors grew increasingly louder as her inexperience and unpreparedness were 
revealed through a series of media interviews. Ultimately, the campaign felt these 
media appearances were so damaging with voters that they completely withdrew 
media access to the vice presidential candidate. She did not conduct a single 
media interview for the entire 2 months of the 2008 campaign.  
Speaking of campaign instances such as these, Holbrook (1996) offered the 
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well after the campaign has ended. Imagining that anything we remember as being 
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with the Reagan debate example, it is important not to overstate or exaggerate the 
existence of a campaign effects based on conventional wisdom and anecdotal evidence 
alone. Holbrook essentially cautions that while we can point to many instances of 
apparent campaign effects, the scholarly community does well to remember the more 
established body of literature suggesting that campaign effects are typically quite limited.   
The above sections suggest that while many campaign happenings may move the 
polls in the short term, or in minute ways, ultimately, the discipline of political science 
remains skeptical that such events are the overarching determinants of individual voting 
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behavior or aggregate electoral outcomes. Instead, scholars have pointed to more 
structural factors such as socialization processes, economic conditions, and party/group 
identification, as much more relevant variables, generally speaking, than campaign 
effects could ever be.  
Theorizing an Obama Effect  
 I have stated my intent to investigate the existence of a positive, unique, and 
lasting Obama Effect following his 2008 campaign. At this point, it becomes important to 
clarify exactly what would constitute such an effect. By lasting, I mean the effect was 
observable two years after the campaign. By unique, I mean the effect was not similarly 
observable in the supporters of other recent presidential candidates. By positive, I mean 
that Obama supporters could be distinguished from non-supporters on the value of 
change in the dependent variable (i.e. the attitude or behavior), and that the change 
occurred in the direction that the Obama campaign would find desirable. For example:  
  If Obama supporters increased or sustained their political interest and/or external 
political efficacy over time, relative to non-supporters, the conclusion would be 
that they experienced a positive Obama Effect on political interest and/or external 
efficacy, respectively. If, however, Obama supporters decreased their interest 
and/or efficacy over time, relative to non-supporters, this would constitute a 
negative Obama effect on political interest and/or efficacy.  
 
 If Obama supporters increased or sustained their loyalty to the Democratic Party 
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would argue that they have experienced a positive Obama Effect on partisanship; 
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conversely, if Obama supporters decreased their party loyalty over time, relative 
to McCain supporters, then this would constitute a negative Obama Effect.  
   Finally, if Obama supporters have increased their political participation and/or 
civic engagement over time, relative to non-supporters, it would show that they 
have experienced a positive Obama Effect. If they have decreased their 
participation in these areas relative to non-supporters, this would constitute a 
negative Obama Effect on participation.  
It is worth emphasizing here the theoretical importance of the relative factor, that 
is, the comparison of Obama supporters to non-supporters when I theorize an Obama 
Effect. In my estimation, it is not enough to observe that Obama supporters experienced, 
for example, an increase in political participation after the 2008 election. Even if the 
numbers demonstrated increased participation among Obama supporters, to accept that as 
proof of an Obama Effect would be to ignore the possibility that non-supporters also 
experienced this increase in participation. If it were true for non-supporters as well as 
Obama supporters, then the observation would clearly be attributable to something other 
than the type of Obama Effect I am hypothesizing for this research, such as a larger 
candidate effect that tend to characterize supporters of all presidential candidates, not 
only winning candidates.  
 For this reason, I set up my analysis of the political attitudes and behaviors of 
2008 Obama campaign supporters as a relative comparison to non-supporters (a category 
that includes McCain supporters, third party voters, and nonvoters). If I observe changes 
(positive or negative) in the attitudes and behaviors of Obama supporters relative to non-
supporters, but do not observe similar changes among McCain supporters relative to 
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McCain non-supporters, then these changes can possibly be attributed to an Obama 
Effect.  
I am expecting a positive Obama Effect to manifest in Obama supporters, relative 
to non-supporters, in the form of a sustained increase in political interest, a heightened 
sense of external political efficacy, a strengthening of party loyalty, an increase in voting 
activity and partisan voting, and an increase in civic engagement.    
Theorizing My Dependent Variables 
I have chosen to focus my study on five important dependent variables which can 
tell us a great deal about the lasting impacts, or lack thereof, of the 2008 Obama 
campaign. These variables political interest, political efficacy, partisanship, voting 
behavior, and civic engagement are conceptually important because, in conjunction, 
they represent a robust combination of both mental and physical engagement with 
political and civic life.    
Dependent Variable #1: Political Interest. Some degree of political interest is a necessary 
precursor to the level of political engagement that is critical for effective democratic 
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	 nterested people are more 
knowledgeable about politics, more likely to vote, and more likely to participate in 
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in and of itself, it functions as a conduit to other desirable outcomes related to democratic 
and civic engagement.  
The subject of political interest has captured the attention of political scientists 
since the Columbia Studies of the 1940s!1950s. These authors (Berleson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berleson, and Gaudet 1944) argued that interest in politics was 
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primarily a function of family background. Before we are even aware of any external 
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al. (1960) agreed that socialization played a major role in political interest, but they 
contended that the relationship was less direct. They believed in a more direct 
relationship between family socialization and party identification. Then, by extension, the 
strength of our party identification would condition our political attitudes, in other words, 
our level of political interest. As such, they found that political interest was strongest 
among the strongest partisans in the electorate (including political elites) and weakest 
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analysis revealed that political interest more closely resembles a personality trait than an 
attitude that would fluctuate for individuals whenever the newsworthiness of politics 
changes. This finding is particularly important for my research because I am examining 
the possibility that one specific campaign(the 2008 Obama campaign(became an 
exception to the relatively static nature of political interest. If this campaign truly 
represented a transformational moment in American politics, then theoretically we would 
expect to see significant, substantive, and positive changes in the political interest of the 
supporters of that campaign (relative to non-supporters).   
Dependent Variable #2: Political Efficacy. A high degree of political efficacy is a 
necessary condition to a healthy citizenry in any democratic system of government. 
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actually influence matters of government and politics because government is responsive.  
Campbell and colleagues (1960) were mainly concerned with the concept of 
external political efficacy. They included two questions on external political efficacy in 
the American National Election Studies surveys that serve as the quantitative datasets for 
my analyses in Chapters 4-'  fl 	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These scholars theorized that an understanding of external political efficacy was 
particularly important because it represented the political attitude that could best explain 
varying levels of political participation within the citizenry. Those who chose not to 
participate in politics, they argued, lacked the desire to participate largely as an artifact of 
low external efficacy. These citizens did not believe that they could positively influence 
their own democratic representation. Conversely, those who participated at high levels 
were reflecting the highest possible levels of external efficacy. These citizens reckoned 
that political participation was worth their investments of time and energy.  
41 
 
Early scholarship on the subject found political efficacy to be positively 
correlated with other desirable attitudes such as trust in government, trust in leadership, 
and patriotism, and also positively associated with various forms of participation, such as 
participation in campaign politics, voting, and participation in protest politics. (For a brief 
review of this early literature, see Balch, 1974, 2-3.) Some scholarship on efficacy has 
observed that the causal arrow does not always point from external efficacy toward 
participation; rather, the act of participation can actually breed an increased sense of 
external efficacy in the individual.  
Balch (1974) argued for the importance of analyzing efficacy as a dependent 
rather than an independent variable, thus emphasizing the importance of figuring out 
what affects individuals with respect to efficacy. This trend has not shaped the prevailing 
research tradition, unfortunately; as Anderson (201    	 
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and scholars in the tradition of John Stuart Mill or The American Voter authors were 
concerned primarily with what efficacy could do for the state or the elites, rather than 
with efficacy in and of itself. However I would argue along with Balch, if we are truly 





























































government exists for the people, and not the other way around. 
In more recent scholarship following this theoretical tradition, Anderson (2010) 
found that a sense of community had a significant impact on individual efficacy. For 
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individuals to truly have a sense of community, she argued, they needed to feel not only 
membership in the community, but also influence, in other words, a sense that the 
relationship is reciprocal. A strong community implies that individuals within that 
community feel they are contributing to communal needs, not only taking from the 
community. It makes sense, therefore, to analyze the 2008 Obama campaign through this 
theoretical lens. Of particular interest is determining whether a political campaign can 
have a lasting positive impact on external efficacy by making its supporters feel as if they 
are a part of something important. As discussed in Chapter 1, this campaign made a 
particularly strong effort to engage and mobilize its supporters by putting unprecedented 
focus on volunteerism and creating a sense of community within that campaign. So if a 
lasting Obama Effect on his supporters truly exists, it very well may manifest in an 
increased sense of external political efficacy because his supporters felt like they were 
getting something out of the campaign for themselves, as opposed to only contributing to 
the campaign for the sake of the candidate.  
Dependent Variable #3: Partisanship. To state the obvious, both the Democratic Party and 
the Republican Party have a vested interest in increasing partisanship within the 
electorate. By partisanship, I simply mean party loyalty among voters. Of course 
Democratic Party candidates, officeholders, officials, and other elites want to see more 
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 Research from Miller and Shanks (1996) has shown party identification to be a 
relatively stable attitude in adults. Notwithstanding the occasional realignment or 
generational change by cohort, Americans stick with the party affiliations of their parents 
more often than not; and meaningful group bonds are not easily broken. (Achen 2002; 
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Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). However, Gerber and Green (1998) discovered 
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receive new information about a party, they show more willingness to change their 
attitudes towards that party. Furthermore, as voters observe parties change their focus on 
specific issues (if not their positions on those issues), those voters may begin to change 
their minds about the parties based on their own issue preferences (Carsey and Layman 
2006). 
Traditionally, the rise of candidate-centered campaigns in this post-reform era has 
been viewed as a largely negative trend for both parties (Wattenberg 1991). After all, 
such campaigns seek to breed loyalty for that individual candidate himself or herself, as 
opposed to attempting to breed loyalty for the political party to which that candidate 
belongs. As noted above, candidates sometimes find it advantageous to draw explicit 
contrasts between their own views and those of their party platforms and/or leadership. 










 which may further weaken 
partisanship. (Stone et al. 1992).   
To be sure, the vast majority of Americans still identify with one of the two major 
political parties, as leaners if not strong partisans. This has been the case since the ANES 
began asking about party identification in the 1952. Yet, partisan identification has 
weakened in recent decades, corresponding to the rise of individual-centered campaigns 
discussed above (American National Election Studies 2010). In the 1950s, those who 
identified as Strong/Weak Democrats/Republicans comprised more than 75% of the 
respondents; pure Independents comprised fewer than 10%, and Independent-Leaners 
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represented about 15%. By the early 1970s, as Vietnam and Watergate took their toll on 
the public trust, and as candidate-centered campaigns became more prevalent, a much 
larger segment of the population began to identify as Independent or as Leaners. In fact, 
from the 1970s all the way through 2008, party identification remained relatively stable. 
Pure Independents and Independent-Leaners have tended to comprise about 40% of the 
electorate, with the percentage of Strong/Weak partisans falling from the high 70s before 
the post-reform era down to about 60% in recent decades.  
Against this backdrop, can any single campaign, such as the 2008 Obama 
campaign, actually produce a positive effect on partisanship, or are all individual-
centered campaigns doomed to having a negative if any effect? Aldrich (1995) noted that 
despite the rise of Independents within the electorate, and the overall weakening of the 
party system in certain respects, most candidates still do maintain a highly symbiotic 
relationship with state parties and with the national party. This again suggests that parties 
are appropriately described as weaker than they once were, but not necessarily as weak.  
Consider the following: as noted above, the majority of Americans continue to 
identify as either Democrat or Republican. Furthermore, once the primary process has 
concluded, parties typically try to unite all their members (including the weakest partisan 
leaners) under a big tent by providing a great deal of logistical, organizational, and 
financial support for their nominees. Once the general election begins, former intra-party 
primary opponents of a candidate may now actually serve as surrogates for that same 
candidate they had previously opposed, because they are now on the same team. Aldrich 
observed that these reciprocal partisan relationships do not end with the election of a new 
president; in fact, the opposite tends to occur. Once the governing starts, relationships 
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within and between the branches of government are typically characterized by partisan 
considerations and structures. 
Perhaps the strongest theoretical reason to suggest that a particularly effective 
campaign can positively impact partisanship is that presidents traditionally serve as heads 
of party (not just heads of state) while they are in the White House. This symbiotic 
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to his/her election and obviously from his/her presidential powers; on the other hand, it 
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incentive for presidential candidates to promote their parties up and down the ballot, in 
other words, to truly promote partisanship from the top of the ticket during their 
campaigns.     
Dependent Variable #4: Voter Turnout. As I have mentioned, presidential candidates 
have a vested interest in building long-term relationships with voters. While the current 
campaign cycle may be the top priority, all candidates are cognizant of the need to build a 
durable coalition of voters, which can be mobilized again for the re-election campaign 
(and potentially for other party operations as well).  
 A line of experimental research developed by Alan Gerber and Donald Green and 
colleagues has been particularly instructive for understanding the potential for a 
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that is, that voting in one election play a significant role in turning out in subsequent 
elections (or at least the next election if not long-term). They are careful not to overstate 
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the causal impact, but on the aggregate their research makes clear that successful 
campaign mobilization can have positive implications beyond the current campaign. 
In a different experiment, Gerber and Green (2000) were able to show that 
nonpartisan contact with voters face-to-face canvassing, in particular had a positive 
and very substantial impact in terms of increasing voter turnout. Conversely, 
professionalized direct mail operations had no effect in terms of driving up turnout, even 
when prospective voters were blasted with get-out-the-vote mailings multiple times in the 
weeks leading up to an election. Given the exceptionally high level of emphasis placed 
on direct voter contact and direct mobilization by the 208 Obama campaign, it seems at 
least possible that a lasting Obama Effect could produce increased voter turnout among 
its supporters in subsequent election cycles.  
Dependent Variable #5: Civic Engagement. While most of my analysis for this project 
focuses directly on political attitudes and voting behavior, I also wanted to consider other 
forms of civic engagement, such as volunteerism (political or otherwise), engagement in 
local political or social issues, attendance of protests or rallies. I think it is at least 
theoretically plausible that the 2008 Obama campaign may have produced a positive 
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almost twice as likely to become involved in the Republican House campaigns in 1988 as 
those who merely preferred Robertson...especially remarkable because a majority of 
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active in a candidate-centered campaign were far more likely to also become active 
volunteers (not just voters) for their local House candidate, despite never having been 
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turned up evidence of positive spillover effects, revealing that activists for losing 
candidates were just as likely to become active in their local House races that year as 
activists for winning campaigns.    
Research in this area has tended toward analysis of losing primary candidates 
because they are often very candidate-centered in their campaigns (relative to the 
candidates who often win the nominations). Often primary candidates have been able to 
appeal to a particular subgroup of highly vocal and active supporters (e.g., antiwar voters 
for McCarthy in 1968, evangelical voters for Robertson in 1988, or libertarians for Ron 
&	"  '((ff " "	   	ffiffi	  	 	 "! 
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nomination. Needless to say, the Obama campaign was unique in that regard. The 
question I will examine, then, is whether or not his winning campaign produced any 
positive spillover effects on his supporters.  
Inclusion of Resource Variables into the Analysis 
 The goal of my quantitative research in Chapters 4-5 is to uncover potential 
changes in the political attitudes and behaviors of 2008 Obama campaign supporters, 
relative to non-supporters. I am primarily interested in determining whether any such 
changes can be attributable to an Obama Effect, that is, support for the 2008 Obama 
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It is common in these types of studies to include resource variablesgender, age, 
race/ethnicity, income, and education as independent variables that allow to factor 
demographics into the causal analysis. These resource variables are typically included in 
causal analysis to determine if they, rather than vote choice, may be responsible for some 
or all of the statistically significant change that is observed in a model.  
For example, suppose we discover that support for Obama (i.e., vote choice, the 
key independent variable under observation) had a statistically significant impact on the 

       efficacy from 2008-2010. This inference may prompt me 
to hastily claim that there is a positive Obama Effect on external efficacy. However if the 
resource variables are included in this same analysis as independent variables in a 
multivariate regression model, the results could show that most of the statistical 
significance previously observed in the first model is attributable to certain participants 
being female and/or highly-educated, rather than to being Obama supporters. Or, the 
analysis could imply that all three independent variables have statistical significance, but 
that the other resource variables (race/ethnicity, age, and income) have no impact on this 
specific model. This type of finding would suggest an additive effect, meaning that being 
an Obama supporter, being female, and being highly educated each separately increased 
the impact on political efficacy. 
There is another major reason for including resource variables in my analyses. In 
addition to analyzing differences between groups (i.e. between Obama supporters and 
non-supporters), such analysis design allows to study also intragroup differences (i.e., 
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within the group of Obama supporters and, separately, within the group of non-
supporters). Resource variables can be very effective in helping us understand the 
potential impact of sub-sample variations. For example, the analysis of sub-sample (intra-
group) variation can help distinguish between the impact of being a female, high-income 
Obama supporter and being a female, low-income Obama supporter. In this example, my 
model can test not only for a potential additive effect among the three variables 
separately, but also for an interactive effect.  
I now turn to the next chapter for a discussion of the data and methods employed 




CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 My original dissertation research required an empirical mixed-methods 
approach incorporating analyses of both quantitative survey data and qualitative 
interview data in order to explore the legacy of the Obama Effect. This chapter first 
details the quantitative data and methods employed in Chapters 4 and 5. It then details the 
qualitative data and methods employed in Chapter 6. 
Using Panel Surveys for Quantitative Analysis 
Panel surveys were the most appropriate form of data for my quantitative 
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survey research is to interview the same individuals at two or more points in time and 
attribute observed changes in their attitudes or behavior to the effects of intervening 
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were conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES), which has been 
conducting election studies surveys biennially since 1952.  
Panel data is generally characterized by surveying the same individuals on the 
same set of variables at different points in time (e.g., t, t - 1, t - 2, etc.), for purposes of 
identifying causal mechanisms for any observable changes over time. For the ANES, 
typically one wave of a panel survey (t) is conducted shortly after a given presidential 
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election, and another wave (t   1) is conducted either shortly before or shortly after the 
midterm elections two years later.  
Use of panel data has two major advantages for my research over other types of 
survey data. First, it allows for a direct measurement of change over time. This 
measurement of change is preferable here to cross-sectional survey data, in which 
respondents are surveyed on a set of variables only at one point in time. It also differs 
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cannot measure it directly) because different individuals are being surveyed at each point 
in time (Bartols 2000; Finkel 1995).  
The second major advantage is that, as noted above, panel data lends especially 
well to causal analysis. Establishing a causal connection between independent and 
dependent variables requires three commonly-cited conditions to be met: that x and y co-
vary, that x precedes y in time, and that the relationship is not spurious, that is, caused by 
some other variable(s) not included in the model. (A fourth and usually implied condition 
is an accurate measurement of variables or the reliability of survey instruments.) By 
definition, cross-sectional data cannot meet the second condition. Even if covariance is 
established and all relevant variables are included in the model, it is not possible to 
determine temporal order from cross-sectional data (in other words, it is not possible to 
know whether x influenced y, or whether y influenced x, or whether the connection was 
spurious). Conversely, panel data avoids this pitfall precisely because the temporal 
ordering is self-evident for survey data collected at different points in time (Finkel 1995). 
In contrast to cross-sectional data, time series data is sometimes employed to 
establish causal inference (e.g., Granger Causality, which uses past variable values to 
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predict future variable values for the different sample of respondents). However, 
establishing causality with time series data is a noisier and less precise process than with 
panel data, for the very reason that respondents are not the exact same individuals who 
were surveyed at the earlier point(s) in time. As such, observable changes on the value of 
the dependent variable are reflecting an estimate of change, as opposed to an exact 
measurement of change among the same individuals.  
Comparing Panel Surveys between Presidencies 
My analytical research incorporates panel data from the first two years of the past 
three presidential administrations: the Barack Obama presidency from 2008-2010, the 
George W. Bush (hereafter referred to as Bush II) presidency from 2000-2002, and the 
Bill Clinton presidency from 1992-1994. Within the first few weeks after each 
presidential election, panel respondents were asked a series of questions about their 
political attitudes and political behaviors. These same respondents were surveyed again 
roughly two years later and asked many of the same questions. In the case of 2010, the 
panel re-contact survey took place in June-July 2010, shortly before the midterm 
elections. In the case of 2002 and 1994, the panel re-contact survey took place shortly 
after the midterm elections, in November-December of those years.  
My central focus is on the political attitudes and political participation of Obama 
supporters from 2008-2010. Across all survey instruments, I compared Obama supporters 
to non-supporters. Merely observing hypothesized differences between these two groups, 
however, would not necessarily constitute evidence that these differences could be 
attributed to an enduring Obama Effect. Such differences could potentially be explained 
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experienced by the supporters of earlier presidents and therefore not unique to Obama 
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supporters of even the losing presidential candidates.  
Because of these possibilities, I compared my 2008-2010 panel data to the 
corresponding data from the previous two presidencies mentioned above. I analyzed 
responses to identical or similar survey questions from each of the three panels in order to 
draw conclusions about Obama panel data in comparison to similar data for supporters of 
previous presidents. These comparisons were essential for allowing me to speak more 
narrowly about an actual lasting Obama Effect (or lack thereof) or more broadly about 
presidential effects and/or candidate effects.  
Respondents for ANES surveys are recruited using traditional random sampling 
methods. The 2008-2010 panel included 1,588 respondents who were recruited by 
telephone and who completed surveys on the internet. The 2000-2002 panel included 
1,187 respondents who were recruited by telephone and who also completed the surveys 
by telephone. The 1992-1994 panel included 759 respondents who were recruited by 
telephone and who completed the surveys face-to-face.   
Variable Measurement and Missing Values  
My quantitative analyses of each empanelment revolved around the five 
dependent variables discussed in the previous chapter: political interest, political efficacy, 
and partisanship in Chapter 4 (on political attitudes); and voting behavior and civic 
engagement in Chapter 5 (on political participation). Operationally, these concepts are 
measured by the responses of panel participants. Content validity is supported by the 
phrasing of each sur	 
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validity as a measure of political interest.  
As a measure of supporter enthusiasm, these five dependent variables in 
conjunction have strong construct validity. A relative increase in these areasfor 
example, an increase in political interest among Obama supporters relative to non-
supporterswould reflect a certain form of increased enthusiasm (i.e., a positive Obama 
Effect), just as a relative decrease in efficacy would reflect a certain form of decreased 
enthusiasm (i.e., a negative Obama Effect). Each variable by itself could not be viewed as 
synonymous with enthusiasm, but taken together, these measurements of political 
attitudes and participation can tell us a great deal about voter enthusiasm, and in 
particular, how it changes over time. 
My statistical models include three types of independent variables. First, each 
model incorporates two dichotomous presidential vote choice variables as my key 
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Including these vote choice variables allowed me to compare all Obama supporters to 
non-supporters and all McCain supporters to non-supporters, for purposes of intra-panel 
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addition to those who voted for the opposing candidate.)  
Second, each model incorporates a lag of the dependent variable (e.g., $  
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control variable. Without this lagged control variable, much of the causality for the value 
in the later period (t -1) would be mistakenly attributed to other independent variables 
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variable thus avoids the problem of endogeneity by accounting for the earlier value 
instead of analyzing the later value in a vacuum.  
Finally, each model includes as explanatory variables the five resource variables 
referenced in Chapter 2 (i.e. age, gender, race/ethnicity, income, and education). 
Inclusion of resource variables allows for consideration of demographic effects in 
addition to candidate effects. As with the dependent variables, each of the independent 
variables in my models are operationalized as responses to the ANES survey items. 
In rare instances, a given observation did call into question the reliability (i.e., 
accuracy in measurement) of certain survey instruments. A classic example, commonly 
observed in election surveys, is that many more respondents typically say they voted than 
those who actually have voted. This observation was true for each of my datasets. In such 
a case, it can be said that a voter turnout survey instrument is not reliable because it is not 
measuring actual turnout. However, this was not a major concern for this study because 
there is no reason to assume any systematic bias that would skew my results (i.e., no 
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would be randomly distributed across groups of respondents. As such, my analysis of 
panel data should be unaffected by such reliability issues.   
Missing values were not a major concern. For almost all the variables in all 
surveys, missing values represented less than 2% of total cases. Given the voluntary 
nature of empanelment, this extremely high response rate for all questions is 
unsurprising. Those who were disinclined to answer these types of political questions 
would likely have been filtered out of the first panel wave (in other words, they would 
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likely not be included in these samples). In light of such rarity, missing values are 
unlikely to have had any substantive impact on my statistical findings.  
Where they do appear, missing values may exist in ANES survey data sets for 
several reasons, including the respondent not finishing the survey, refusing to answer a 
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respondents were dropped from the analyses, so that they are unaffected by cases of 
missing values.  
Question Wording 
For each of the three presidential periods, I analyzed the exact same survey 
questions whenever possible. In the most ideal cases, identical questions were used across 
all surveys. For example, the same Party Identification (partisanship) question, 
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In a few instances, the essence of a question is identical, but the wording is 
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 highest level of political efficacy. 
In still other instances, I had to use different questions for different periods 
because they address the same concept despite variances in wording. Even minor 
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differences in question wording can make a significant difference, so this unideal 
decision reflected the limited and sometimes inconsistent nature of ANES survey 
questions from one election cycle to the next. For example from the 2008-2010 survey, I 
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Therefore, to gauge political interest from 2000-2002 and from 1992-1994, I relied upon 
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interest, and therefore not ideal for comparative analysis, I determined that both questions 
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Below are the full texts of survey questions that were incorporated into my 
analyses for Chapters 4-5. When necessary, the year of the question is included in 
parentheses to designate varied question wording between surveys. The questions on 
political attitudes relate to interest in politics, political efficacy, and partisanship. The 
questions on political participation relate to voter turnout, voter choice, and civic 
engagement.  
Survey Questions: 2008-2010 








government and politics? (5-point scale) 
 
External Efficacy A: How much do government officials care what people like you think? 
(5-point scale) 
 
External Efficacy B: How much can people like you affect what the government does? (5-
point scale) 
 
Partisanship/Party ID: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? (7-point scale) 
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Turnout (2010 only): How likely is it that you will vote in the congressional elections this 
November? (5-point scale)  
 
Turnout (2008 only): How about the election for the U.S. House of Representatives in 
Washington DC? Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, or 
not? 
 
Meetings (2010 only): During the past 12 months, have you attended a meeting to talk 
about political or social concerns, or have you not done this during the past 12 months?  
 
Meetings (2008 only): Have you done this, or have you never done it? Attended a 
meeting to talk about political or social concerns. 
  
Protests (2010 only): During the past 12 months, have you joined in a protest march, 
rally, or demonstration, or have you not done this during the past 12 months?  
 
Protests (2008 only): Have you done this, or have you never done it? Joined in a protest 
march, rally, or demonstration. 
 
Survey Questions: 2000-2002 and 1992-1994 
Political Interest: Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How 
about you? (5-point scale) 
 
External Efficacy A   	
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you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or 
disagree strongly with this statement? (5-point scale) 
 
External Efficacy B

































somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? (5-point scale) 
 
Partisanship/Party ID: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? (7-point scale) 
 
Turnout (2002, 1994 only): In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of 
























 you"did you vote in the elections this November? 
 
Turnout (2000, 1992 only): How about the election for the House of Representatives in 
Washington. Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives? 
 
Meetings: Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like 




Protests (2000, 2002 only): Aside from a strike against your employer, in the past twelve 
months, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or 
local issue? 
    
Hypothesis Testing 
 In Chapters 4 and 5, my quantitative analysis chapters, I tested several specific 
hypotheses on relative change in political attitudes and political participation. My 
hypothesis-testing was applied to all three panels (2008-2010, 2000-2002, and 1992-
1994): within each panel, I examined the attitudes and participation of Obama supporters 
relative to non-supporters, as well as those of McCain supporters relative to non-
supporters. This allowed me to determine whether there was a possibility of a positive 
Obama Effect (if the results support the hypothesis), a negative Obama Effect (if the 
results run contrary to the hypothesis), a candidate effect experienced by supporters of 
both candidates, or no effect at all (the null hypothesis). I then drew comparisons between 
panels to determine whether the initial findings are unique to the 2008-2010 cycle, or 
whether any significant results can be better explained as a broader presidential effect or 
a candidate effect. A presidential effect would be one experienced by the supporters of 
winning candidates (i.e., Obama, Bush II, and Clinton), whereas a candidate effect would 
be one experienced by the supporters of both winning and losing candidates.  
The dependent variable for each specific hypothesis is the political attitude or 
political behavior in the midterm year. My general hypothesis is that presidential vote 
choice has a significant impact on attitudinal and behavioral change over time. I generally 
expect the changes between 2008 and 2010 to be in the direction that would be 
considered a positive Obama Effect. 
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I also expect positive Obama Effects to be most concentrated among the 
demographic groups that were most supportive of Obama in the 2008 election. Tables 1-5 
below present cross-tabulations for my 2008 2010 panel data that break down each 
demographic group by voice choice. 
Table 1 Gender and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008 
Candidate Male Female Total 
McCain 47.8 37.9 42.0 
Obama 39.8 52.1 47.0 
Neither 12.4 10.0 11.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
N 655 933 1588 
 
Gender: Table 1 reveals a major gender gap in candidate support among 
respondents, with Obama defeating McCain 52-40 among female respondents, and 
McCain defeating Obama 48-40 among male respondents. The panel included 933 
women (58.8%) and only 655 men (41.2%). Therefore, Obama received a substantially 
wider margin of the vote among the much larger gender group in the sample. Clearly, this 
gender gap favoring female respondents was a  	




leading me to hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect among females 
relative to males and a significant interaction effect indicating a stronger positive Obama 
Effect on Obama-supporting women than on Obama-supporting men.  
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success, their impact should not be overstated. The gap in candidate support was indeed 
widest among this 18-29 year old group, but they represented only about 6% of 
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respondents, the smallest portion of the panel by far. The next smallest group was 30-44 
year olds, who represented about 23% of respondents.  
Table 2 Age and Presidential Vote Choice, 2008 
 18-29 30-44 45-59 
60-
above Total 
McCain 30.4 36.1 41.2 49.2 42.0 
Obama 45.7 47.5 48.4 45.3 47.0 
Neither 23.9 16.4 10.5 5.4 11.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 92 360 622 514 1588 
  
 The more noteworthy takeaway from Table 2 is the remarkably consistent share 
of the vote that Obama received from each age group. His support ranged from 45% to 
48%, meaning he drew almost the same proportion of support from senior citizens as 
from younger respondents. Thus, the age gaps between candidates are almost entirely 
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only 30 % support from the youngest bracket, but over 49% from the oldest group of 
respondents.  
Nevertheless, the age gap between candidates did narrow with each bracket of 
older respondents relative to the next-youngest bracket. This leads me to hypothesize a 
significant and positive Obama Effect among younger respondents relative to older 
respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a stronger positive Obama 
















McCain 46.7 1.8 29.6 27.0 42.0 
Obama 43.1 88.3 50.7 54.0 47.0 
Neither 10.2 9.9 19.7 19.0 11.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 1343 111 71 63 1588 
 
Race/Ethnicity: Table 3 shows the breakdown of presidential vote choice by 
race/ethnicity. White respondents comprised over 84% of the sample and supported 
McCain by a relatively narrow margin of 47-43%. But the three non-white groups 
supported Obama over McCain by a much larger margin of 66% to 20%. Thus, while 
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the panel, the overwhelming support for Obama among these non-white subgroups more 
than made up for his deficit among white voters, effectively accounting for his entire 
margin of victory. This leads me to hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect 
among non-white respondents relative to white respondents and a significant interaction 
effect, indicating a stronger positive Obama Effect on non-white Obama supporters than 
on white Obama supporters.  















or more Total 
McCain 50.0 24.3 40.6 41.8 42.3 46.8 42.0 
Obama 30.0 54.1 46.5 46.7 48.0 46.5 47.0 
Neither 20.0 21.6 12.9 11.5 9.8 6.7 11.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 




Income: Table 4 shows the breakdown for presidential vote choice by income 
level. Unlike the breakdowns for gender, age, and race/ethnicity, which showed McCain 
defeating Obama among at least one subgroup, Obama led McCain by a substantial 
margin among all income brackets except among those earning over $100,000. Among 
those highest earners, Obama and McCain effectively tied for support, with each 
candidate receiving about 47% of the vote among respondents.  
Most noteworthy here is that major difference between the three middle brackets, 
in which Obama defeated McCain by a margin of 5-6% and the lowest income bracket, in 
which Obama defeated McCain by a 30-point margin, 52% to 24%. This leads me to 
hypothesize a significant and positive Obama Effect among lower income respondents 
relative to higher income respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a 
stronger positive Obama Effect among lower income Obama supporters than among 
higher income Obama supporters.  
Education: Table 5 shows the breakdown of vote choice by education level. 
Although the widest gap in candidate support was found among those with no high 
school diploma, this result was likely skewed by a very low number of respondents (33) 
in this subgroup. A clearer pattern emerged across the other four subgroups, with Obama 
losing to McCain 44-38 among those with a high school diploma but no college 
education, and losing 45-   	
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degree. Conversely, Obama defeated McCain 53-41 among college graduates, and by an 





















McCain 27.3 44.4 44.8 41.0 38.2 42.0 
Obama 51.5 37.7 41.0 53.3 55.6 47.0 
Neither 21.2 17.9 14.2 5.7 6.2 11.0 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 33 223 585 407 340 1588 
 
Interestingly, the trend here was the inverse of the observed trend for income 
levels. Given that Obama performed best among the lowest income earners, one might 
have expected that Obama would also perform best among the least-educated 
respondents. However with a moderately weak correlation between income and education 
in this panel (.393), the opposite was true. Obama performed best among college 
graduates and those with advanced degrees. This leads me to hypothesize a significant 
and positive Obama Effect among higher-education respondents relative to lower-
education respondents and a significant interaction effect, indicating a stronger positive 
Obama Effect among higher-education Obama supporters than among lower-education 
Obama supporters.  
Major Hypotheses for Political Attitudes  
1. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their political interest 
relative to non-supporters.  
2. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their external political 
efficacy relative to non-supporters. 
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3. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their partisan loyalty 
(partisanship) relative to non-supporters. 
Major Hypotheses for Political Participation  
1. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their voter turnout levels 
relative to non-supporters. 
2. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of 
political meetings relative to non-supporters. 
3. Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of 
political protests relative to non-supporters. 
Statistical Testing for Quantitative Analysis 
My statistical results in Chapters 4 and 5 were derived from OLS regression 
models or binary logistic regression models. (Cross-tabulation data for these models are 
presented in Tables 6-12 in Appendix A.)     	
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regression model using two-tailed t tests. These baseline models included only three 
independent variables: Voted for [President], Voted for [Challenger], and the lag of the 
dependent variable. As noted above, each vote choice variable is dichotomous. These 
baseline models allowed me to make an initial determination about the possibility of a 
positive Obama Effect or other possible effects (i.e., negative Obama Effects, presidential 
effects, or candidate effects).  
I then ran each model a second time with resource (demographic) variables 
included along with the three aforementioned predictors from that baseline model. 
Incorporating these resource variables could result in finding significant additive effects, 
in other words, being an Obama supporter mattered x amount, being female mattered y 
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amount, and being low income mattered z amount. Although my analyses generally were 
focused on  	 
    	   		 (as opposed to 
men to women, young to old, etc), testing for additive effects in this way allowed me to 
estimate the separate (and cumulative) statistical effects of multiple independent variables 
on a given political attitude or behavior.  
Finally, one-by-one I added an interaction term to each model to test for possible 
interaction effects. An interaction term is created by multiplying the vote choice value by 
a given demographic variable value (e.g., Obama*Gender); as such, there were 10 
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variables). Analysis of interaction terms provided for more valuable analysis of the 
impact of demographics than that of additive effects alone. A significant interaction 
effect is a multiplicative effect indicating that vote choice is significant when moderated 
by a given demographic value. For example, the Obama*Gender interaction term allows 
for direct comparisons of Obama-supporting women to Obama-supporting men. Testing 
for interaction effects allowed me to determine if the attitudinal or behavioral outcomes 
of these two subgroups are significantly different from each other.  
Interview Methodology: Using In-Depth Interviews for Qualitative Analysis 
 During the summer of 2013 I conducted 30 in-depth, ethnographic interviews 
with former Purdue University students who volunteered on campus for the 2008 Obama 
campaign. As a student volunteer for that campaign, I helped maintained a spreadsheet 
with contact info for the more than 300 Purdue students who volunteered for the Obama 
campaign that fall; thus I was able to sample from this spreadsheet to contact volunteers 
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for these interviews. I contacted 43 former volunteers before reaching my target number 
of 30. This included 11 non-responses and 2 refusals, resulting in a contact rate of 74%. 
(I discuss my personal involvement and sampling technique more broadly in Chapter 6.) 
The purpose of these interviews was to broaden my understanding of whether or not there 
was a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect that the 2008 Obama campaign had on 
its most enthusiastic supporters: those who chose to volunteer for the campaign. 
These interviews lasted roughly 15-20 minutes each and were conducted by 
phone. I used a recording application to record each interview for purposes of accurate 
transcription. Each interviewee was asked to elaborate on a series of questions related to 
their political attitudes and behaviors over the 5-year period from 2008-2013. The 
interview questions were largely open-ended and designed to provide insight into the 
causes of their political attitudes and the motivations behind their political behaviors over 
the past 5 years. (The interviewee recruitment information sheet, script to begin the 
interview, and full list of questions can be found in the appendices.)  
Needless to say, this sample of 30 interviewees who spent a portion of their free 
time volunteering for a political campaign represents a dramatically different sample than 
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ers) in the field 
which they were asked to discuss. In other words, while the ANES data employed in my 
quantitative analysis was derived from surveys with a representative sample of the 
national population, my interview data was derived from a convenience sample of 
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interviewees who were not representative of and far more engaged in the Obama 
campaign than the national population.    
As with the ANES data, my interview questions fall into 2 categories: political 















and the direction of the country. I then ask about their political participation in terms of 
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2008 Obama campaign and their other forms of civic engagement since 2008, such as 
their attendance of local political meetings or volunteer work for non-political causes.  
The major benefit of this qualitative approach was the open-ended nature of my 
interview questions. This allowed me to explore the major themes from my quantitative 
analysis in greater depth and through analysis of volunteers who were presumably 
uniquely susceptible to a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect. The closed-ended 
ANES questions allowed only for respondents to register their attitudes and behaviors on 
a limited response-set, and did not allow for follow-up questions, whereas my open-
ended interview questions allowed for respondents to delve deeper into these subjects and 
elaborate on their attitudes and behaviors whenever I prompted them to do so. This line 
of qualitative interview-based research, then, stands alone as an analysis of the Obama 
Effect on former campaign volunteers; but also functions as a powerful complement to 






Appendix A: Cross Tabulation Tables for 2008 Survey Responses 
Table 6 Political Interest and Candidate Choice, 2008 
Interest 









interested Total  
McCain 0.70% 5.70% 24.70% 40.90% 27.90% 100.00% 
Obama 0.80% 5.50% 23.60% 39.50% 30.70% 100.00% 
Neither 5.70% 19.00% 39.10% 24.10% 12.10% 100.00% 
Total 1.30% 7.10% 25.80% 38.40% 27.50% 100.00% 





Table 7 Political Efficacy A and Candidate Choice, 2008 
Efficacy A Not at all A little 
A moderate 
amount A lot 
A great 
deal Total 
McCain 9.60% 35.80% 45.60% 7.30% 1.60% 100.00% 
Obama 4.10% 25.60% 50.70% 14.70% 4.80% 100.00% 
Neither 24.10% 35.60% 28.70% 7.50% 4.00% 100.00% 
Total 8.60% 31.00% 46.20% 10.80% 3.40% 100.00% 
N  137 492 733 172 54 1588 
 
 
Table 8 Political Efficacy B and Candidate Choice, 2008 
Efficacy B Not at all A little 
A moderate 
amount A lot 
A great 
deal Total 
McCain 9.60% 36.70% 38.80% 10.90% 3.90% 100.00% 
Obama 3.20% 28.40% 42.70% 17.10% 8.60% 100.00% 
Neither 20.10% 40.80% 25.30% 10.30% 3.40% 100.00% 
Total 7.70% 33.20% 39.20% 13.80% 6.00% 100.00% 
N  123 528 622 219 96 1588 
 
 
















McCain 3.00% 6.00% 1.30% 6.10% 15.90% 21.30% 46.30% 
Obama 47.50% 20.50% 17.00% 6.60% 2.30% 5.10% 1.10% 
Neither 10.90% 11.50% 12.60% 25.30% 12.60% 19.00% 8.00% 
Total 24.80% 13.40% 9.90% 8.40% 9.10% 13.40% 20.80% 
N  394 213 158 134 145 213 331 
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Table 10 Voter Turnout and Candidate Choice, 2008 
Turnout Nonvoter Voter Total  
McCain 0.10% 99.90% 100.00% 
Obama 0.10% 99.90% 100.00% 
Neither 77.60% 22.40% 100.00% 
Total 8.60% 91.40% 100.00% 
N  137 1451 1588 
 
 





done this  Total 
McCain 43.50% 56.50% 100.00% 
Obama 41.00% 59.00% 100.00% 
Neither 69.50% 30.50% 100.00% 
Total 45.20% 54.80% 100.00% 
N  718 870 1588 
 





done this Total  
McCain 81.40% 18.60% 100.00% 
Obama 66.40% 33.60% 100.00% 
Neither 85.50% 14.50% 100.00% 
Total 74.70% 25.30% 100.00% 
N  1184 400 1584 
 
 
Appendix B: Interviewee Recruitment Information Sheet 
Title. After the Honeymoon: The Obama Effect on Political Attitudes, Political 
Participation, and Civic Engagement 
Principal Investigator. Dr. James McCann, Purdue University, Department of Political 
Science 
Purpose of Research. To gather information from former 2008 Obama campaign 
volunteers regarding political attitudes, civic engagement, and political participation, for 
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purposes of understanding how and why political attitudes and behaviors develop or 
change over time. 
Specific Procedures. Your interview will be conducted via telephone or on the Purdue 
University campus, whichever you choose. In the interview you will be asked a series of 
questions about your political attitudes, civic engagement, and political participation. 
You may refuse to answer any questions if you choose. The interview will be conducted 
by Laurent Vesely, a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Purdue 
University. Your interview will be audio-recorded for purposes of transcription only. 
Duration of Participation. You will be interviewed once for about 15-30 minutes. 
Risks. Potential risks in research such as invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality, 
and psychological harm are minimal or absent in this research. Please be aware that your 
personal information will not be accessed or collected without your knowledge and 
consent; that no information you provide will be disseminated outside the research 
setting; and that the risk of psychological harm is minimal given that you may decline to 
answer any questions if you choose. 
Benefits. There are no direct benefits to you by participating in this study.  
Compensation. You will not receive any compensation for your voluntary participation in 
this research.  
Confidentiality. The project's research records may be reviewed by departments at 
Purdue University responsible for regulatory and research oversight. Your records 
associated with this research will be kept confidential at all times and your name will not 
be reported in the research. The name, audio-recording, and transcription associated with 
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of your interview will be destroyed at the conclusion of this research and no later than 
August 31st, 2013.  
Voluntary Nature of Participation. You do not have to participate in this research project.  
If you agree to participate you can withdraw your participation at any time without 
penalty.      
Contact Information. If you have any questions about this research project, you can 
contact the Principal Investigator for this research: Dr. James McCann at 765-494-0738, 
or the interviewer, Laurent Vesely at 765-543-4996. Laurent Vesely is designated Key 
Personnel for this research and may be considered your first point of contact. If you have 
concerns about the treatment of research participants, you can contact the Institutional 
Review Board at Purdue University, Ernest C. Young Hall, 10th Floor, Room 1032, 155 
S. Grant St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2114. The phone number for the Board is (765) 
494-5942. The email address is irb@purdue.edu. 
Informed Consent: I have had the opportunity to read this information form and have the 
research study explained.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research 
project and my questions have been answered.  I am prepared to participate in the 
research project described above.  
Appendix C: Script to Begin Interview 
First off, thank you for your willingness to be interviewed for this research project. This 
interview will last about 15 minutes and will be audio-recorded for purposes of accurate 
transcription. Just as a reminder, your records will be kept confidential and your name 
will not be publicized in this research. At any time, please let me know if you prefer not 
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to answer any question, and I will simply skip to the next question. Are you ready to 
begin? 
Appendix D: Interview Questions  
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Has your interest changed very much over the past 5 years or remained fairly 
consistent?  
2) Do you think the government cares what people like you think? 
3) How do you feel about Barack Obama these days? And how have your feelings 
about him changed (or not changed) since his 2008 campaign?  
4) How do you feel about the way things are going for the U.S. these days? Are you 
more optimistic and positive about the future, or are you more pessimistic and 
negative?  
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1) Did you vote in the midterm elections in November 2010 and/or the presidential 
election of 2012? Do you think of voting more as a duty or responsibility, or is it 
something where you really need to be inspired by specific candidates or parties 
to vote? 
2) Have you volunteered on any campaigns since the 2008 Obama campaign? For 
what campaign? What kind of stuff did you do? 
3) Can you think of any other way in which you participated in politics since the 
2008 campaign, such as contributing money to a candidate, putting a campaign 
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bumper sticker on your car, contacting an elected official about an issue, or 
attending a political protest?  
4) Was the 2008 Obama campaign the first political campaign for which you ever 
volunteered? 
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1) In the last 5 years, have you voluntarily joined any non-political organizations or 
associations?  
2) In the last 5 years, have you attended any kind of community meeting about social 
or community issues?  
3) In the past 5 years, have you voluntarily participated in any kind of charity work 
or donated to any charity yourself?  
4) Since 2008, can you think of any other type of volunteer work that you have 
engaged in?  
5) Finally: When you think back to volunteering on that 2008 Obama campaign 5 
years later, is there anything in particular that is really memorable for you or that 






CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE OBAMA EFFECT 
Theory 
Democratic theory suggests that in an electoral democracy, political candidates 
and parties will seek to mobilize specifically those segments of the electorate most likely 
to support them in the next election. Presidential candidates, however, have a vested 
interest in thinking beyond just the upcoming election. Among other titles, they are 
seeking to become the de facto leaders of their respective parties. Both statements hold 
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accomplish much without the support of lower party officeholders. A major goal of 
presidential campaigns, then, should be to establish the highest quality of democratic 
engagement possible. A campaign with a particularly high quality of democratic 
engagement may build coalitions of electoral support not only for the upcoming election, 
but for future election cycles as well. As such, presidential campaigns should seek to 
produce long-term positive effects on the political attitudes, and, ultimately, on the future 
political participation of their supporters (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Holbrook, 1996; 
Mayhew, 1997; Campbell et al, 1960). 
The 2008 Obama campaign experienced unprecedented success by many short-
term measures, such as fundraising, volunteerism, and voter turnout. However, the 
campaign also put a tremendous amount of effort into high-quality democratic 
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engagement with the electorate, with the express hope of producing more durable 
positive effects on its supporters. Their campaign outreach and mobilization efforts were 
notoriously methodical and sustained. As I discussed in Chapter 1, they were quite 
explicit in seeking this longer-term form of engagement with the electorate, even going as 
far as to claim that pulling the lever for Obama in the general election was not enough. 
The campaign sought much more from its supporters, asking that they stay engaged, that 
they believe in their own power to create change, and that they remain involved in 
politics even after the election. In sum, the 2008 Obama campaign sought to have a truly 
transformational effect on the political attitudes and participation of its supporters. But 
did it succeed?  
In this chapter I address this question as it pertains to three political attitudes that 
may play particularly strong roles in driving long-term democratic engagement within the 
electorate: political interest, external political efficacy, and partisanship. Political interest 
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to meaningfully engage and influence government and politics because government is 
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largely be a function of long-term socialization which depend on their family, friends, 
school, and media, I have theorized that such attitudes may also be influenced 





Hypothesizing an Obama Effect on Political Attitudes 
My general hypothesis for this chapter is that the 2008 Obama campaign had a 
significant, lasting, and positive (or even transformational) impact on the political 
attitudes of its supporters over time. My approach is to compare Obama supports directly 
to non-supporters (i.e., McCain supporters + third-party voters + nonvoters.) I test each 
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would manifest as an increase in political interest, external efficacy, and partisanship 
among Obama supporters relative to non- 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Obama Effect would manifest as a relative decrease over time in the political interest, 
external efficacy, and partisanship of Obama supporters.   
Initially, I considered any significant impact (in either direction) to be a sign of 
only a possible Obama Effect. This qualification is warranted because what initially 
appears to be a confirmed hypothesis may actually reflect a larger presidential effect (i.e., 
one typically experienced by supporters of winning campaigns) or an even broader 
candidate effect (i.e. one typically experienced by supporters of both winning and losing 
candidates). In other words, Obama supporters may have experienced presidential effects 
or candidate effects that are not unique to that group. To account for these possibilities, I 
performed comparable hypothesis-testing for the 2000ffi2002 campaign, comparing the 
political attitudes of Bush II supporters to those of non-supporters, and for the 1992ffi
1994 campaign, comparing Clinton supporters to non-supporters.   
My dependent variable for each hypothesis test is the value of the political 
attitude in the midterm year (i.e., 2010, 2002, or 1994). The lag of this variable (i.e., the 
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value of the attitude in the corresponding presidential year) is always included as a 
control variable in each model to avoid the problem of endogeneity (see Chapter 3).  
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panel who voted for Obama is compared on the value of the dependent variable to 
everyone on the panel who did not vote for Obama (i.e. McCain voters + third-party 
voters + nonvoters). Likewise, everyone who voted for McCain is compared to everyone 
who did not vote for McCain (i.e., Obama voters + third party voters + nonvoters). In 
short, my two key predictors are my vote choice variables. Since both dummy predictors 
are included in each model, the coefficient always indicates the difference between voters 
for a particular candidate and everyone else who did not vote for that candidate. 
My baseline models include only the vote choice variables and the lagged 
dependent variable as predictors. After each baseline regression, I ran another 
multivariate regression model to test for demographic effects as well. These broader 
models allowed me to test for positive additive effects of gender, age, race/ethnicity, 
income, and education. I also ran models incorporating all interaction terms that moderate 
vote choice by a demographic value. Interaction terms allow me to test for multiplicative 
effects instead of only additive effects. 
Political Interest 
Major Hypothesis #1: Political Interest. My first major hypothesis is that from 2008-
2010, Obama supporters increased or sustained their political interest relative to non-
supporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced among those 
subgroups that were most supportive of Obama, for instance, female respondents, 
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younger respondents, non-white respondents, lower income respondents, and highly 
educated respondents. The hypothesis would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect (that 
is, a decrease in political interest in supporters relative to non-supporters) was found. The 
null hypothesis states that vote choice did not have any impact on the direction of 
political interest between 2008 2010.  
The measure of political intere   	
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question wording sometimes varies between surveys.) The response set consisted of a 5-
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Obama-McCain Findings on Political Interest. Contrary to my hypothesis, results from 
Table 13 revealed a possible negative Obama Effect on political interest rather than a 
positive one. The lagged dependent variable, with a continuity score of .639, indicates a 
fair but not overwhelming level of stability in political interest during these two years; 
but it was only McCain supporters who experienced a statistically significant increase 
(.191) relative to non-supporters. (Obama supporters actually experienced a relative 
decrease of -.041, but this was not statistically significant.) This possible negative Obama 
Effect represents a rejection of my hypothesis and a rejection of the null as well. Results 
were statistically significant, but in the opposite direction than I had hypothesized.  
The broader model reflected in Table 14 indicates that even after controlling for 
demographics (gender, age, and race/ethnicity, income, education), McCain supporters 
still increased their interest relative to non-supporters (.120), albeit at the lower 
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confidence level of .10 as opposed to .01 for the baseline model. The relative decrease 
among Obama supporters of -.063 was not statistically insignificant in this model either.   
In terms of additive effects, in addition to being a McCain voter, both gender and 
age were statistically significant. Contrary to my expectations, for the period of 2008-
2010, it was men rather than women who experienced a relative and significant increase 
in political interest (.172). Similarly surprising was that the older the respondents, the 
more likely they were to increase their relative political interest over time. I found that 
every additional year of age corresponded to an increase in political interest of .009, 
representing significance at the .01 level. It should be noted that for purposes of my 
regression models, the actual age of respondents was incorporated in the form of 
continuous interval data, as opposed to the ordinal age brackets presented in Chapter 3, 
Table 2. This was done to provide more specificity for my causal explanations than was 
necessary or practical for cross-tabulation purposes.  
Race/ethnicity did not appear to have a significant impact on interest in 
government and politics over this time period. I had expected that non-white respondents 
would increase their interest relative to white respondents, but no significant effect was 
observable. It should be noted that for purposes of my regression models, non-white 
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this grouping was far from ideal, non-whites collectively comprised a relatively small 
15.4% of the panel and supported Obama overwhelmingly. Therefore it was more logical 
to group them into a sufficiently large n for purposes of hypothesis testing. 
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Likewise, income and education appeared to have no impact. I had expected 
lower income respondents and highly educated respondents to experience a positive 
Obama Effect. However neither group increased their political interest at a statistically 
significant level.  
Testing for interaction effects revealed two highly significant interaction terms: 
Obama*Gender (-.174, see Table 15) and Obama*Income (-.055, see Table 16). In other 
words, both gender and income were statistically significant when moderated by support 
for Obama. (McCain supporters were not distinguishable by gender or income.) The 
Obama*Gender effect was particularly interesting since my gender hypothesis had 
already been rejected in the additive model: it was men, not women, who experienced the 
relative increase in political interest. The interaction effect ran similarly contrary to my 
hypothesized direction: it was specifically Obama-supporting women who decreased 
their interest so sharply, relative specifically to Obama-supporting men.  
The income variable did not produce an additive effect; however, when 
moderated by support for Obama, an observable difference appeared between lower-
income Obama supporters and higher-income Obama supporters. Each increase of 1 
income bracket corresponded to a -.055 decrease, indicating a substantial falloff in 
relative political interest among higher-income Obama supporters compared to lower-
income Obama supporters. This effect occurred in the hypothesized direction.   
Excepting this last observation, each statistically significant result on political 
interest ran contrary to my hypothesis. There was no grand correspondence between 
support for Obama and increased political interest; in fact, the opposite appeared to be 
true under certain conditions. One explanation could be an actual negative Obama Effect 
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on political interest, rather than a positive effect, manifested as increased interest among 
those who opposed him. A second possibility could be a negative presidential effect, 
similarly manifested as increased relative interest among opponents of other winning 
candidates as well as Obama. I considered these possibilities by turning my attention to 
the 2000 2002 and 1992 1994 panels for comparative purposes.  
Bush II-Gore Findings on Political Interest. Results from the baseline model (Table 17) 
reveal a significant increase in political interest among both Bush II and Gore supporters 
between 2000 and 2002. The lagged continuity score of .431 indicates a relatively low 
degree of stability in political interest over those 2 years; therefore, it is unsurprising that 
the coefficients for Bush II (.244) and Gore (.197) were substantially higher than for 
Obama and McCain (see Table 13).    
The Bush II coefficient remains largely unchanged (.224) when demographics are 
introduced into the model (Table 18). The relative increase in political interest among 
Bush II supporters remains significant at the .05 level (compared to .01 in the baseline 
model). For Gore supporters, however, the significance of the increase disappears, 
indicating that it was likely attributable to variables other than the Gore vote choice.  
This model identified four different demographic variables as statistically 
significant. The first variable was age: as with the 2008-2010 panel, older respondents 
tended to increase their political interest relative to younger respondents. Each year of 
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implications similar to 2008-2010, with women decreasing their political interest relative 
to men. The coefficient for the Bush II-Gore cycle was actually twice as large (.347) as it 
was for the Obama-McCain cycle (.172), indicating an even more substantial gender 
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effect. The other two significant variables race/ethnicity and income had not been 
significant in the Obama-McCain cycle. In this cycle, being non-white was associated 
with an increase in political interest (.294), while higher incomes were actually associated 
with decreased political interest, with each added income bracket corresponding to a 
decrease of -.042.  
Based on the significant Obama*Gender and Obama*Income interaction effects 
shown in Tables 15 and 16, I tested four interaction terms for the Bush II-Gore election 
cycle: Bush II*Gender, Bush II*Income, Gore*Gender, and Gore*Income. None of these 
interaction terms appeared to be statistically significant.   
Clinton-Bush I Findings on Political Interest. Next, I turn to comparative data from the 
1992-1994 cycle. Findings from Table 19 reveal that Clinton and Bush supporters both 
experienced a significant increase in political interest relative to non-supporters. The 
lagged continuity score of .382 ranks among the lowest in any of my regression models, 
indicating relatively high fluctuations in levels of political interest during this cycle. 
These fluctuations also helps explain the relatively large coefficients of .440 for Clinton 
supporters and .325 for Bush I supporters. 
As Table 20 shows, both vote choice variables and nearly all demographic 
variables were shown to have a significant additive effect, with the statistically 
insignificant race/ethnicity variable being the lone exception. Even after controlling for 
demographics, there was a statistically significant relative increase in political interest 
among both Clinton supporters (.272) and Bush I supporters (.305). Both were significant 
at the .01 level in the baseline model, but dropped to the .05 significance level in this 
model incorporating demographic variables.  
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For this 1992-1994 cycle, the additive effects of both gender and age were very 
similar to those of the other two cycles. Once again, older respondents increased their 
interest relative to younger respondents; each year of additional age corresponded to an 




substantially compared to that of men, as indicated by the relatively large coefficient of 
.326.  
My analysis of the income and education variables did not produce such clear 
patterns. Neither had been significant in the Obama-McCain cycle. Income was 
statistically significant for the 2000-2002 cycle, but not in 1992-1994, for which each 
increase in income bracket corresponded to a .018 increase in political interest. The 
education variable had not been significant for the other cycles, but for 1992-1994, each 
increase in educational level corresponded to a .108 increase in political interest.  
 Summary and Discussion of Political Interest. The most interesting observation from my 
findings above is that I had to reject my major hypothesis of a positive Obama Effect on 
political interest. In fact, the opposite seems to have been the case. The supporters of all 
five of the other candidates in my analysis actually did increase their relative political 
interest significantly over the course of two years. Obama was the only candidate whose 
supporters actually decreased their relative interest (albeit not at a statistically significant 
level) during this span.  



















 was very similar for both 
candidates: a combined 70.2% for Obama supporters and a combined 68.8% for McCain 
supporters (see Table 6). Such comparable percentages indicate that the relative decrease 
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in interest among Obama supporters was not due to having been much more interested in 
2008. It would be appropriate, then, to identify these results as having a negative Obama 
Effect on political interest.  
One possible explanation for their relative falloff in political interest is that 
Obama supporters experienced burnout or fatigue due to relatively heavy campaign 
involvement. They may have expended so much energy during the 2008 campaign that 
they were content with the election itself and less interested, relatively speaking, in the 
governance to follow. This potential explanation would gain considerable traction if the 
analysis in the next section would show a relative increase in external political efficacy 
among Obama supporters. Decreased political interest, combined with increased external 
efficacy, could indicate that Obama supporters felt exhausted after a high level of 
campaign engagement and were thus inclined to trust the Obama administration to do the 
rights things while in office (whether they were paying attention or not).  
An alternative explanation that seemed very plausible from the 2008-2010 data, 
but that I found to be lacking after comparisons to the earlier data, is the rise of the Tea 
Party Movement. Initially, I considered that perhaps the Tea Party phenomenon 
manifested as increased political interest among those least supportive of Obama, with 
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in negative attitudes (e.g., concern, anger, fear, etc.). Looking only at the results for 2008-
2010, such an explanation may seem not only possible but even intuitive. However, the 
comparisons to 2000-2002 and 1992-1994 election periods make this explanation appear 
less plausible. After all, the relative increase in political interest of McCain supporters 
was actually lower than the comparative relative increases for the supporters of Bush II, 
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Gore, Clinton, and Bush I. This suggests that a relative increase in political interest may 
be a fairly common candidate effect. The results, then, are likely indicating something 
closer to the burnout theory mentioned above. The Obama supporters may have simply 
disengaged after the election because they were relatively exhausted after accomplishing 
their major goal of helping to elect Obama.  
 Turning my attention back to demographics: I had initially hypothesized that the 
demographic groups most supportive of Obama would experience a positive effect on 
political interest, and/or that the significance of those demographics could be fleshed out 
by incorporating interaction terms into the models. But this was rarely the case. For 
race/ethnicity, income, and education, the null hypothesis was confirmed (i.e., no 
statistical significance).  
But most notably, in all three cycles women actually decreased their political 
interest relative to men, and younger participants decreased their political interest relative 
to older participants. I would be reluctant to characterize the age result as a negative 
Obama Effect, given that the interaction terms were not statistically significant. I would, 
however, characterize the 2008 gender finding as a somewhat negative Obama Effect 
given that Obama-supporting women experienced a decline in interest relative to non-
supporting women. More broadly, though, such gender and age effects were not 
attributable to the 2008 Obama campaign, given the broader patterns of gender and age 
effects that spanned across multiple election cycles and presidencies. For gender, this 
pattern was surprising, given the truism in American elections that women consistently 
vote at higher rates than men. One might speculate that women may be more engaged in 
elections, while men experience a relative uptick in interest during the governance period 
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after the presidential election. For age, the established pattern was unsurprising. While I 
hypothesized a positive Obama Effect on subgroups that were associated with the Obama 
electoral coalition, such as younger voters, I cannot say I was surprised to find that 
younger participants were most likely to become disinterested after the election, 
compared to older participants who are presumably more likely to remain interested in 
government and politics year in and year out.  
External Political Efficacy 
Major Hypothesis #2: External Political Efficacy. My second major hypothesis is that 
between 2008 and 2010, Obama supporters increased or sustained their external political 
efficacy relative to non-supporters. Once again, I expected this positive Obama Effect to 
be most pronounced among the subgroups most supportive of Obama (i.e. women, 
younger respondents, non-white respondents, low income respondents, and highly 
educated respondents). I also tested for interaction effects (i.e., vote choice multiplied by 
a given resource variable) to determine whether any significance from demographics is 
additive or multiplicative (or both) in nature. The major hypothesis would be rejected if a 
negative Obama Effect was found, that is, if I observed a decrease in external efficacy 
among Obama supporters relative to non-supporters. The null hypothesis states that vote 
choice did not have any impact on the direction of external efficacy from 2008-2010.  
My analysis incorporated two different survey instruments as measures of 
external efficacy. (I will present descriptive results for both measures before delving into 
a summary and discussion of outcomes.) The first instrument, External Efficacy A, asks: 
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Obama-McCain Findings on Political Efficacy A. Results from Table 21 support my 
hypothesis of a positive Obama Effect on the first measure of external efficacy (External 
Efficacy A). As I predicted, based on data from 2008-2010, Obama supporters became 
significantly more efficacious (.188) relative to non-supporters. This result stands in 
sharp contrast with McCain supporters, who became significantly less efficacious (-.180) 
during this span. Both values were significant at the .01 level. The continuity score for 
the lagged dependent variable was .457, representing a relatively low level of stability for 
this attitude.  
These findings held up in the broader demographics model as well (see Table 22). 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for McCain supporters (-.229) became even larger and 
remained significant at the .01 level. The coefficient for Obama supporters (.122) also 
remained statistically significant (albeit at the.10 level). Even after controlling for 
demographic effects, much of the explanatory power appeared to be concentrated in the 
vote choice itself and not just in demographics. These results pointed to the possibility of 
a positive Obama Effect on this measure of external efficacy. 
Although the gender variable was not significant in this model, other demographic 
variables did have additive effects. The age and income variables were significant, but in 
the opposite direction from what I hypothesized. Specifically, each additional year of age 
corresponded to an increase of .003, indicating that relatively older respondents increased 
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their political efficacy relative to younger respondents. And each move up one income 
bracket corresponded to an increase of .030, indicating that higher income respondents 
increased their efficacy relative to lower income respondents. On the other hand, the 
race/ethnicity and education variables were significant in the direction that I 
hypothesized. Being non-white corresponded to an increase of .108 relative to white 
respondents. And each move up one education bracket corresponded to an increase of 
.075, indicating a positive relationship between formal education and increased efficacy.   
Two of the 10 interaction terms I tested were statistically significant at the .10 
level: Obama*Income (Table 23) and McCain*Income (Table 24). In other words, while 
income had an additive effect, a clearer picture of its import emerged when this variable 
was moderated by vote choice. Specifically, the interaction effect for Obama*Income 
(.056) suggests that higher-income Obama supporters became significantly more 
efficacious from 2008-2010 than lower-income Obama supporters. The interaction effect 
for McCain*Income (-.056) suggests that lower-income McCain supporters actually 
increased their efficacy significantly as compared to higher-income McCain supporters. 
 These results largely appeared to confirm my major hypothesis that support for 
Obama had a positive effect on this first measure of external efficacy. The hypothesis 
was further supported by what appeared to be a contrasting negative effect among 
McCain supporters. But before I could confirm the hypothesis outright, I turned my 
attention back to the 2000-2002 and the 1992-1994 panel data. This comparative data 
allowed me to determine whether there truly was a positive Obama Effect at work, or 
whether there may have been a broader presidential effect on external efficacy that 
predated any Obama campaign effect.  
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Bush II-Gore Findings on External Efficacy A. The baseline model in Table 25 indicates 
a tremendous increase in this form of external efficacy among Bush II supporters relative 
to non-supporters (.577). There was also a statistically significant increase among Gore 
supporters relative to non-supporters, but only at the .10 level of significance (.254). The 
lagged continuity score of .460 reflected a fairly low level of stability in political efficacy 
during this 2-year cycle. 
As Table 26 shows, inclusion of demographic variables barely reduced the 
explanatory power for the Bush II vote choice variable (.464); it remained significant at 
the .01 level. Meanwhile, the Gore vote choice variable lost its explanatory power. These 
results were not very surprising, given the controversial outcome of the 2000 election, 
which involved the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court ruling in favor of Bush II. Presumably, 
that ruling would have made Gore supporters relatively unlikely to respond favorably to 
the external effi   	
















-white respondentswho supported Gore over Bush II 
at a rate of more than 2 to 1significantly decreased their efficacy (-.286) between 2000 
and 2002. As I observed in most other models, men increased their efficacy relative to 
women (.208). And once again, higher levels of education also corresponded to increased 
external efficacy (.123). 
Both interaction terms for income (Obama*Income and McCain*Income) had 
been significant in the 2008-2010 cycle, but only the Bush II*Income interaction term 
was significant (.108, see Table 27) in the 2000-2002 cycle. The direction was the same 
as for Obama supporters (with higher-income Bush II supporters increasing their efficacy 
relative to lower-income Bush II supporters), and the opposite direction of McCain 
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supporters. Given the parallels between Obama and Bush II supporters, and those 
between McCain and Gore supporters, these findings may reflect some support for a 
positive presidential effect thesis, as opposed to one of a unique Obama Effect.  
Clinton-Bush I Findings on External Efficacy A. The pattern did not hold up for the 
1992 1994 cycle, as neither support for Clinton nor support for Bush I was statistically 
significant in either the baseline model or the broader demographics model (see Tables 
28 and 29). Only two demographic variables were statistically significant: income (.014) 
and education (.169); both had a positive and significant effect on this measure of 
external efficacy, matching the pattern from the other election cycles. However, the vote 
choice*income interaction terms that had been significant for the other cycles were not 
statistically significant for the Clinton-Bush I cycle.     
In the next section, I present the findings for External Efficacy B, my second 





















 I will then summarize and 
synthesize the results for both measures of external efficacy.  
Obama-McCain Findings on External Efficacy B. Interestingly, as Table 30 shows, 
results for this measure of external efficacy stand in stark contrast to results from the first 
measure. On this second measure, it was McCain supporters who significantly increased 
their efficacy (.142) relative to non-supporters, at the .05 significance level. For Obama 
supporters, the increase was not statistically significant. The lagged continuity score of 
.511 indicated a moderate level of stability in this attitude over the two-year cycle.  
When demographics are introduced into the model (see Table 31), the relative 
increase among McCain supporters loses its statistical significance, falling just outside 
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the .10 threshold of significance. Other variables, race/ethnicity and education in 
particular, also fell just outside the .10 threshold. The only demographic variable to reach 
statistical significance was age: just as with the first measure of external efficacy, each 
additional year added .003 for External Efficacy B. In this case, too, older respondents 
increased their political efficacy relative to younger respondents. Gender and income 
were not statistically significant in this model.  
The two interaction terms that were statistically significant for this variable were 
Obama*Race (.438, see Table 32) and McCain*Race (-.611, see Table 33). Both were 
highly significant at the .01 level. This indicated that non-white Obama supporters 
increased their efficacy significantly relative to white Obama supporters while non-white 
McCain supporters decreased their efficacy relative to white McCain supporters. It is 
important, however, not to read too much into these particular interaction effects, given 
the fairly small n of non-white respondents on the panel. Of 1588 respondents, only 245 
(15.4%) were non-white. This allows for a very small number of non-white respondents 
supporting a candidate to have an outsized impact on the level of significance for these 
interaction terms, thus potentially skewing the results. This may be especially the case for 
the McCain*Race term, given that only 37 of those 245 non-white respondents on the 
panel were McCain supporters.   
Bush II-Gore Findings on External Efficacy B. Results from Table 34 reveal a major 
significant increase in this measure of external efficacy among Bush II supporters relative 
to non-supporters (.636), and a lesser but still significant increase among Gore supporters 
relative to non-supporters (.290). The lagged continuity score of .529 reflected a fair but 
not especially high degree of stability in this attitude between 2000 and 2002.  
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Table 35 reflects a rare instance in which the vote choice coefficients actually 
grew larger to .646 for Bush II supporters and to .310 for Gore supporters after 
controlling for demographic variables. None of the explanatory power was conceded to 
demographic factors, although the education variable was statistically significant at the 
.05 level. Each additional education bracket corresponded to an increase in efficacy of 
.113, indicating the positive relationship between education and external efficacy that I 
hypothesized and observed in most other models. The Bush II*Race and Gore*Race 
interaction terms were not statistically significant.  
Clinton-Bush I Findings on External Efficacy B. Results from Tables 36 and 37 reveal 
that presidential vote choice had very little impact on this measure of external efficacy in 
the 1992-1994 cycle. In the baseline model, the null hypothesis was confirmed for 
Clinton supporters; there was no significant change in their efficacy relative to non-
supporters. Bush I supporters showed an increase in efficacy relative to non-supporters 
(.179), but it was just barely significant at the .10 level. The lagged continuity score of 
.262 was among the lowest in my entire analysis, reflecting a very low level of stability in 
this attitude over the two-year period. 
Once demographics were introduced into the model, neither support for Clinton 
nor support for Bush I had any significant impact. Gender was significant in this model (-
.157), but only at the .10 level. This result appeared to be an outlier in relation to findings 
from the other election cycles. In all other models for which gender has been significant, 
it was men who experienced a positive increase in the attitude relative to women, but in 
this lone model it was women who became more efficacious relative to men. The 
education variable was also significant, and again it was positively associated with 
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external efficacy. Each education bracket upward corresponded to a .202 increase in 
efficacy, a coefficient that reached the highest level of statistical significance.  
The interaction terms Clinton*Race (-.453) and Bush I*Race (.634) were both 
statistically significant (see Tables 38 and 39). However, as I noted for Obama*Race 
(Table 32) and McCain*Race (Table 33), the relatively small sample size of non-white 
participants warrants qualification in terms of the substantive impact of race/ethnicity. 
Indeed, the samples were even smaller for 1992-1994: out of 759 participants on the 
panel, only 116 where non-white. Among those, only 60 supported Clinton and only 14 
supported Bush I. Creating interaction terms for such small n subgroup samples resulted 
in unusually large standard errors for these interaction terms. This issue makes it very 
difficult to interpret the true impact of race/ethnicity when moderated by vote choice. I 
struggled to identify a coherent theoretical explanation for these results, given that 
Obama and Clinton supporters experienced opposite outcomes, and McCain and Bush I 
supporters experienced opposite outcomes. As with the 2008-2010 findings, I suspect 
these 1992-1994 results were skewed by the small sample size of non-white respondents 
on the panel. 
Summary and Discussion of External Efficacy. I employed two distinct survey items 
measuring different dimensions of external political efficacy; the results for each 
dimension were markedly different from the other. On the measure asking whether 
government cared about what people like them thought, Obama supporters became much 
more efficacious while McCain supporters registered a sharp decrease in external 
efficacy, not only relative to each other, but relative to all other candidates in the earlier 
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that it would have a lasting and positive effect on their efficacy. Obama supporters had a 
unique sense that the Obama-led government now cared, or cared more, about what 
people like them thought. This effect appeared to be especially pronounced among higher 
income Obama supporters and not as much among lower income supporters. For McCain 
supporters, unlike my conclusion for political interest, these efficacy findings did appear 
to reflect a manifestation of the 2009-2010 rise of the Tea Party Movement. This 
movement of disaffected citizens, overwhelmingly McCain supporters, formed after the 
2008 election for the express purpose of organizing around shared feelings of political 
disenfranchisement and alienation; so it makes sense that such attitudes would register as 
a relative decrease on that first measure of external political efficacy. 
On the second measure of external efficacy, which asked whether people like 
them could affect what government does, I observed a possible negative Obama Effect 
that ran contrary to my hypothesis. It was not Obama supporters but rather, McCain 
supporters who experienced the relative increase on this dimension of efficacy. It is likely 
that the organizational capacity provided by the Tea Party movement and the decision of 
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(for instance, the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act) led to McCain supporters 
feeling more emboldened in terms of their capacity to influence government. For Obama 
supporters, the relative ambivalence may have reflected a reluctance to continually 
engage a grueling legislative process. Obama had campaigned on change, but even with 
strong Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, he had to make major 
compromises and concessions on his major agenda items to get them passed through 
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Congress. It is not completely surprising, then, that Obama supporters would come to feel 
that they had a strong advocate (External Efficacy A), but who was not as successful a 
change agent as they had hoped (External Efficacy B); and that McCain supporters would 
come to feel that they could influence government policy (External Efficacy B) even if 
they felt increasingly that the Obama-led government did not care what people like them 
thought (External Efficacy A). Presumably they felt they could influence government 
specifically by blocking Oba  	  
In the above section on political interest, I suggested that the relative decline 
among Obama supporters was likely due, at least in part, to burnout or fatigue after an 
exciting but exhausting campaign. Here I posit a related argument: that the relative 

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meet the impossibly high expectations placed upon him by his supporters. Indeed, Obama 
rode into Washington in January 2009 on a wave of popularity and high expectations, 
with his approval ratings ranging in the high 60s for the first half of that year (Peters and 
Woolley 2015), following nearly two full consecutive years of campaigning for support. 
But the honeymoon period did not last long. By late 2009 the heated national debate was 
raging over passage of the Affordable Care Act, and many supporters had grown 
disenchanted with Obama compromising and agreeing to remove key provisions from the 
legislation (most notably, the so-called public option being stripped to win the votes of 
moderate Democratic senators). His approval ratings dropped into the low 50s by 
October 2009 as the legislative process kicked into full gear. The relative decline in 
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part of Obama to allow his support base to influence his administration. Presumably 
  	
	 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       but not at all by his 
governance after the election. Yet they continued to feel that they had an advocate in the 
White House who at least cared about people like them. This would help explain why his 
supporters experienced a positive effect on External Efficacy A, but registered a negative 
effect on External Efficacy B.  
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Partisanship 
Major Hypothesis #3: Partisanship. My third major hypothesis is that from 2008-2010, 
Obama supporters increased or sustained their partisanship (i.e., party identification) 
relative to non-supporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced 
among sub-groups that were most supportive of Obama, in other words, that women, 
younger respondents, non-white respondents, those with relatively low levels of income, 
and those with relatively high levels of formal education became more loyal to the 
Democratic Party, while men, older respondents, white respondents, those with relatively 
high incomes, and those with relatively little formal education became more loyal to the 
Republican Party. As with the political interest and political efficacy variables, I also 
tested for interaction effects for the 10 interaction terms that multiply the vote choice 
value by a given resource variable. My hypothesis would be rejected if I found a negative 
Obama Effect on partisanship. The null hypothesis would find support if vote choice was 
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you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an inde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The response set consists of a 7-point scale ranging from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong 
Republican (7). A positive effect on partisanship, for purposes of my analysis, is an 
increase in partisanship. (In certain other political contexts, increased partisanship may be 
considered a negative outcome; but because presidential candidates are explicitly seeking 
to become the leaders of their respective parties, increased partisanship is considered here 
to be a positive campaign effect.)  
Obama-McCain Findings on Partisanship.1 Table 40 reveals a highly significant and 
positive effect on partisanship for both Obama supporters relative to non-supporters (-
.326) and McCain supporters (.301) relative to non-supporters. This result appears to 
reflect 	 	
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hypothesized Obama Effect) or only to winning candidates (i.e., a presidential effect). 
The lagged continuity score of .743 reflects a very high degree of stability during this 
cycle, with the low degree of movement taking the form of both Democrat and 
Republican participants retreating even deeper into their partisan corners.   
Each vote choice variable remained significant at the .01 level even after 
demographics were introduced into the model. As Table 41 shows, the gender and 
income variables had no significant impact in the demographics model. On the other 
                                                          
1
 With regard to all my independent variables and the partisanship lag in particular, I considered the 
possibility of a multicollinearity issue between independent variables. It seemed especially plausible that 
candidate support might be correlated too strongly with party identification for OLS assumptions to hold. I 
therefore tested for the VIF (variable inflation factor) statistic in each OLS model. In all models the VIF 
statistic was below 4; it was 2.215 for the partisanship lag from Table 34. The danger zone for 
multicollinearity would be a VIF statistic between 9 and 10; therefore I determined that multicollinearity 
was not a major concern in my OLS regression models.     
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hand, age, race/ethnicity, and education were all statistically significant. Each additional 
year of age corresponded to a -.004 change toward the Democratic Party identification; 
this result was the opposite of my hypothesis. Being non-white was associated with a 
.203 movement in the hypothesized direction of Democratic Party identification. Finally, 
each additional education bracket corresponded to a -.042 change in the hypothesized 
direction of Democratic Party identification. The only significant interaction term was 
McCain*Education (.083, see Table 42), indicating that higher-educated McCain 
supporters increased their loyalty to the Republican Party more than lower-educated 
McCain supporters. This interaction effect was significant at the .10 level, but the 
corresponding interaction term for Obama supporters was not statistically significant.     
Bush II-Gore Findings on Partisanship. Table 43 reveals a very similar pattern for the 
2000-2002 cycle as that observed in the 2008-2010 cycle. Once again, supporters of the 
winning candidate, Bush II, become much more Republican relative to non-supporters 
during those two years (.427); and supporters of the losing candidate, Gore, became even 
more loyal to the Democratic Party (-.546), relative to non-supporters, during that cycle. 
The lagged continuity score of .719 was comparable to the 2008-2010 score, reflecting a 
very high degree of stability in party identification during this cycle.  
The demographics model presented in Table 44 did not have much impact on the 
significance of the vote choice variables. Both support for Bush II and support for Gore 
remained significant at the .01 level. The only demographic variable to achieve statistical 
significance was the race/ethnicity variable, with non-white respondents becoming much 
more Democratic (-.265) during this cycle. The interaction terms moderating education 
by vote choice were not statistically significant.  
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Clinton-Bush I Findings on Partisanship. The results shown in Table 45 for the 1992-
1994 cycle are markedly similar to those from the other two cycles, with Clinton 
supporters becoming much more loyal to the Democratic Party (-.928) and Bush I 
supporters becoming much more loyal to the Republican Party (.588). The lagged 
continuity score of .639 reflected a moderate level of stability in party identification 
during this cycle, which translated into a greater change than was observable in the other 
cycles.  
The model incorporating demographic variables is presented in Table 46. 
Controlling for demographics did not mitigate the highly significant impact of either vote 
choice variable; both remained significant at the .01 level. The race/ethnicity variable was 
once again significant (-.352), with non-white respondents becoming significantly more 
Democratic during this cycle than their white counterparts. The income variable was also 
highly significant in this model, with each move upward into a new income bracket 
corresponding to a .023 increase in loyalty to the Republican Party. The race/ethnicity 
variable was significant at the .05 level, and the income variable was significant at the .01 
level.  
The education variable was highly significant when moderated by vote choice, as 
had been the case for McCain supporters. As shown in Tables 47 and 48, both the 
Clinton*Education term and the Bush I*Education term revealed significant interaction 
effects. Clinton supporters with higher levels of education increased their loyalty to the 
Democratic Party significantly more than Clinton supporters with lower levels of 
education (-.240); and Bush I supporters with higher levels of education became 
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somewhat more loyal to the Republican Party than Bush I supporters with lower levels of 
education (.159).   
Summary and Discussion of Partisanship. Results across the three election cycles 
revealed a far more consistent pattern for the partisanship variable than I had observed for 
the political interest and political efficacy variables. Indeed, supporters of all candidates 
under analysis Obama and McCain, Bush II and Gore, and Clinton and Bush I 
became much more partisan during the 2 years after the election, and at the highest .01 
level of statistical significance in every case. The one consistent demographic trend was 
that of non-white respondents increasing their loyalty to the Democratic Party to a greater 
extent than white respondents did to the Republican Party; however, this outcome is not 
surprising given that a substantial proportion of Democratic Party supporters were white, 
while only a small percentage of Republican Party supporters were non-white.   
Clearly this pattern of increasing partisanship after the election was not isolated 
among a small subset of the population or among one or two particular demographic 
groups. It was experienced by supporters of Democratic and Republican candidates, by 
young and old, by male and female, and across income and education levels. Such 
consistent and wide-ranging candidate effects point to a noteworthy observation in recent 
presidential politics: that campaign supporters of the president tend to become much 
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election.   
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to from political attitudes to the Obama 
Effect on political participation. 
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Table 13 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.125 .091 .000 
Voted for McCain .191 .069 .006*** 
Voted for Obama -  .041 .069 .553 
Interest 2008 .639 .021 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .385 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 14 Political Interest, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .734 .142 .000 
Voted for McCain .120 .069 .085* 
Voted for Obama -  .063 .069 .357 
Interest 2008 .603 .022 .000*** 
Gender .172 .040 .000*** 
Age .009 .001 .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .049 .056 .375 
Income .010 .016 .506 
Education .007 .020 .715 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .413   
c. *** p < .01 
d. *     p < .10 
 
Table 15 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Gender 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .700 .142 .000 
Voted for McCain .119 .069 .085* 
Voted for Obama .007 .076 .931 
Interest 2008 .604 .021 .000*** 
Gender .250 .054 .000*** 
Age .009 .001 .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .052 .056 .350 
Income .011 .016 .483 
Education .008 .020 .706 
Obama*Gender -  .174 .079 .029** 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .412 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .1 
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Table 16 Political Interest, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Income 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .659 .147 .000 
Voted for McCain .105 .070 .135 
Voted for Obama .103 .112 .360 
Interest 2008 .604 .021 .000*** 
Gender .172 .040 .000*** 
Age .010 .001 .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .056 .056 .317 
Income .036 .021 .084* 
Education .009 .020 .668 
Obama*Income -  .055 .029 .061* 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .411 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .1 
 
 
Table 17. Political Interest, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.492 .092 .000 
Voted for Bush II .244 .088 .006*** 
Voted for Gore .197 .088 .025** 
Interest 2000  .431 .025 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .235 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
Table 18. Political Interest, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.246 .233 .000 
Voted for Bush II .224 .090 .013** 
Voted for Gore .140 .088 .112 
Interest 2000 .403 .025 .000*** 
Gender   .347 .068 .000*** 
Age   .014 .002 .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity   .294 .084 .000*** 
Income -  .042 .017 .015** 
Education   .011 .034 .737 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .292 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
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Table 19 Political Interest, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.443 .143 .000 
Voted for Bush .440 .122 .000*** 
Voted for Clinton .325 .117 .006*** 
Interest 1992 .382 .036 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 1994 
b. R2 = .175 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 20 Political Interest, 1992-1994, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .835 .346 .016 
Voted for Bush .305 .132 .021** 
Voted for Clinton .272 .125 .030** 
Interest 1992 .357 .040 .000*** 
Gender .326 .101 .001*** 
Age .011 .003 .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity .186 .141 .187 
Income .018 .009 .042** 
Education .108 .050 .030** 
a. Dependent Variable: Interest 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .222  
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
Table 21 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.190 .077 .000 
Voted for McCain -  .180 .066 .006*** 
Voted for Obama .188 .066 .004*** 
Efficacy A 2008 .457 .022 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .281 












Table 22 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .645 .138 .000 
Voted for McCain -  .229 .067 .001*** 
Voted for Obama .122 .067 .070* 
Efficacy A 2008 .441 .022 .000*** 
Gender -  .006 .040 .884 
Age .003 .001 .035** 
Race/Ethnicity .108 .055 .048** 
Income .030 .015 .050** 
Education .075 .020 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .293 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .01 
 
 
Table 23 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Income 
Model B Std. Error    Sig. 
(Constant)   .719   .143   .000 
Voted for McCain -  .214   .068   .002*** 
Voted for Obama -  .048   .110   .666 
Efficacy A 2008   .442   .022   .000*** 
Gender -  .006   .039   .870 
Age   .003   .001   .041** 
Race/Ethnicity   .114   .055   .037** 
Income   .004   .020   .832 
Education    .074   .020   .000*** 
Obama*Income   .056   .029   .052* 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .294 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 












Table 24 Political Efficacy A, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Income 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .577 .143 .000 
Voted for McCain -  .051 .114 .654 
Voted for Obama .113 .067 .093* 
Efficacy A 2008 .443 .022 .000*** 
Gender -  .006 .039 .876 
Age .003 .001 .048** 
Race/Ethnicity .113 .055 .039** 
Income .054 .020 .006*** 
Education .075 .020 .000*** 
JM*Income -  .056 .029 .052* 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .294 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .10 
 
Table 25 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.816 .154 .000 
Voted for Bush II .577 .142 .000*** 
Voted for Gore .254 .141 .073* 
Efficacy A 2000 .460 .043 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .127 
c. *** p < .01 



















Table 26 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant)  1.451   .390   .000 
Voted for Bush II   .464   .152   .002*** 
Voted for Gore   .189   .149   .206 
Efficacy A 2000   .428   .044   .000*** 
Gender   .208   .109   .057* 
Age   .001   .004   .861 
Race/Ethnicity -  .286   .138   .039** 
Income   .028   .028   .320 
Education   .123   .054   .023** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .136 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .10 
 
Table 27 Political Efficacy A, 2000-2002, Interaction Effect for Bush II*Income 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.613 .397 .000 
Voted for Bush II -  .015 .276 .957 
Voted for Gore .200 .149 .180 
Efficacy A 2000  .425 .044 .000*** 
Gender  .207 .109 .057* 
Age   .001 .004 .801 
Race/Ethnicity  -  .306 .138 .027** 
Income -  .011 .033 .750 
Education  .123 .054 .022** 
Bush II*Income .108 .052 .038** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A, 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .139 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 















Table 28 Political Efficacy A, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.644 .101 .000 
Voted for Bush I .005 .099 .956 
Voted for Clinton .099 .095 .297 
Efficacy A 1992 .260 .031 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .092 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 29 Political Efficacy A, 1992-1994, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.145 .281 .000 
Voted for Bush I -  .150 .108 .166 
Voted for Clinton .039 .102 .703 
Efficacy A .245 .033 .000*** 
Gender -  .045 .083 .590 
Age  -  .002 .003 .352 
Race/Ethnicity .107 .116 .355 
Income .014 .007 .067* 
Education  .169 .040 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy A 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .145 
c. ***p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 30 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.154 .081 .000 
Voted for McCain .142 .071 .047** 
Voted for Obama .071 .071 .321 
Efficacy B 2008 .511 .021 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: EfficacyB 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .202 
c. *** P < .01 











Table 31 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .795 .149 .000 
Voted for McCain .118 .073 .109 
Voted for Obama .039 .073 .599 
Efficacy B 2008 .506 .022 .000*** 
Gender .032 .043 .457 
Age .003 .002 .047** 
Race/Ethnicity .092 .060 .128 
Income .003 .017 .877 
Education .032 .021 .140 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .276 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
Table 32 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for Obama*Race 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.136 .177 .000 
Voted for McCain .070 .074 .347 
Voted for Obama -  .498 .169 .003*** 
Efficacy B 2008 .505 .022 .000*** 
Gender .031 .043 .469 
Age .003 .002 .053* 
Race/Ethnicity -  .201 .102 .050** 
Income .004 .017 .792 
Education .037 .021 .087 
Obama*Race .438 .124 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .282 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
















Table 33 Political Efficacy B, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Race 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .646 .153 .000 
Voted for McCain .782 .178 .000*** 
Voted for Obama .036 .073 .618 
Efficacy B 2008 .505 .022 .000*** 
Gender .034 .043 .421 
Age .003 .002 .060* 
Race/Ethnicity .206 .066 .002*** 
Income .005 .017 .774 
Education .036 .021 .093* 
McCain*Race -  .611 .150 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .284 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 34 Political Efficacy B, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.664 .150 .000 
Voted for Bush II .636 .136 .000*** 
Voted for Gore .290 .135 .032** 
Efficacy B 2000  .529 .038 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .196 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .5 
 
Table 35 Political Efficacy B, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.568 .373 .000 
Voted for Bush II .648 .145 .000*** 
Voted for Gore .310 .142 .030** 
Efficacy B 2000  .501 .041 .000*** 
Gender  .110 .104 .288 
Age   -  .005 .003 .132 
Race/Ethnicity  -  .102 .132 .437 
Income .004 .027 .867 
Education  .113 .052 .030** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .136 
c. *** p < .01 





Table 36 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.737 .123 .000 
Voted for Bush I .179 .108 .099* 
Voted for Clinton .060 .104 .565 
Efficacy B 1992  .262 .032 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .090 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 37 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.861 .316 .000 
Voted for Bush I .013 .119 .911 
Voted for Clinton -  .056 .112 .614 
Efficacy B 1992  .218 .034 .000*** 
Gender  -  .157 .091 .084* 
Age   -  .004 .003 .117 
Race/Ethnicity -  .053 .127 .679 
Income   .005 .008 .562 
Education   .202 .045 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .136 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 38 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Clinton I*Race 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.613 .343 .000 
Voted for Bush I .035 .119 .770 
Voted for Clinton .488 .318 .125 
Efficacy B 1992  .214 .034 .000 
Gender  -  .165 .091 .069 
Age  -  .004 .003 .127 
Race/Ethnicity .176 .178 .324 
Income   .005 .008 .508 
Education   .199 .044 .000 
Clinton*Race -  .453 .248 .068 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .139 
c. *** p < .01 




Table 39 Political Efficacy B, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Bush I*Race 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.968 .321 .000 
Voted for Bush I -  .681 .392 .083* 
Voted for Clinton -  .050 .112 .654 
Efficacy B 1992  .222 .034 .000*** 
Gender   -  .155 .091 .089* 
Age  -  .004 .003 .125 
Race/Ethnicity -  .152 .137 .271 
Income  .004 .008 .623 
Education  .200 .044 .000*** 
Bush I*Race .642 .346 .064* 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficacy B 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .139 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
 
Table 40 Partisanship, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.051 .093 .000 
Voted for McCain .301 .084 .000*** 
Voted for Obama -  .326 .084 .000*** 
Party ID 2008 .743 .015 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .818 
c. *** p < .01  
 
 
Table 41 Partisanship, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.612 .176 .000 
Voted for McCain .326 .086 .000*** 
Voted for Obama -  .285 .086 .001*** 
Party ID 2008  .738 .015 .000*** 
Gender  .018 .048 .708 
Age   -  .004 .002 .024** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .203 .067 .002*** 
Income  .004 .019 .849 
Education   -  .042 .024 .077* 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .819 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** = p < .05 
e. * = p < .10 
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Table 42 Partisanship, 2008-2010, Interaction Effect for McCain*Education 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.729 .188 .000 
Voted for McCain .052 .174 .764 
Voted for Obama -  .269 .086 .002*** 
Party ID 2008  .736 .015 .000*** 
Gender   .018 .048 .715 
Age   -  .004 .002 .026** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .210 .067 .002*** 
Income  .004 .019 .852 
Education  -  .076 .030 .012** 
McCain*Education .083 .046 .070* 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .820 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** = p < .05 
e. * = p < .10 
 
Table 43 Partisanship, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.272 .101 .000 
Voted for Bush II .427 .093 .000*** 
Voted for Gore -  .546 .088 .000*** 
Party ID 2000   .719 .022 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .736 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 44 Partisanship, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant)  1.433   .249   .000 
Voted for Bush II   .407   .097   .000*** 
Voted for Gore -  .609   .094   .000*** 
Party ID 2000    .701   .023   .000*** 
Gender     .107   .067   .111 
Age  -  .001   .002   .612 
Race/Ethnicity    -  .265   .084   .002*** 
Income   .003   .017   .866 
Education      .046   .033   .162 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 2002 
b. Adjusted R2 = .740 





Table 45 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.636 .142 .000 
Voted for Bush I .588 .126 .000*** 
Voted for Clinton -  .928 .120 .000*** 
Party ID 1992  .639 .030 .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .650 
c. *** p < .001 
 
Table 46 Partisanship, 1992-1994, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 2.130 .354 .000 
Voted for Bush I .538 .134 .000*** 
Voted for Clinton -  .918 .129 .000*** 
Party ID 1992  .623 .032 .000*** 
Gender   -  .101 .098 .301 
Age   -  .004 .003 .150 
Race/Ethnicity -  .352 .138 .011** 
Income  .023 .009 .008*** 
Education  -  .010 .047 .823 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .676 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
 
Table 47 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Clinton*Education 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 1.947 .358 .000 
Voted for Bush I .473 .135 .000*** 
Voted for Clinton -  .264 .266 .322 
Party ID 1992  .618 .031 .000*** 
Gender   -  .095 .097 .330 
Age   -  .005 .003 .111 
Race/Ethnicity -  .371 .138 .007*** 
Income  .023 .009 .007*** 
Education   .084 .058 .143 
Clinton*Education -  .240 .085 .005*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .679 





Table 48 Partisanship, 1992-1994, Interaction Effect for Bush*Education 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 2.269 .362 .000 
Voted for Bush I .071 .302 .814 
Voted for Clinton -  .892 .130 .000*** 
Party ID 1992   .622 .031 .000*** 
Gender   -  .100 .097 .307 
Age   -  .005 .003 .126 
Race/Ethnicity -  .364 .138 .009*** 
Income  .023 .009 .008*** 
Education   -  .058 .054 .286 
Bush I * Education .159 .092 .085* 
a. Dependent Variable: Party Identification 1994 
b. Adjusted R2 = .677 
c. *** p < .01 

























CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE OBAMA EFFECT 
 A New York Times article from April 2014 chronicles the campaign experience of 
Eric Lesser, a candidate in a Massachusetts Senate race who traces his inspiration for 
seeking public office directly to the 2008 Obama campaign. Mr. Lesser, then age 29, 
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 ge for Obama campaign staff and for 
reporters covering that campaign. He accepted a low-level job in the White House after 
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reminisced (Horowitz 2014).  
 As I discussed in Chapter 1, Obama built his 2008 campaign largely upon a theme 
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young supporters such as Mr. Lesser to become more politically and civically engaged. 
























As I discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of the democratic and electoral processes 
in the United States stipulates that candidates must mobilize their supporters in order to 
be successful in the next election. However if a presidential candidate is able to 
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truly engage, inspire, and mobilize supporters for the upcoming election, then his actions 
can have a positive impact for the candidate/party not just for that election, but in 
subsequent election cycles as well. Such  spillover effects can have major positive 
implications for the political parties and for the larger democratic system. A positive 
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civic life in other ways in the future. Although support for an individual candidate in one 
election cycle guarantees neither future party loyalty nor future participation in politics, a 







participate in politics. Indeed, it was an explicit goal of the 2008 Obama campaign to 
create positive spillover effects by emphasizing the importance of long-term engagement 
and participation in political processes and civic life. In this chapter I test the degree to 
which that campaign accomplished this objective, in other words, I investigate the 
possibility of a positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect on various types of political 
participation.  
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years after the electiona candidate effect on participation would likely manifest in ways 
that reflected this increased partisanship. A negative candidate effect on participation 














relationship between political interest and External Efficacy B, the measure of political 
efficacy regarding how much people feel they can affect what government does. Obama 
supporters registered relative decreases in interest and relative decreases in this form of 
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efficacy in tandem, even as they increased their External Efficacy A (i.e., they felt 
government cared more about what people like them think). I suggested these findings 
may be related to increased complacency, burnout or fatigue after the exciting campaign, 
personal satisfaction with Obama but dissatisfaction with the larger government, and/or 
to unrealistically high expectations for the Obama presidency. Thus although I framed 
my formal hypotheses at the onset of this project to expect a positive Obama Effect on 
participation, I knew it was at least possible that these negative outcomes on attitudes 
discussed in the previous chapter may correspond to negative outcomes on participation.  
 In this chapter, I focus on three specific manifestations of political participation 
that represent individual engagement with the democratic process: voter turnout, 
attending local government meetings, and attending political protests. Voter turnout 
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following the presidential election cycle in question. Attending local government 
meetings demonstrates a higher level of political participation and a deeper engagement 
with the democratic process than voting alone. The same can be said for attending 
political protests. I argue that the decision to participate in politics in these ways may be, 
at least to some degree, a function of a positive or negative Obama Effect.  
Hypothesizing an Obama Effect on Political Participation 
My general hypothesis for this chapter is that the 2008 Obama campaign had a 
significant, lasting, and positive (or even transformational) impact on the political 
participation of its supporters over time. A positive Obama Effect would manifest as a 
relative increase in voter turnout among Obama supporters, a relative increase in 
attendance of local political meetings, and a relative increase in attendance of political 
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protests. Conversely a negative Obama Effect would manifest as relative decreases in 
these forms of participation among Obama supporters. Once again, in this chapter I 
distinguish between an Obama Effect, a broader presidential effect, and a candidate effect 
by comparing outcomes from the 2008-2010 election cycle to those from the 2000-2002 
cycle and the 1992-1994 cycle.  
My dependent variable for each hypothesis test is the value of the political 
behavior in the midterm year (i.e., 2010, 2002, or 1994). The lag of this variable (i.e., the 
value of the behavior in the corresponding presidential year) is always included as a 
control variable in each model to avoid the problem of endogeneity (see Chapter 3).  
    	
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!" I replicate my methodological approach 
from the previous chapter so that everyone on the panel who voted for Obama is 
compared on the value of the dependent variable to everyone on the panel who did not 
vote for Obama (i.e. McCain voters + third-party voters + nonvoters). Likewise, everyone 
who voted for McCain is compared to everyone who did not vote for McCain (i.e., 
Obama voters + third party voters + nonvoters). Since both dummy predictors are 
included in each model, the regression coefficient indicates the difference between voters 
for a particular candidate and everyone else who did not vote for that candidate. 
I employ linear regression models for the voter turnout question and binary 
logistic models for the questions regarding attendance of political meetings and 
attendance of political protests. As in the previous chapter, my baseline models in this 
chapter include only the vote choice variables and the lagged dependent variable as 
predictors. After each baseline regression, I ran a second regression model to test for 
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demographic effects as well. These broader models allowed me to test for positive 
additive effects of resource variables as well as for interaction effects between 
demographics and vote choice.  
Voter Turnout 
Major Hypothesis #1: Voter Turnout. My first major hypothesis is that from 2008-2010, 
Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their voter turnout levels relative to 
non-supporters. I expected this positive Obama Effect to be most pronounced among 
those subgroups that were most supportive of Obama, namely, female respondents, 
younger respondents, non-white respondents, lower income respondents, and highly 
educated respondents. The hypothesis would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect (that 
is, a decrease in voter turnout in supporters relative to non-supporters) was found. The 
null hypothesis states that vote choice did not have any impact on the direction of voter 
turnout between 2008 2010.  
The measure of voter turnout during midterm years (2010, 2002, 1994) was: 
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serves as the lag, so that I am comparing House voting levels in the midterm years 
directly to House voting levels in the presidential years (instead of to presidential voting 
levels in those years).  
Summary and Discussion Findings on Voter Turnout. My findings for the voter turnout 
variable were more consistent across election cycles than my findings for any other 
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dependent variable under analysis in either this chapter or the previous chapter. There did 
not appear to be any significant candidate effects in either 2008-2010 or 2000-2002; the 
null hypothesis was confirmed for both election cycles. As Table 49 shows, neither 
support for Obama (-.041) nor support for McCain (.223) had a statistically significant 
     	 
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, relative to nonsupporters, in the 2010 midterm 
elections. Table 51 shows that the same was true for supporters of Bush II (.525) and 
Gore (.478). Only in the 1992-1994 cycle did vote choice appear to have a significant 
effect on voter turnout (see Table 53), with support for Bush 1 produced a coefficient of 
.599 which was significant at the .05 level in the baseline model. Support for Clinton in 
this cycle did not have a significant effect. The null being confirmed for 5 of 6 cases in 
my analysis lends strong support for the notion of minimal candidate effects on voter 
turnout.   
 The broader models reflected in Tables 50, 52, and 54 revealed various 
demographic characteristics to be significant in various election cycles. Being male was 
associated with an increase in turnout for both 2008-2010 (.155) and for 1992-1994 
(.580). Relatively high income was associated with increased turnout from both 2008-
2010 (.048) and 1992-1994 (.084). Both these results were the opposite of the direction I 
hypothesized, meaning it was not those subgroups most supportive of Obama that were 
associated with relative increases in turnout. On the other hand, in accordance with my 
hypothesis relatively high education was associated with increased turnout from both 
2008-2010 (.122) and 2000-2002 (.404). Only the age variable was consistent across all 
three cycles, yet it ran contrary to my hypothesis; each year of age corresponding to an 
increase of .016 from 2008-2010, .043 from 2000-2002, and .040 from 1992-1994. The 
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race/ethnicity variable was the only variable not statistically significant in any of my 
voter turnout models.  
 I now turn my discussion to the voter choice variable.  
Attending Political Meetings 
Major Hypothesis #2: Attending Political Meetings. My second major hypothesis is that 
from 2008-2010, Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of 
political meetings relative to non-supporters. I further expected positive additive effects 
among the demographic subgroups most supportive of Obama. The hypothesis would be 
rejected if a negative Obama Effect was found, in other words, if Obama supporters 
registered a relative decline in attendance of political meetings from 2008-2010. The null 
hypothesis would be confirmed if presidential vote choice did not have any significant 
effect on levels of attendance of political meetings.  
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flff parallels the midterm version 
conceptually despite the unfortunateness of varied question wording. 
Obama-McCain Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Contrary to my hypothesis, 
results from Tables 55 suggested a broader candidate effect rather than a unique Obama 
effect on attendance of political meetings. McCain supporters increased their attendance 
significantly (.880) relative to nonsupporters. Obama supporters also increased their 
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attendance (.555), but only at the .10 level of significance compared to the much higher 
.01 level for McCain supporters.  
 As Table 56 shows, even after controlling for demographics McCain supporters 
increased their attendance of meetings at almost the same rate (.878), still significant at 
the .01 level. Yet in this broader model, support for Obama was not statistically 
significant. In its stead, being male (.248) and being relatively highly educated (.175) 
both were associated with increased attendance of meetings. This gender finding, which 
ran contrary to my hypothesis, seemed to correspond to my finding in the previous 
chapter regarding the decrease in political interest in women relative to men. (While this 
gender dynamic was consistent across all 3 election cycles in terms of political interest, 
the gender variable was typically not statistically significant on either measure of external 
efficacy.) That higher levels of formal education would correspond to increased 
attendance of political meetings was in line with my hypothesis. I had also expected that 
being non-white, being relatively young, and relatively low income would significantly 
affect attendance of political meetings positively, but none of these demographic 
variables were statistically significant in the model. Likewise, none of the interaction 
terms I tested in this model were statistically significant.  
Bush II-Gore Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Results from my 2000-2002 
baseline model (Table 57) showed increased relative attendance of political meetings 
among Gore supporters (1.109) at the .05 level of significance. The relative increase 
among Bush II supporters (.656) was not statistically significant.   
When demographics were introduced into the model (Table 58), the relative 
increase among Gore supporters (.935) was still significant but only at the .10 level. The 
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only other statistically significant variable was gender. In this election cycle as well, 
being male corresponded to a relative increase in attendance of political meetings (.589).  
The age, race/ethnicity, income, and education were not significant in this model.      
Clinton-Bush I Findings on Attending Political Meetings. Results from the 1992-1994 
baseline model (Table 59) revealed increased attendance of political meetings among 
Bush I supporters (1.149) relative to nonsupporters. This increase was statistically 
significant at the .01 level. For Clinton supporters, there was a slight but not statistically 
significant increase of attendance (.316) relative to nonsupporters.    
 The broader model shown in Table 60 indicated that support for Bush I was still 
significant, but now only at the .10 level. The coefficient dropped to .888. The only 
demographic variable that was significant was education (.537) at the .01 level. The 
gender, age, race/ethnicity, and income variables were not significant in this model.  
 I will turn to the discussion of the Obama Effect and civic engagement after the 
next section, in which I summarize my findings on attendance of political protests.  
Attending Political Protests 
Major Hypothesis #3: Attending Protests. My third major hypothesis is that from 2008-
2010, Obama supporters will have increased or sustained their attendance of protests, 
marches, rallies, and/or demonstrations relative to non-supporters. (I refer to these going 
   	
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 	rotests for shorthand.) Despite the oppositional nature of protests 
and demonstrations (if not marches and rallies), I still hypothesized a relative increase 
among Obama supporters because they are important measures of civic engagement. 
Presumably Obama supporters would not become protesters of Obama specifically but 
may have been galvanized or otherwise influenced by the Obama campaign to take a 
125 
 
more oppositional but active role in some other area of civic life. Such an outcome would 
indeed, in my view, potentially reflect a positive Obama campaign effect. The hypothesis 
would be rejected if a negative Obama Effect was found, that is, if Obama supporters 
registered a relative decline in attendance of political protests, marches, rallies, and 
demonstrations from 2008-2010. The null hypothesis would be confirmed if presidential 
vote choice did not have any significant effect on levels of attendance of political 
meetings.  
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this question was not asked on the 1994 panel survey; therefore the results discussed 
below pertain only to the 2008-2010 cycle and the 2000-2002 cycle.  
Obama-McCain Findings on Attending Protests. My findings from Table 61 showed that 
Obama supporters increased their attendance of political protests (1.286) relative to 
nonsupporters, but only at the .10 level of significance. Conversely, McCain supporters 
increased their attendance of political protests (2.340) at the .01 level of significance. As 
with attendance of political meetings, the relative increase in this form of political 
participation among supporters of both candidates suggested the possibility of a broader 
candidate effect, rather than the unique Obama Effect that I hypothesized. Furthermore, 
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while vote choice was statistically significant for both, the effect of support for McCain 
appeared to be much stronger than the effect of support for Obama.  
 The demographics model shown in Table 62 revealed very little change in the 
vote choice coefficients for either Obama supporters (1.228) or McCain supporters 
(2.312). Both remained significant at the .10 and .01 levels, respectively. Gender had a 
statistically significant effect on attending protests (.434), but again not in the direction I 
hypothesized. It was men who increased their attendance relative to women, a result that 
did not support my thesis of an Obama Effect but that did correspond to my findings on 
political interest as well as political meetings. Income was significant (.136) but only at 
the .10 level and not in the direction I hypothesized. It was higher income respondents 
who increased their attendance of protests relative to lower income respondents. The age, 
race/ethnicity, and education variables were not statistically significant in this model. I 
tested each interaction term in this model but as with the model on political meetings, 
none were statistically significant.  
Bush II-Gore Findings on Attending Protests. Contrary to the Obama-McCain cycle, 
results from the 2000-2002 baseline model (Table 63) showed a relative decrease in 
attendance of political protests among both Bush II supporters (-1.375) and Gore 
supporters (-.808). The relative decrease among Bush II supporters was at the .01 level, 
while the level of relative decrease among Gore supporters was at the .10 level.  
 The broader model shown in Table 64 appeared to be an isolated finding in which 
the vote choice effects actually became stronger after demographic variables were 
included. The coefficients among Bush II supporters and Gore supporters became -1.788 
and -1.284, respectively. Both vote choice variables were now significant at the.01 level. 
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Both income level (.196) and education level (.429) appeared to have a positive effect on 
attendance of protests. The age, gender, and race/ethnicity variables were not statistically 
significant in this model.        
Summary and Discussion of Civic Engagement. My general hypothesis of a unique, 
positive, and lasting Obama Effect on civic engagement was not confirmed, either with 
regard to attendance of political meetings or attendance of political protests. In fact, it 
was McCain supporters, not Obama supporters, who experienced a relatively positive 
increase in attending political meetings. Yet as I compared this result to those from the 
earlier two cycles, I observed what appeared to be a negative presidential effect rather 
than a uniquely negative Obama Effect. Indeed, in terms of attending political meetings, 
the candidate effects even after controlling for demographics were concentrated 
among the supporters of McCain, Gore, and Bush I, the losing candidates in my analysis.  
Interestingly, this oppositional trend did not extend to attendance of political 
protests. I observed what appeared to be a negative presidential effect on attendance of 
political meetings, but with regard to political protests, there was a relative increase in 
attendance among supporters of all four candidates under analysis (Obama, McCain, 
Bush II, and Gore). Two caveats are important to note here, however. First, fewer than 
5% of respondents participated in protests; thus these results may be skewed by just a few 
respondents among a relatively small n. Second,      	
	   	 	
shorthand but the question pertains to political demonstrations, marches, and rallies as 
well as protests. Unfortunately for my purposes, the closed nature of the ANES survey 
instrument is rather broad and did not allow me to determine the nature of this political 
participation at a more detailed level.   
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 Initially I posited that the excitement surrounding the 2008 Obama campaign may 
have had a transformative impact on the civic engagement of Obama supporters. After 
all, Obama made many explicit appeals throughout his campaign for his supporters to 
become more civically minded and civically engaged. Suffice to say, I did not observe 
any kind of positive Obama Effect that would suggest that campaign was successful in 
that regard. On the contrary, based on the data not only from 2008-2010 but from the 
previous election cycles as well, it appears more likely that supporters of the losing 
presidential candidates will become more participatory in these regards than supporters of 
the winning candidates.  
 In Chapters 4-5, I conducted quantitative analyses on the Obama Effect in relation 
to the political attitudes and participation of the broader American electorate. In the next 
chapter I analyze the Obama Effect qualitatively in relation to the political attitudes and 
participation of those who volunteered on the 2008 campaign. I compare and contrast 
these two populations to determine the differences between these two populations, 
namely, one that was more representative of the national population and one that was 
representative of those most enthusiastic about the 2008 Obama campaign.   
 
Table 49  Turnout, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant)  2.617   .089   .000 
Voted for McCain   .223   .177   .207 
Voted for Obama -  .041   .176   .814 
Turnout 2008  1.790   .192   .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .214 






Table 50 Turnout, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Model B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant)  1.349   .179   .000 
Voted for McCain   .089   .170   .602 
Voted for Obama -  .135   .169   .427 
Turnout 2008    1.687   .184   .000*** 
Gender    .155   .052   .003*** 
Age    .016   .002   .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .038   .071   .595 
Income    .048   .020   .016** 
Education     .122   .026   .000*** 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2010 
b. Adjusted R2 = .218 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
 
Table 51  Turnout, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II   .525   .442   .235 
Voted for Gore   .478   .439   .276 
Turnout 2000  1.276   .254   .000*** 
(Constant)   .138   .461   .764 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .031 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 52  Turnout, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II   .487   .492   .322 
Voted for Gore   .482   .495   .331 
Turnout 2000  1.035   .276   .000*** 
Gender   .345   .224   .123 
Age   .043   .008   .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity   .240   .287   .402 
Income   .080   .056   .156 
Education   .404   .115   .000*** 
(Constant) - 3.758   .902   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .089 
c. *** p < .01 
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Table 53 Turnout, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush I   .599   .269   .026** 
Voted for Clinton   .362   .255   .155 
Turnout 1992   .829   .268   .002*** 
(Constant)   .067   .285   .814 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 1994 
b. Pseudo R2 = .028 
c. *** p < .01 




Table 54 Turnout, 1992-1994, with Demographics  
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush I   .564   .313   .072* 
Voted for Clinton   .647   .309   .036** 
Turnout 1992  1.375   .299   .000*** 
Gender   .580   .239   .015** 
Age   .040   .008   .000*** 
Race/Ethnicity -  .065   .320   .838 
Income   .084   .022   .000*** 
Education   .058   .118   .622 
(Constant) - 3.705   .789   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Turnout 1994 
b. Pseudo R2 = .147 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .10 
 
Table 55 Meetings, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for McCain   .880   .304   .004*** 
Voted for Obama   .555   .304   .068* 
Meeting 2008  1.629   .162   .000*** 
(Constant) - 3.144   .305   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2010 
b. Pseudo R2 = .090 
c. *** p < .01 






Table 56 Meetings, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for McCain   .878   .310   .005*** 
Voted for Obama   .494   .310   .111 
Meeting 2008  1.572   .168   .000*** 
Gender   .248   .137   .070* 
Age -  .002   .005   .704 
Race/Ethnicity   .290   .193   .133 
Income 2008   .036   .054   .508 
Education   .175   .070   .013** 
(Constant) - 4.167   .535   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2010 
b. Pseudo R2 = .099 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 57 Meetings, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II   .656   .520   .207 
Voted for Gore  1.109   .500   .026** 
Meeting 2000  2.221   .324   .000*** 
(Constant) - 6.179   .604   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .047 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
 
Table 58 Meetings, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II   .483   .542   .372 
Voted for Gore   .935   .516   .070* 
Meetings 2000  2.178   .341   .000*** 
Gender   .589   .308   .056* 
Age   .006   .011   .583 
Race/Ethnicity   .217   .369   .557 
Income   .077   .080   .334 
Education   .020   .148   .893 
(Constant) - 7.289  1.082   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .047 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
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Table 59 Meetings, 1992-1994, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush I  1.149   .419   .006*** 
Voted for Clinton   .316   .448   .481 
Meetings 1992  2.479   .332   .000*** 
(Constant) - 3.747   .363   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 1994 
b. Pseudo R2 = .079 
c. *** p < .01 
 
Table 60 Meetings, 1992-1994, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush I   .888   .466   .057* 
Voted for Clinton   .136   .482   .778 
Meetings 1992  2.215   .350   .000*** 
Gender   .067   .334   .842 
Age   .001   .011   .916 
Race/Ethnicity   .072   .526   .891 
Income -  .012   .032   .714 
Education   .537   .168   .001*** 
(Constant) - 5.175  1.079   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Meetings 1994 
b. Pseudo R2 = .097 
c. *** p < .01 
d. * p < .10 
 
Table 61 Protests, 2008-2010, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for McCain  2.340   .725   .001*** 
Voted for Obama  1.286   .733   .079* 
Protests 2008  1.398   .201   .000*** 
(Constant) - 4.752   .718   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2010 
b. Pseudo R2 = .049 
c. *** p < .01 









Table 62 Protests, 2008-2010, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for McCain  2.312   .733   .002*** 
Voted for Obama  1.228   .740   .097* 
Protests 2008  1.292   .206   .000*** 
Gender   .434   .201   .031** 
Age   .008   .008   .278 
Race/Ethnicity   .553   .272   .042** 
Income   .136   .082   .097* 
Education   .066   .106   .529 
(Constant) - 6.679   .990   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2010 
b. Pseudo R2 = .058 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 
e. * p < .10 
 
Table 63 Protests, 2000-2002, Baseline 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II - 1.375   .505   .006*** 
Voted for Gore -  .808   .434   .063* 
Protests 2000  2.977   .472   .000*** 
(Constant) - 2.937   .308   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .036 
c. *** p < .01 



















Table 64 Protests, 2000-2002, with Demographics 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Voted for Bush II - 1.788   .522   .001*** 
Voted for Gore - 1.284   .472   .007*** 
Meetings 2000  2.668   .513   .000*** 
Gender -  .166   .394   .673 
Age   .013   .013   .339 
Race/Ethnicity   .179   .474   .705 
Income   .196   .103   .057* 
Education   .429   .190   .024** 
(Constant) - 5.689  1.149   .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Protests 2002 
b. Pseudo R2 = .047 
c. *** p < .01 
d. ** p < .05 











CHAPTER 6: CAMPAIGN VOLUNTEERS AND THE OBAMA EFFECT 
 Are the political attitudes and behaviors of those who actually volunteered for the 
2008 Obama campaign markedly different from the political attitudes and behaviors of 
   	
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
data from in-depth ethnographic interview transcripts with former 2008 Obama campaign 
volunteers, in relation to my quantitative findings on political attitudes and behaviors 
from the previous two chapters. My overarching goal is to determine whether or not there 
was a unique, lasting, and positive Obama Effect on his volunteer base that was distinct 
from the effects (or lack thereof) observable in the larger population of citizens 
represented by the ANES panel and discussed in the previous 2 chapters. 
Over 300 Purdue University students, including myself, volunteered on campus 
for the Obama campaign during the fall of 2008. Volunteers were typically engaged in 
one of the following activities: 1) Voter registration drives to encourage Purdue students 
to register and vote locally; 2) Phone-banking drives to encourage students to support 
Obama over McCain; 3) Data entry to help the campaign record and track the attitudes of 
potential voters and volunteers; and 4) Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) drives to ensure that 
registered Obama supporters would actually go out to cast their ballots. 
One of my individual volunteer tasks, with respect to data entry, was to maintain a 
spreadsheet of all volunteer names and contact information. Throughout that fall of 2008, 
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I coded and re-coded volunteers in that spreadsheet as 1 (highly active), 2 (moderately or 
regularly active), 3 (volunteered more than once and worth asking again), or 4 
(volunteered only once, do not invite again until GOTV time). This coding system helped 
the campaign reach out to volunteers in a more efficient manner than if all who had 
volunteered at least once were treated equally in the database, regardless of level of 
enthusiasm or involvement.   
That database had been dormant for the entire first Obama term before I 
reactivated it to reach out to potential interviewees (via email or text message) for my 
research in the summer of 2013. I randomly sampled the 1s, 2s, and 3s in the database 
until I had identified 30 former volunteers who were willing to be interviewed about their 
political attitudes, political participation, and civic engagement. Therefore while they 
were randomly sampled within that limited universe of Purdue student volunteers, they 
rep   	
	        (In other words, I sampled 
from this limited universe of young volunteers instead of a national sample of Obama 


















































contact rate of 74 percent (32 of 43), with only 2 former volunteers declining my 
interview request. Names used below are not the real names of the volunteers, so as to 
protect their anonymity. Below is the breakdown of the 30 volunteers I interviewed, by 
level of volunteer engagement achieved by the end of the campaign.   
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time) in the interviewee sample. Therefore al 30 interviewees in the sample 
volunteered at least twice for the 2008 Obama campaign.      
Next I recount the demographic characteristics of all 30 volunteers in the sample.     
Demographic Characteristics of Volunteer Sample: 
 Gender: 19 men, 11 women 
 Age: all were between 18-26 years old in November 2008   
 Race/Ethnicity: 18 white, 12 nonwhite  
 Income: unknown 
 Education: All 30 volunteers were Purdue University college students (27 
undergraduates, 3 graduate students) in November 2008 
Volunteer Responses to Interview Questions 
Political Interest# ! $ %    & '   ff
 (      )  ff*























































































/ less than in 2008; and the remaining 3 as being far less interested in 2008. 
Given the relative falloff in interest among Obama supporters that I discussed in Chapter 
4, it is noteworthy if not surprising that these young Obama volunteers maintained their 
high interest to this degree. Among the 70% of the sample who reported a continuing 
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high level of interest, several appeared to be the direct product of a positive Obama 
Effect. One volunteer, Cassie, summed up the views of several others in stating,  I would 
  	
 	
		   		
  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	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	 	 		  nterest since then.ffi Another 
volunteer, Derek  	   	
 	
		! 
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  #  
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	
State Democratic Party in Minnesota now. I would say I was a little interested in politics 
even before 2008, but my interest has grown exponentially over time because of Barack 
and what we did in 2008.ffi  
 Others told me they had been interested even before the 2008 campaign, and so 
their sustained or increased interest could not be attributed to an Obama Effect. 
Samantha, for example, came fro   	
 fl	
ffi $	  %	  fl		
very interested in local politics even in high school; and when she moved back to her 
hometown after living in Indiana for four years, she picked up her interest in local 
politics right where she had left it before college. During her four years in Indiana, she 
did become more interested in national electoral politics, perhaps because of Obama, but 
	  	












llow the news on a daily basis, as I have since my parents started reading 
the newspaper to me when I was a kid. And I just graduated in May, so I actually work 
for a government relations firm in Washington now
!
(
    
)
fl 	 
would be my hobby.
ffi
For volunteers like these two, it appeared that Obama was a 
beneficiary of preexisting political interest. 
Others offered rather nuanced views of how their interest had changed over time. 
*
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PACs and nonprofits that work toward policy goals. Richard also reflected on his 
changing political interest:  
The sorts of politics and government           
the past decade. When I first became interested in high school I was drawn in by 
opposition to the Iraq War so I became very interested in issues of foreign policy. 
And also civil liberties issues relating to wire-tapping and some of the things that 
came out of the Patriot Act as a response to 9/11. Then it became more related to 
         	  ff  
    
less about civil liberties and more about fiscal issues. 
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   	 up to date on what issues are 
going on. And I encourage other people to be more involved than I am. Cameron 
    
          ffi	  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  
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so obnoxious how nobody in Washington can accomplish anything without a 
	#      	     
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 
 e way I want. Too 
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External Efficacy. The second question I asked interviewees was: 
ffi
Do you think the 
government cares what people like you think?

 On this measure of external efficacy the 
interviewees reported in aggregation 7 yesses, 14 mixed responses, and 9 nos. I observed 
perhaps more nuance in responses to this question than any other question I asked in the 
interviews.   
Representing the most externally efficacious viewpoints, $ %
ffi
Yes, 
absolutely. I think that everyone who wants to can get representation. Sometimes I 
wonder if people have access to information or know how to voice their opinion, but 
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there are always ways.   		
    	  	 
 
 	 
to get a response from the government on a platform like Reddit. Picking up on this 
  	 I think individuals have the ability to put enough power behind 
their voice when they become part of a big voting constituency or lobbying effort. 
Conversely, Richard said he was efficacious at the individual level but not the societal 
level, specifically    
  	 ff Yes actuallyfifl   	
always felt that way. In high school and college     
	ffifl   	   
pretty affluent white male and a business owner. On an identity basis the only thing that 





  be donor class people like mefl  
Almost half of the sample, 14 of 30 interviewees, were best characterized as 
	
 !   " !	 fl #	  !  I 
think there are individuals within the government that certainly care, like Obama. One of 
the problems we face is, as an institution that is more difficult to believe.

$ 	
appeared to be a direct causal result of the Obama Effect. While it did not give her a high 
degree of external efficacy in general, it did increase her efficacy from where it was 
before the Obama election. I observed the Obama Effect at work in another volunteer, 
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my opinion is. But I do think the executive branch does care about what I think.

 Aaron 
said it just depended who we are talking about: 

I think it depends on if your name 




    	 	     	es based on the 
dependability of the person voicing their issues. 
Multiple volunteers distinguished between their external efficacy when it comes 
  	  		     	 	 I think at the level of local 
and state gove ff  	 	   fi 
 	fl	ff ffi 	  	
government, that our voices are heard. Jeff agreed:  
Sometimes yeah with respect to certain issues, but with respect to other issues I 
 ffi   	  fl  ff  	 ff For the most part I feel like 
more local issues are where I have more of a voice, but for national issues like 
  ff fi  ffi fi 
 	 	ff 	ff 	 	 !  	  fl 

a city council meeting like how to allocate library funds I feel like I have more of 
a voice.  
 
 Seven of the 30 volunteers expressed more negative or cynical attitudes on 
external efficacy. Speaking personally, Lucas offered an interesting contrast to " 	

response above:  
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  #		 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
the White House impacted his views on that at all, which prompted him to express the 
following: 
I think the President is different. I think he actually thinks about people. I was 
able to sign up for his healthcare plan at a really good premium with subsidies 
from the federal government. I think his actions are very indicative of actually 
caring and trying to get something done. He came into office to increase the 
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Thus while Lucas directly indicated low external efficacy, the follow-up question 
appeared to reveal indirectly a significant Obama Effect on his efficacy toward Obama 
himself, if not the larger federal government.  
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 Almost one-quarter of my sample, 7 of 30 interviewees, expressed 
overwhelmingly negative external efficacy. Cassie answered the question thusly, in a 
response fairly typical of this last group:  
 	
   	   	     		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that voting is important. And I believe    	     	

 other 
people that just to get other people to come out and participate, otherwise they 
 		 	  	  	   		 
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Republicans are there versus how many Dem ffi    	 
	 
the public, including myself, as much as they should.   
 
Attitudes toward President Obama. Although my quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 
centered on attitudes such as interest, efficacy, and partisanship, for this qualitative 
chapter I wanted to gain a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of these former 
young 
		 	  	 		 	
   below I included full 
or partial responses from most volunteers to my third question:  !ow do you feel about 
Barack Obama these days? And how have your feelings about him changed (or not 
changed) since his 2008 campaign?" Among the 30 interviewees, 21 were best 
characterized as having overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward Obama; the other 9 had 
mixed attitudes toward the president. It should not be surprising that none of the 
interviewees had an overwhelmingly negative attitude toward Obama, given that all 30 of 
them had volunteered to help elect him less than 5 years prior.  
Although 70% of my interviewees expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes 
toward Obama in the summer of 2013, almost all responses contained some qualification 
related to partisanship, gridlock, 




specific issues. Yet a few volunteers did express unqualified approval for the president, 
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ove, love, love President 
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Obama. I love to watch him on TV, I love to read about him and listen to him. I just think 
  	
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Love him. Always have. Another volunteer, Bridget said:  
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when he talks about how he wants to revamp student loan policies because that 
affects me a lot. 
 
Yet another, Olivia, indicated that her support had become even broader in recent 
 fl ffi     	   	      	 this country. Overall I feel 
   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 	 and good for America. Especially since his re-election, 
 
   much more assertive which is good.  
 I prompted Lucas to elaborate after he initially offered the short response that he 
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He replied, 
ffi
I really like his nominees to the federal bench, his economic stimulus, and 
like I said his health care bill
     
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pleased with his appointment of Justice Elana Kagan. I knew what I was getting into 
when I voted for him again. I was pleased with him during his first term a
  
pleased right now.
 fi  
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When he was considering getting us into the war in Syria, I 
was very much against that. I was very pleased [Secretary of State] John Kerry ratcheted 
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down the war rhetoric. That is probably the only negative thing that I would put on 






  	 My opinion is pretty much the same as it was in 2008. A lot of 
people I know are disillusioned with Obama     
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y positive, but are there any 
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 disappointed in him? ! ff
fi I think on issues like gun 
control and immigration he could use his powers from the executive branch a little more 
strongly to try and force legislation through or to do things unilaterally with executive 

 ! 
 	   	     "   	 
    	
on this issues where most of the American people would support him. 
Victoria expressed similar attitudes in that she was very approving of the 
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ounds like your feelings about President Obama are mostly positive but 
not fully. Any particular issues where you think he could be doing more? She did then 
offer some specifics critiques of the president:  
Two issues where he could make a bigger stand are regarding national gay 
marriage legalization, and also marijuana. He came out in support of same-sex 
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enough. I definitely think we could be doing reforms in 
the areas of both medical and recreational use of marijuana. I think 
decriminalizing it would help out a lot. And in terms of border security, he says 
he is friendly to immigrants but they are putting up a wall in certain parts of Texas 
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fi  " 
 	 	 	 
 	 








Jeff, similarly, articulated overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward Obama, knowing 
how constrained he would be as president. He stated,   	
 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feasible. I wanted the infrastructure program in the American Recovery Act when he first 
got elected to be much larger. And I wanted healthcare to be single payer but those 
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 		  # current policies. But if I 
had to scale my support 1-10 I would say a 9.fi When I asked if Johnathan had been 
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Chris also expressed deep sympathy for Obama entering office during an 
economic crisis:  
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circumstances in Congress. The economy, unemployment, job creation, creating a 
strong middle class
fl 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important issues that the President has focused on. 
#&		 &  ff	 ff 
 
  ff	ff  
*





given what he inherited and given the situation, I 
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 job.   
 
One volunteer, Caroline began by articulating a very positive view of Obama, but 
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Derek also felt this frustration, but 
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thought such attitudes were the product of unrealistically high expectations given the 
context of the negative economic and militaristic conditions under which Obama 
assumed the office:  
The president inherited a very difficult situation with the economy that no one 
could fix overnight, and two very costly wars,    done a very good job 
trying to fix all that. But because he came into office with such high 
expectations	
     	   
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2008. 
 
This last point made by Derek reflected the most common theme that arose when 
I asked about attitudes toward Obama. Indeed, most volunteers offered some combination 
of an expression of support for Obama and an expression of frustration with 
congressional Republicans striving to block any agenda item supported by the president. 
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but I 
definitely wish he could get more through Congress. Another volunteer, Dominic, said 
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job so far.$ Abby agreed, elaborating on why she still had such positive attitudes toward 
Obama: 
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with John Boehner and the Republicans.$ '
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her, she said,  I was proud of his show of support for LGBT issues recently, especially 
given the climate in Washington  	
 
    
Republicans.  
Speaking as one of those volunteers who had more tepid support or mixed 
attitudes toward the president, Cliff said, 
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be effective, and that his hands are tied. There have been a few examples though 
where I thought he should have been a little bolder, like not dropping the public 
option or just letting the Bush tax cuts expire. But I think  the danger of our 
system right now, how our Congress is supported by lobbyistsSo a lot of this 

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turned out into what we thought it would. I think most of the blame is on who he 
has to work with. 
 
Tyler offered a somewhat different perspective by focusing more on the fact that 
Democrats had large majo
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 ffi
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really changed completely. I was disappointed with Democrats generally because they 
had a supermajority and failed to deliver the kind of healthcare law I wanted. I think the 















 I think the President has been too conciliatory in light of all the 
Republican obstructionism. But I do think he has restored some of our positive image 
around the world, and I also like his Supreme Court pick, so a lot of my frustration is 
with the Democratic leadership in Congress.

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Tonya, a self-described environmentalist, offered another interesting combination 
      	
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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	 I still really like Obama  	 
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I feel increasingly sorry for him as I watch his level of frustration grow with Congress.
But she qualified her support  	  	 	 
 	 :  
A couple of years ago when the big [BP] oil spill happened, he had an opportunity 
to really do something big related to climate change legislation. If there was ever 
an opportunity that was squandered, that was it. I really felt like an environmental 
disaster that nothing good could have come out of except for increased legislation 




	fiThat was one of the reasons I supported Obama in the first place, 
because he was all about science, but then he barely even fought Republicans on 
that issue. I think most people in the country would have supported him, he sort of 
squandered it which made me very frustrated. But except for the oil spill, when 
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 $ I think he could do a better 
job of fighting Republicans on issues like the environment.   
 
Although all volunteers expressed at least mixed support for Obama, several 
offered sharp criticisms of certain policy positions. For example, volunteers like Kent 
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s handling of the Affordable Care Act and the economy, 
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 but actually the opposite. Proba
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really disappointing not much has changed th
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referring to drone strikes, to letting interest groups write legislation, and to letting 
lobbyists continue to have so much influence over government decisions.

 Another 
volunteer, Jordan, agreed, saying that his attitudes toward Obama were  
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Generally positive but     	 
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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       	 	 to act on civil 
liberties and civil rights issues. Things like how he handled Snowden, and not 
fighting the bad state voting laws that are popping up everywhere, and joblessness 
for minorities being mu         
		 
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rapidly I think he could be more proactive in that regard.  
 
Only 3 of the 30 volunteers in my sample could appropriately be characterized as 
having mixed, but more negative than positive feelings toward Obama. Obviously since 
they had volunteered for his campaign, such attitudes were attributable to a deep 
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alone give him so much power over the economy. Foreign policy is the one part, 
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estic issues, 
he could do so much better When he passed Obamacare, it was by the skin of 
his teeth. It was like   ff   ff       
		 &  
really fault him for that. But on economic issues, issues of government 
















ey be president. 
So my support went up slightly then, but overall I would say a slight decline from 
2008.     
 



















I support his social policies but any Democrat can be pro-choice. I wish he were 
more liberal on tax equality, and I really wish he were more liberal on questions 
of national security, NSA data collection. I wish he pursued financial regulations 
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harder than he currently does. The Dodd-Frank bill was weak, does anybody 




     	 I still happily voted for him in 2012. We 
could be doing a whole lot worse. I think expectations were unrealistically high 
for him coming into office, given what he has to work with in Congress.  
 
Thus while Greg and a few others did attribute much of their frustration to congressional 
Republicans, they also laid a substantial portion of the blame for their disappointment at 
the feet of Obama himself.  
 Finally, Cameron offered perhaps the most negative views of among all 30 
volunteers: 
 	
  same as when he was campaigning, obviously. I do have very mixed 
feelings about him. Overall I stand by my vote because the Republican candidate 
was too far away from my political views. But that being said, there are some 
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domestic spying. 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	 	  	 upportive enough of Israel. Sometimes 
he sounds like he is trying to move back in the right direction, like when he said 
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intrusive in the first place.  
 
 As I noted above, it was not surprising that all 30 of these volunteers from 
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2013, or that the overwhelming majority still have overwhelmingly positive attitudes 
toward him. Yet I also observed a wide range in negative attitudes couched within the 
positive overall assessments of the president, especially with respect to his handling of 
specific issues (e.g., the Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, the NSA domestic 
surveillance, tax policy, gun control, choice of appointees, the environment, etc.) Many 
of these young volunteers were inclined to qualify their support by raising some objection 
to his handling of said issues. I noticed most of the interviewees only criticized Obama 
after fist expressing their general ongoing support for him. Without question, the vast 
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majority of volunteers that I interviewed pinned the blame for their frustrations on 
Republicans in Congress, rather than at Democrats or at Obama himself.  
Attitudes on Direction of the Country. My final question in the attitudes section of the 
    	
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 
             
about the way things are going for the U.S. these days? Are you more optimistic and 
positive about the future, or are you more pessimistic and negative? Exactly half the 
sample, 15 volunteers, were best characterized as optimistic. Nine of the 30 had mixed 
attitudes, and the remaining 6 said they were more pessimistic on the whole.  
Chris, picking up on the major theme from the previous section, said that he was 
ery optimistic about our future  
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	 ff
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overall I feel pretty optimistic. Daniel 
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up. Economy is recoverin 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reasons. First, when I hear the job numbers, compared to where they were 2-3 years ago, 
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Looking at the classes 1 or 2 years ahead of me, it
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easier to find jobs now. So I feel more optimistic about the economy.

 Aaron also felt the 
economy provide solid ground for a positive outlook
 	
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initiatives:     
I feel optimistic. The private sector is picking up a lot of slack where the public 
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President has recently been promoting these manufacturing hubs, public-private 
partnerships to bring together community businesses, schools, and research 
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institutions to bring together ideas and concepts that are conceived at universities, 
to bring them to market. And I think th    	
  
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positive feeling about the future. More startup companies are emerging, the Dow has 
doubled since 2008 when everything fell apart, and   	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the country is heading.fi  
Caroline attributed her optimism more to personality than to Obama or any other 
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pushing things in the wrong direction, at the ground level I see lots of great work being 
done in our country by young people.      ff 	!fi 
Certainly other interviewees were more tepid, reserved, or qualified in their 
optimism. Cliff, for example, qualified his response by saying it depended on class: 
That really depends who you are. For the middle class or for the average person, 
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re certain things 
about this country that were tougher on us how than they were 15 or 20 years ago, 
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d. I think 
we should be thankful that we are not in a third world country where people can 
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barely feed themselves. We still have it so much better than so many other places 
in the world so we should be very thankful for that. But it really depends on who 
you are. 
 
Tonya and several others agreed with Cliff that class and income inequality were 
paramount  
 
Issues with respect to the future health of the United States: 
 
It totally depends on who you are. When you think about inequality, the rich are 
getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, well is that going to be acceptable, 
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the globe, all the people on the low end in the U.S., where do they fall globally? 
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me people could stand to realize how lucky they 
are to be Americans. From a global perspective, a lot of our problems in the U.S. 
will seem very trivial but from a national perspective they seem very tough. So it 
depends a lot on the perspective we take.     
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direction in terms of how we relate to the rest of the world; building relationships 
with other countries and working together on global challenges. I think the 
economy 
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more inequality.  That gap between people who have the most and people who 
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Lucas also gave a mixed assessment because of rising income inequality.  
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democratic party, one that is willing to talk about the economy as a project that 
we can control, as something where government has the levers to achieve that. 
 
Only 6 volunteers in my sample reported an overwhelming pessimistic attitude. 
Greg offered perhaps the most cynical or negative outlook of all, beginning by saying he 
was *
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	 ffi  fl  "
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opposition party. One party is just trying to win the political game	       
thought it was possible for things to get better or reverse course in this regard, and he said 
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lot of optimism for any sort of legislation, which means the country will be held back 
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Republicans exist. Josh       ffMostly pessimistic"because of the 















Dominic gave a particularly interesting response, invoking the income inequality 
issue as grounds for his pessimism, but tying it to his observations from being employed 
at a struggling retail outlet:  
















skewed higher for people who make more money, and lower for people who 
	 
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middle class, to provide a stable environment for their offspring. But if you just 
look at something like retail, I work in retail at a mid-range department store, JC 
Penney, and they have been really squeezed. But you look at Saks 5th Avenue and 
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Voting Behavior. In the second segment of the interview, I asked the 30 volunteers 
several questions about their political participation (or lack thereof) in the four and a half 






Did you vote in the 





response would prompt the follow up question,  Do you think of voting more as a duty or 
responsibility, or is it something where you really need to be inspired by specific 
candidates or parties to vote? All but 1 volunteer said he or she voted in 2012 to reelect 
President Obama. (The lone nonvoter said she did not vote because she was hospitalized 
at the time.) The vast majority, 25 of 30, said they also voted in the 2010 midterm 
elections. About 77% of the sample, 23 of them, said they saw voting as a duty and/or 
responsibility. The remaining 7 said that they viewed voting as more of a personal 
decision and/or that their voting habits were conditional upon being inspired to turn out 
for a particular election (as in 2008).  
Caroline represented the views of many volunteers with her straightforward and 
strong opinion on the importance of voting:     	
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 responsibility that we 
all need to take.  !"#$% &$'#( )* #!%+, ,-'%. /0 1!,'%2 '& 3!%,'%24%, 56!% /0 74147 !8
motivation for a specific candidate. I guess I would classify it more as a civic duty. I think 
',+& '/6!",$%, ,! -$14 $ 1!'34 ,! ,-4 4
9
,4%, ,-$, 0!5 3$% -$14 $ 1!'34( &! * #!%+, ,-'%. ',+&
dependent on personality or how excited I am about a specific party or candidate.: Daniel 
told me he would vote even if he hated everyone on the ballot, and he wished all citizens 
felt that way.  
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  I always think of it as a 2-
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not that naïve. But 	  
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about, and beyond that I just go by party.  
Only a handful of volunteers admitted to not having voted in the 2010 midterm 
elections; and only 7 said they did not see voting as a duty or responsibility. Most in these 




























did elaborate on her views, Cassie, said she did not vote in the midterms, but felt the full 
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for him in the presidential election. 
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f they 
responded in the affirmative, I followed up by asking which campaign(s) they had 
volunteered for and what their responsibilities were. I also asked if the 2008 Obama 
campaign was the first campaign on which they had ever volunteered; a full 90% of the 
sample, 27 of 30 volunteers, said that it was indeed their first campaign volunteer work.  
My first 4 interviews included a related question regarding campaign mobilization 
























 after noting the stark 














I mean, I received emails from the 
157 
 
campaign asking me to volunteer but       	  
    personally by 
    appeared evident that the 2012 Obama campaign sought to reactive all former 
2008 volunteers early in the campaign through mass email outreach, but that the approach 
was not as personalized as in 2008. (This also represented my own experience as a former 
volunteer: I was sent many mass emails by the 2012 campaign but was not contacted 
directly.) This was not surprising, given that Obama was not a new candidate in 2012 and 
already had some existing campaign infrastructure in place for his reelection bid. It was 
also not surprising because many volunteers clearly were more qualified in their support 
for Obama in 2012 than they had been in 2008. The campaign may have focused more on 
recruiting a fresh group of young volunteers than on reactivating its former volunteer 
base. Yet perhaps the main reason for the lack of direct campaign mobilization with these 
former volunteers was that Indiana was treated by both campaigns as a swing state in 
2008 but not in 2012. It is likely that the 2012 Obama campaign did in fact engage in 
more personalized direct mobilization efforts, as opposed to mass email outreach only, 
for former 2008 volunteers who were living in swing states in 2012. Those with Indiana 
addresses may have been left off the recruitment list for that reason alone.    
Notwithstanding the       	 ff  fi
volunteer outreach in Indiana, about 57% of the sample had volunteered in some political 
capacity in the four and a half years since the 2008 election. Among these 17, I coded 6 
as having volunteered a lot, 8 as having volunteered a little, and 3 who had worked in 
politics since leaving Purdue and also volunteered at some point. Of the remaining 13 
interviewees, 2 had worked in politics since graduating but not volunteered; and 11 had 




   was involved in a couple midterm campaigns back in 
	In 2012 I was a field organizer for Obama on the ground in Las Vegas. 
credited his experience volunteering for the 2008 campaign with giving him the desire to 
pursue a full time job on the 2012 campaign. Kent told a very similar story: he worked 
full time as a field organizer on the 2012 Obama campaign in Ohio, and volunteered for 
several local Democratic Party candidates on several 2010-2011 local races in West 
Lafayette, Indiana.  	     very active in the 2012 Obama 

I was an organizer over the summer, and I did some volunteer work like 
doing data entry and voter registration as well. I went to Ohio to register voters. I was 
also in charge or re-activating some volunteers from 2008.  	     	
organizer, and she said it was an unpaid internship requiring 20 hours of campaign work 
each week.  
On the other end of the spectrum were volunteers like Tonya, who volunteered 1 
time for 1 candidate. She told me that she had volunteered to attend the Indiana State 
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volunteer for Obama in 2012 simply because Indiana (or the state they were living in) 
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he knew Obama was going to win his state of Maryland in 2012; but this did not fully 
deter him from volunteering. Instead he canvassed down-ballot Democratic Party 













 he said. 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 I asked if he had considered working for the 2012 Obama 
campaign so that he could be paid to do what he enjoyed so much as a volunteer back in 
2008; he laughed, saying that woul         	
   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 In contrast, 
Caroline, another o  ff   	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   "  fifl!fi#We did a 
lot of GOVT stuff, organizing people into canvassing and phone-banking events. I was 
also part of a group that helped organize a debate between Howard Dean and Liz 
Cheney. She and Donovan seemed to have very contrasting experiences, with one 
experiencing a powerful but short term Obama Effect, and the other a lasting Obama 
effect that made her want to do political volunteer work in the future.   
Perhaps the most engaged volunteers since 2008 were Jordan and Richard 	
volunteered on several races for state senate and state representative in Indianap

Jordan told me, continuing, 

I also volunteered  $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In sum, a full 30% of the sample reported either working in politics or doing lots 
of volunteer work; and another 27% had done at least some political volunteering since 
2008. Based on what many of the interviewees told me, it would appear the 2008 Obama 
campaign did produce a positive and lasting Obama Effect on political participation. In 
many cases, it manifested very directly in the form of a spillover effect, in which former 
Obama campaign volunteers from 2008 became engaged as volunteers for other 
Democratic Party candidates in off-year and down-ballot races. 
Other Forms of Political Participation. My third question in the participation section 
  Can you think of any other way in which you participated in politics since the 
2008 campaign, such as contributing money to a candidate, putting a campaign bumper 
sticker on your car, contacting an elected official about an issue, or attending a political 
protest? 	
     
         
at least 4 distinct ways since the 2008 Obama campaign. Two others participated in 
exactly 3 ways, and 10 more said the participated in 2 different ways. Another 5 said they 
had participated in only 1 way, and 4 of the 30 reported not having participated in politics 
at all since 2008 beyond voting (and volunteering, in the case of 2 of the 4).   







My car is covered in Obama bumper stickers, and I wear 
flffi

























































Josh had gone a bit further: 
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contacted local congressmen in 
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Indiana about stuff, especially about the gay marriage ban they were talking about, and 
some gun control stuff.   
Greg said that he often participated in politics both offline and through social 
 	
           When I say 
informally I mean posting on Facebook and that sort of thing. I also donated to 3 
campaigns, including Obama 2012 because he really needed my $15 or he would not 
have won! 	
    	  on behalf of candidates I support.   
Chris, Kent, and Tyler were perhaps the most active in terms of non-volunteer 
political participation since 2008. He also mentioned participating both online and 
offline:  
Yeah I have an Obama bumper sticker, and I try to make sure that people know 
 
 ffff       current public affairs. 	
 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be involved. 	
     	
  ff 	 ould Tweet 
at them, like last year with my Congressman Todd Rokita back in Indiana and his 
vote against the debt ceiling increase. I felt that was very irresponsible of him. 
People like that can become my worst enemy on Facebook. I remember I also 
gave money to a couple of senate candidates like Joe Donnelly. And with friends, 
colleagues, anyone I meet, I like to talk to them about all that political stuff. 
 
Kent, who told me he came from a very politically active family, said 
   
Kentfi 	
   	




lobbied government officials as a constituent. 
	
  
number of state and national officials about a number of issues. Letters and emails 
  	
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bers of Congress with a student 
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some state legislators about some state issues. 
 
Finally, Tyler articulated the widest array of types of participation: 
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undecided legislators about the importance of supporting same-sex marriage. I 
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 or gay rights groups like Planned 
Parenthood and the Human Rights Campaign. I have also attended Jefferson-
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Jackson dinners and paid for tickets which go into the Democratic Party fund. I 
also did some research for a candidate running for judge, because he needed to be 
    	
   
          
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 

Chair for College Dems of Indiana I actually just sent letters to a bunch of 
legislators last night. I went to law school after Purdue and part of the reason is 
because I wanted to be able to participate in the process of crafting public policy.      
 
Joining Organizations or Associations. In the third segment of my interviews, I asked 
the volunteers about various types of civic engagement that are not explicitly political in 
nature. I really wanted to get a sense here of whether the Obama Effect had any lasting 
implications in terms of a nonpolitical spillover effect. My first question was, In the last 5 
years, have you voluntarily joined any non-political organizations or associations? Five 
of the 30 said that they had joined at least 1 professional and 1 nonprofessional 
association/organization; 6 others said they had joined at least 1 nonprofessional 
organization; and 5 others had joined at least 1 professional association. The remaining 
14 volunteers said they had not joined any organizations or associations, meaning the 
sample was almost evenly divided in half between joiners and non-joiners.  
Professional organizations that were mentioned included Young Professionals of 
Lafayette, the American Library Association, the American Geographical Union, Quad 
Cities Chamber of Commerce, the American Counseling Association, The Verge (an 
association for young professionals), the Black Law Student association, and National 
Association of American Personnel Administrators.  
Some of the nonprofessional organizations that were mentioned included the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Black Expo, the Lafayette Go Greener Commission, 
and the Foreign Policy Association. Although I had asked for nonpolitical examples, I 
thought the responses were still worth noting since they related to issues and not 
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campaigns. I was surprised, however, at the dearth of examples that lacked any explicit 
political connection. None of my volunteers reported linking up with the local book 
group, or signing up with the cycling club, or even joining a bowling league.  
One response, from Tyler, jumped out to me as particularly interesting. He told 
me,  
Immediately after undergrad I joined the Peace Corps. I served for about a year as 




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domestic violence get protective orders. I worked for a year as a fundraiser for an 
international development firm called Oxfam, to raise money to combat severe 
drought and famine in East Africa. And I was part of a clinical project at my law 
school that helps provide legal research and assistance to the LGBT community in 
Indiana.  
 
I followed up with Tyler to ask if he was inspired to join the Peace Corps in part because 
 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influence. Being part of that campaign made me want to be part of some of those other 
things for sure, because I saw what people could accomplish when they join up for a 
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the past 5 years, have you attended any kind of community meeting about social or 
community issues? Almost two-thirds of the sample said yes they had attended at least 1 
such meeting. The remaining 11 of 30 said no they had not attended any community or 
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different community events and public debates. We did them on issues like freedom of 
speech, or on whatever was going on in the country at the time. And I went to city 
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  I attended a symposium about the future and the economy of water. And 
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s Club in her neighborhood. Dominic said the 
Black Expo sometimes held meetings that he would attend, to discuss things like 
organizing community events to promote local and African American owned businesses. 
        	   
	ff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initiative. I did a compost workshop, and a rain barrel workshop. These were to promote 
environmental 	      	  ff	      
fl 
 
agenda. It was really a chance for the public to come out and ask questions about 
sustainable and environmentally friendly living.  
Nonpolitical Volunteering since 2008. The final question of my formal 
   fi #$$%  	   fl     
 fl 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     	


  & I was surprised that the overwhelming majority, 23 of 30, said yes 
they had done nonpolitical volunteer work, while only 7 had not. If someone reported 
doing a particularly substantial amount of volunteer work, then I followed up by asking 
them to articulate their motivations as best they could.  




















 ,  was involved in volunteer work through the 
Black Law Student Association. There were various things we did, whether it was 
adopting a highway, or visiting a soup kitchen, or donating law books to prisons. It was a 
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way to get a good amount of community service work done in different areas and to raise 
money for various organizations and other things.   	
   
school organizations to help domestic violence victims get protective orders and help the 
LGBT community with legal research and assistance. 
One interviewee, Victoria, seemed particularly excited to answer this question. 
Part of my position [at work] is to do service projects for community members. A recent 
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involvement are very important to you and a core part of your work as well. Do you feel 
like being involved in that 2008 Obama campaign encouraged you toward more 
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political organizations like the Quad City Chamber of 
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someone who was more likely drawn to the Obama campaign for the opportunity to 
volunteer, than drawn to volunteering because of an Obama Effect.   
Others mentioned donating blood, participating in clothing drives, donating to the 
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, helping out the Defenders of 
Wildlife, and working for a Jewish organization that feeds the poor. One worked with the 
Trusted Mentors program, and three had been a Big Brother or a Big Sister at some point 
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in the past 5 years. Caroline was the volunteer who seemed to have done most of these 
things herself:  
I am     	 
   	   	 	 
 		
home visits, food drives, stuff like that. I also teach Sunday school. We also have 
a high immigrant population here in Milwaukee, so I have done lots of tutoring 
and organizing of other community events particularly for the Mung population. 





Representing the other end of the spectrum and revealing a lack of a lasting 
Obama Effect, I asked Donovan, one of the most active volunteers for Obama at Purdue, 
ff 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Final Thoughts from the Volunteers. I closed these interviews with what I described to 
the volunteers as a very open-ended question that they could answer however they chose. 
I asked, fiWhen you think back to volunteering on that 2008 Obama campaign almost 5 
years later, is there anything in particular that is really memorable for you or that you 
think of as having had a lasting impact on your life?
fl
 
  ff 
!
	 
to give the volunteers an opportunity to articulate any manifestations of a lasting Obama 
Effect that may not have been captured in responses to the more pointed questions related 
to the core of my research and analysis (i.e., those related directly to political attitudes or 
participation).  
I identified 4 main themes or points of recurring focus in the volunteer responses: 
involvement, community, memorable events, and connection to family. Representing the 
first major theme of involvement, Donovan recalled how being involved in the campaign 
inspired him to become a more civically engaged even in his professional life:  
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My experience on that campaign actually made me think more about what 
government is supposed to do for the people, and made me change majors to civil 
engineering, because it has the biggest effect on people day      	 

why I want to be involved in government still. I think it made people who 
volunteered want to be leaders more, maybe not political leaders but people who 
      
        had never 
experienced that drive before. 
 
Bridget was another who drew inspiration for her professional life from her involvement 
in the Obama campaign:  
Yeah, I have great memories about relationships that were fostered. Really, one of 
 	         	
  tayed as involved as I want to be. But it 
changed me in a way that will serve me well in the future. Working on the 
campaign, learning to organize and persuade, I think it helps me a lot in my 
professional life. So I would say the skills I gained during that time period are 
really positive memories for me. 
 
Abby talked about how being involved in the campaign inspired her early in her Purdue 
career helped her realize her agency:   
When I worked on the 2008 campaign, it was my freshman year in college. So 
seeing how active and engaged people wanted to be in the process if they felt they 
had a candidate that spoke to them, that gave me a good push toward what I 
wanted to do in life. It made me think younger people do really care if candidates 
talk to them abou
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impressive.  
 
Several others reminisced positively and proudly about their involvement in the 




that campaign is it showed me what people can accomplish when they come together and 
work hard for a common goal. Just the way everyone seemed to have self-motivated to do 









" Jordan talked 
about the excitement he felt from helping others to get involved as well: ffiI had a lot of 
good moments, especially when we were registering voters where it had been years and 
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years since they voted. And it was pretty exciting to see that level of involvement and 
    	
   		  
      
s a very 
refreshing experien Aaron relished in having been involved in 

  : 
Obviously it was really exciting when we won. I guess it was my first real-world 









 Tyler offered a particularly emotional response about the meaning of his 
involvement in the 2008 Obama campaign. When I asked what was particularly 
memorable for him, he responded:  
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was basically symptoms of depression. So when that campaign started I basically 
decided to force myself to go out and do something. And then during that 

	
    ff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      ff  
campaign on top of school stuff. I felt myself being more energized and more 
productive and even got better grades that semester, I think just based off the 
energy we had on the campaign. It was very fulfilling working toward something 
that I believed in like that. That was very rewarding. Being able to work that 
much on something that I care about, to completely throw myself into a 











	 fi    
miss that sometimes. 
 
 The second major theme I identified was community. Many volunteers deeply 
appreciated the opportunity to work side by side in a community of peers on a project of 
such great significance. Cliff, for example, responded to the final question like this:  
For me what really stood out was, we all came from different backgrounds. There 
were political science students but also engineering students. The diversity of our 
group was pretty widespread. It was amazing just how focused everybody was 
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  ff
problems electing Obama president but to work so hard as a team for a common 
goal was just amazing. 
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Greg also tapped directly into the theme of community, citing it as a source of future 
inspiration:  
 
Two big things I remember. One is it really demonstrated how important that type of 
work can be. It felt like      	  
    
  

thing that kept me coming back. The other thing is, it was really cool seeing my peers 
being so dedicated not just mentally and emotionally, but also with their time. That 
was the first time I had 
  
  




Lucas told me that for him, the campaign had evolved into a joint business venture with a 
	  
 [Richard] and I are still working together on our business venture. The 
social network has also been very substantial in my life since then. 
 The third major theme I identified was memorable events. Several volunteers 
spoke about a single experience from the campaign that was especially memorable for 
them. Of the 12 nonwhite volunteers, only one, Dominic, talked about race in relation to 
this final interview question. He told me about a particularly meaningful day for him on 
an out-of-state campaign trip that really influenced his thinking about race relations:  
I thin 	    ff  
    

 	 fi 
 flffi 
from an all African American community from Gary, and when I got to Purdue I 
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that campaign really challenged my thinking on race. Point in case is when we 
were in Ohio, canvassing in this rich white neighborhood, me and my girlfriend, 
these 2 young black kids, and I was just shocked at how many people invited us to 
come into their homes and actually sit on their furniture and talk to them. Some 













remember thinking wow, this is really cool, some rich white people are actually 
nice like this in real life! So that was a really big deal for me, because they 
actually cared what we were saying and asked questions about what we were 
studying in school and stuff, like they were really excited we came by. It was just 
a very exciting experience.   
 
Richard also focused his response on his most memorable experience campaigning for 
Obama in another state:  
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I remember going to Iowa to volunteer over winter break. I was gonna be moved 
to Cedar Rapids but one of the staffers was sick so I was put in charge of the 
entire Osage, Iowa office. I remember going out canvassing with this former 
Department of Justice staffer who had this personal vendetta against the Clintons. 
We went out in his little Prius and the wind chill was like -3 degrees. So his job 
was to drive between houses as I went up to knock and make the pitch. Then the 
day of the actual caucus, it was in the senior center and the Hillary people were 
the older people and they had the keys to the center. So they went up and hung up 
a bunch of Hillary signs all around the caucus area. So I remember showing up 
and having to call the elections officials and waiting for the official to come down 
before we went in to set up. But anyway, we won, we went out to a bar and 
celebrated with the Edwards people. So it was between that, and when Obama 
came to ca   	
           
  
 
Daniel first told me about a particular memorable event from the campaign, and then 
turned to the theme of involvement and how it helped his professional development:  
I remember the day of Halloween I ran into Jade ( field organizer for the 
Obama campaign) and we went down to the tailgating crowd for the football 
             ff
 fi  	  
always remember. But overall I guess just the sense of working as a team. I 
worked at a couple jobs before Groupon and I think it helped me out with that. I 
also think it may have contributed to my job at Groupon. When we first started, 
there were a ton of people I knew who applied at Groupon     fl

But my interviewer was really interested in what kind of campaign work I did, 
and what kind of team work I had experienced. So I told her about the campaign, 
how I did all this work, and I got the feeling that she really liked that part. 
 
One volunteer, Josh, talked about how excited he was to be invited to a special event with 





 !My buddy and I were 
still in high school during the 2008 primaries, and we got to see Obama play basketball in 
Kokomo because we got so many voter registrations. That was our reward from the 
campaign. It was a great day!" Another, Cameron, mentioned a big local music festival in 
    
# !I also remember the Turn Indiana Blue musical festival on the 
Lafayette Bridge. And in the end we actually turned Indiana Blue!"
fi
also 
referenced election night itself as a particularly memorable moment for Purdue 
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volunteers like her:   	 
      	 	   t a few 
thousand votes. So just knowing I had participated in that, I remember feeling that night 
like it was a historical moment and I had been part of creating it. What a feeling. 
The final theme that emerged in volunteer responses was connection to family. 
Two volunteers touched upon this theme in very meaningful ways. Caroline told me:  
That campaign was actually a pivotal moment in the history of my family. My 
mom was a volunteer coordinator for the campaign, and my dad was making sure 
that everyone w  	  	   
	 	 ff	 fi	 
brother and sister got into phone-banking for Obama. Then we all took a road trip 
to his inauguration in January 2009!   
 
Tonya fl 	   ffi	 fl	  
    the 4 themes I 
discussed in this section. She began by discussing a memorable event, but then quickly 
pivoted to the larger meaningfulness of her involvement. She then drew an emotional 
connection between her involvement in the 2008 Obama campaign and her family 
history:  
I 
	 	 ! "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ff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involved now. I may have been disconnected for a few months around when my 
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an informed citizen too. And the other thing, my dad was a journalist for PBS 
radio in New York City so I kind of grew up in a household with politics, because 
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grew up in a household where the news was important to my dad but never really 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The story I thought I might be telling, not long after I began this project, was one 
of the Obama Effect gone awry. I situated my project in the literature on campaign effects 
and individual-centered campaigns, hypothesizing a positive and lasting Obama Effect 
for this seemingly unique candidate; but    	
 
    	  
 
his first year. W
   	 	 
 

   
    ff 
already beginning to wonder if I had my general hypothesis backward. The 2008 Obama 
campaign had set out to transform the electorate, but instead was welcomed by the rise of 
the Tea Party Movement. Obama had sought to strengthen his Democratic Party, but 
instead it was the other Party that he seemed to energize more after his 2008 election. 
The Democrats suffered landslide losses in the 2010 midterms and found themselves 
thereafter blocked at nearly every policy turn by their Republican counterparts. I 
wondered if the Obama Effect might be a negative thing, a phenomenon experienced 
most deeply by his harshest critics rather than by his strongest supporters.  














would transform the electorate into a more engaged and participatory citizenry. I framed 
my hypotheses accordingly to expect a positive and lasting Obama Effect on political 
interest, external political efficacy, partisanship, voter turnout, attendance of political 
meetings, and attendance of political protests. As it turns out, the picture that emerged 
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was far too muddy to characterize so neatly or generally as an overarching  	 

 	   What is rather obvious from the data is that the 2008 Obama 
campaign did not have the clearly transformational positive impact on the electorate in 
these ways as it had hoped. 
Within the chapter on political attitudes, I found a negative Obama Effect on 
political interest, indicating that his supporters did not stay engaged in politics after the 
election to the degree that his campaign hoped. I observed a positive Obama Effect on 
one type of external efficacy (How much do government officials care what people like 
you think?), although the negative sentiment among McCain supporters was stronger than 
the positive sentiment among Obama supporters. And I observed a sort of oppositional 
effect on my second measure of efficacy (How much can people like you affect what the 
government does?) I observed a very broad candidate effect on partisanship, indicating 
that supporters of any candidate prone to increased partisanship in the first two years after 
a typical modern presidential election.   
Within the chapter on political participation, I observed no statistically significant 
candidate effect on voter turnout. I did, however, find a negative presidential effect on 
attending local meetings to discuss political or social concerns. Although Obama 
supporters did register a relative significant increase their attendance, the magnitude of 
the increase was stronger among McCain supporters. Likewise, supporters of Gore and 
Bush II, the other losing candidates, registered similar increases. This suggested a 
possible oppositional thesis, in which the opponents rather than the supporters of the 
winning candidate become more participatory after the election. I observed a similar 
dynamic between Obama and McCain supporters with attending protests, with supporters 
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of both candidates showing an increased attendance of protests, but with a significantly 
larger increase among McCain supporters. Not surprisingly, comparative data from the 
contested 2000 election showed a spike in protest activity among both Bush II and Gore 
supporters. In sum, results on participation were mixed but revealed more of an 
oppositional thesis, in other words, more of a negative Obama Effect on participation 
than a positive one. It is important to keep in mind the relative nature of the analysis here, 
given that even Obama supporters showed increases in these types of participation, just 
not as large as those for supporters of McCain and other candidates from previous 
election cycles.   
It seems safe to say, based on my quantitative analyses, that there was not a 
positive, unique, and lasting Obama Effect in any overarching sense regarding the 
attitudes and behaviors of his supporters. Certainly the election was not transformative in 
the sense that the Obama campaign hoped. If anything, his opponents appeared to be 
emboldened more than his supporters when it came to thinking they could affect 
government. He did not inspire heightened turnout among his supporters in the 2010 
   	
  	  

 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attending meetings and protests during those two years after the election.  
Within the chapter on 2008 Obama campaign volunteers, I found that former 
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category). Volunteers gave overwhelmingly positive assessments of President Obama in 
that summer after his 2012 reelection, but the vast majority also qualified their praise by 
expressing certain frustrations. The most common frustration expressed was with 
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congressional Republicans who were viewed as universally obstructionist toward any 
proposal by made by President Obama. While many expressed frustration with systems 
of checks and balances and divided government that disallowed Obama from enacting 
parts of his agenda, most also expressed some awareness of and sympathy for Obama 
constraints. Many volunteers mentioned that he had been put in an impossible political 
situation, citing circumstances such as the economic crisis and the two ongoing wars. Yet 
quite a few volunteers did lay partial blame for their disappointment squarely on 
  shoulders. Some were displeased with his handling of the NSA or the 
Affordable Care Act or other individual issues, while others thought he was right on the 
issue(s) but too eager to compromise. This latter group wanted him to fight harder to 
defend his positions instead of, as they perceived it, giving in to his political opponents.  
Almost all volunteers I interviewed had voted in 2010 and 2012, with the vast 
majority viewing voting as a duty or responsibility. Most of them participated in politics 
in other ways, if not by volunteering for a campaign, then through social media, bumper 
stickers, and the like. Several had even worked in politics. In terms of direct mobilization 
efforts, it seemed the 2012 Obama campaign contacted many of these Indiana volunteers 
only by mass email and not with personal outreach; nonetheless, several became involved 
with the 2012 campaign as staffers or volunteers.  
More broadly, in the area of participation I saw what appeared to be some clear 
evidence of a positive and lasting Obama Effect on many of these young volunteers. Yet 
when it came to the other type of participation I asked about, non-political civic 
engagement, a lasting Obama Effect seemed to be largely absent. The group was not 
nearly as civically engaged outside of politics as I might have expected, with only half 
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the group having joined even 1 organization or association in the past 5 years. When 
professional organizations were discounted, that figure dropped to about one-third. Most 
of them had volunteered in some non-political capacity at some point in the past 5 years, 
but only a few spoke about volunteering as a core part of their lives or identities.  
   	
  to many specific questions, I did hear what 
sounded like a positive and unique and lasting Obama Effect. Surely if the (anecdotal) 
responses to my final survey question are indication, many or even most of them would 
claim that the 2008 Obama campaign had some kind of transformational impact on their 
lives. Yet at the aggregate level, for most questions under analysis I could not make this 
argument even for my sample of interviewees, let alone for the national population that 
was sampled for the ANES panels. The data was often mixed and sometimes even 
pointed to a negative Obama Effect.  
Very rarely did I find any clear evidence of a positive, lasting, and unique Obama 
Effect. Only in a few instances were my original hypotheses of significant and positive 










































found that even for the historic Obama campaign, even with a candidate who won a 
landslide victory, even with a campaign that broke all previous fundraising and 
volunteerism records, it was not possible to produce that kind of transformative impact on 
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